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Abstract 
 
 
The limitations of the current civil aviation surveillance systems include a lack of coverage in some 
areas and low performance in terms of accuracy, integrity, continuity and availability particularly in 
high density traffic areas including airports, with a negative impact on capacity and safety. 
Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) technology has been proposed to address 
these limitations by enabling improved situational awareness for all stakeholders and enhanced 
airborne and ground surveillance, resulting in increased safety and capacity. In particular, its 
scalability and adaptability should facilitate its use in general aviation and in ground vehicles. This 
should, in principle, provide affordable, effective surveillance of all air and ground traffic, even on 
airport taxiways and runways, and in airspace where radar is ineffective or unavailable. 
 
The success of the progressive implementation of ADS-B has led to numerous programmes for its 
introduction in other parts of the World where the operational environment is considerably different 
from that of Australia. However, a number of critical issues must be addressed in order to benefit 
from ADS-B, including the development and execution of a safety case that addresses both its 
introduction into legacy and new systems’ operational concepts, the latter including the Single 
European Sky (SES) / Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) and the US’ Next Generation Air 
Transportation System (NexGEN). This requires amongst others, a good understanding of the 
limitations of existing surveillance systems, ADS-B architecture and system failures and its interfaces 
to the existing and future ATM systems. Research on ADS-B to date has not addressed in detail the 
important questions of limitations of existing systems and ADS-B failure modes including their 
characterisation, modelling and assessment of impact. The latter is particularly important due to the 
sole dependency of ADS-B on GNSS for information on aircraft state and its reliance on 
communication technologies such as Mode-S Extended Squitter, VHF Data Link Mode-4 (VDLM4) or 
Universal Access Transceiver (UAT), to broadcast the surveillance information to ground-based air 
traffic control (ATC) and other ADS-B equipped aircraft within a specified range, all of which increase 
complexity and the potential for failures. 
 
This thesis proposes a novel framework for the assessment of the ADS-B system performance to 
meet the level of safety required for ground and airborne surveillance operations. The framework 
integrates various methods for ADS-B performance assessment in terms of accuracy, integrity, 
continuity, availability and latency, and reliability assessment using probabilistic safety assessment 
methods; customized failure mode identification approach and fault tree analysis. Based on the 
framework, the thesis develops a failure mode register for ADS-B, identifies and quantifies the 
impact of a number of potential hazards for the ADS-B. Furthermore, this thesis identifies various 
anomalies in the onboard GNSS system that feeds aircraft navigation information into the ADS-B 
system. Finally, the thesis maps the ADS-B data availability and the quantified system performance 
to the envisioned airborne surveillance application’s requirements. The mapping exercise indicates 
that, the quantified ADS-B accuracy is sufficient for all applications while ADS-B integrity is 
insufficient to support the most stringent application: Airborne Separation (ASEP). In addition, some 
of the required performance parameters are unavailable from aircraft certified to DO-260 standard. 
Therefore, all aircraft must be certified to DO-260B standard to support the applications and 
perform continuous monitoring, to ensure consistency in the system performance of each aircraft. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Air transport is one of the fastest growing means of transportation. This is due to, amongst other 
factors, increased globalization and the freedom of movement of people and goods within and 
between regions. A long term traffic forecast conducted by EUROCONTROL (2010b) based on the air 
traffic in 2009, indicates an average annual increase of 4% in the European airspace till the year 
2030. This is corroborated by the International Air Transport Association (IATA, 2010) and Boeing 
(2010).  
 
The current Communication, Navigation, and Surveillance (CNS) systems that support Air Traffic 
Management (ATM), and in particular ATC, are at their operational limit (SESAR, 2008) and 
therefore, cannot accommodate the increasing traffic. This is particularly acute in the provision of 
the ATC services in low altitude, remote and oceanic areas. Limitations in the current surveillance 
systems include unavailability of services in oceanic and remote areas, limited services during 
extreme weather conditions and outdated equipment with limited availability of spare parts to 
support system operation (ICAO, 2000). These limitations have the potential to result in fatal 
accidents. For example, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) (Esler, 2007) predicts that there is 
a 13% chance of fatal accidents in a terrain-incursion accident in Alaska due to a limited surveillance 
service as a result of difficulties in siting radar in the area. 
 
1.1.1 Meeting the demand 
 
In order to meet increasing air travel demand and traffic, airspace capacity must be increased, which 
in turn depends to a large extent on the ATM/ATC technology and the capability of ATC and 
associated functions to manage the airspace. One way of increasing airspace capacity is to reduce 
the required separation minima between aircraft, which demands very high performance (accuracy, 
integrity, continuity and availability) of the navigation and associated functions of communications 
and surveillance. This is also conditioned upon three main factors; safety, environment and the 
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airport operation itself. Reducing the separation between aircraft to increase airspace capacity, 
without considering the constraints will cause an increase in the risk of collision.  
In order to overcome the limitations and to meet the future air travel demand, the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) established a special committee on Future Air Navigation Systems 
(FANS) to develop a plan and programme for future ATM. This introduced the Communication, 
Navigation, Surveillance and Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) concept (Whelan, 2001) as an 
improved ATM concept. According to Oliveira et al. (2009), the idea of the CNS/ATM concept arose 
from the existence of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) and Aeronautical 
Telecommunication Network (ATN). GNSS has the capability to provide the functionality of 
navigation to aircraft and aircraft positioning information to the ATC, while the ATN enables the 
exchange of all aeronautical information between various system users in a safe and efficient 
manner. As a result, a new surveillance technology referred to as Automatic Dependent Surveillance 
Broadcast (ADS-B) was proposed by the ICAO and is envisioned to fill the gaps in the current 
surveillance systems. In line with this, the FAA’s Next Generation Air Transportation System 
(NextGen) (FAA, 2010, FAA, 2012) and EUROCONTROL’s Single European Sky (SES) and its ATM 
Research (SESAR) programme (SESAR, 2012) recognize ADS-B as key to the respective goals to 
modernize the ATM operations and address the limitations in the current surveillance systems. 
 
1.2 Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) 
 
The Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) (2002) defines ADS-B as a function on an 
aircraft or a surface vehicle operating within the surface movement area that periodically broadcasts 
the aircraft/vehicle state vector and other information without knowing the recipients and without 
expecting acknowledgements as the system only supports one-way broadcast. The system is 
automatic in the sense that it does not require external intervention to transmit information. ADS-B 
is considered to be a dependent and cooperative surveillance system. The former is due to its 
dependency on aircraft navigation avionics to obtain the surveillance information. ADS-B is a 
cooperative system, because it requires common equipage for aircraft or vehicles to participate in 
the system. The ADS-B system has the potential to support surveillance services in the terminal and 
en-route airspace including remote and oceanic areas. According to Lester and Hansman (2007), 
ADS-B has the potential to increase capacity, improve efficiency, reduce costs and improve safety 
with its envisioned high performance. Furthermore, it should enable many new surveillance 
applications such as synchronized situational awareness (crew-crew, crew-ATC and ATC-ATC). These 
benefits have the potential to enhance the current operational paradigm of ATM in non-radar and 
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remote areas without jeopardizing the required level of safety. However, the close link between 
ADS-B and external systems such as GNSS and communication infrastructure increase its complexity 
with the potential for associated failures. Therefore, to accrue maximum benefit from ADS-B, a 
number of issues must be addressed before implementation (Boeing, 2009):  
 Identification of future operational needs. 
 Determination of surveillance requirements and the capability of ADS-B to satisfy them. 
 Establishment of ADS-B performance standards. 
 Development of the optimum architecture. 
 Establishment of ADS-B procedures. 
 Development of a roadmap, transition strategy and plan including operational incentives 
and mandates. 
 
However, safety underlies most of the issues above. ICAO envisages that the ADS-B system should 
resolve the problems faced in the current surveillance systems. ADS-B is designed to improve safety 
through enhanced surveillance coverage in non-radar areas, enhanced and common situational 
awareness to the pilots and controllers on the ground, and conflict detection on runways and 
taxiways in all visibility conditions. Therefore, ADS-B is critical to the requirement to accommodate 
increase in air travel demand in the future. However, despite few studies to date, the actual and 
practical level of safety of ADS-B is still to be analysed in detail and quantified. The issues with the 
state-of-the art are discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
 
In addition, research on ADS-B to date (ICAO, 1998c, Butcher, 2002, Vismari, 2005, Vismari, 2008, 
Vismari, 2011, EUROCONTROL, 2008c, EUROCONTROL, 2010c, Zeitlin, 2001), in particular, has not 
addressed in detail the important questions of limitations of existing systems and ADS-B failure 
modes including their characterisation, modelling and assessment of impact. The latter is particularly 
important due to the sole dependency of ADS-B on GNSS for information on aircraft state and its 
reliance on communication technologies such as Mode-S Extended Squitter, VHF Data Link Mode-4 
(VDLM4) and Universal Access Transceiver (UAT), to broadcast the surveillance information to 
ground-based air traffic control (ATC) and other ADS-B equipped aircraft within a specified range, all 
of which increase complexity and the potential for failures. 
 
Therefore, a comprehensive and rigorous safety assessment framework is required for ADS-B system 
to ensure that the system is acceptably safe to operate in any particular operational environment to 
support the ATC surveillance and aircraft flight navigation operations.  
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1.3 Aim and objectives 
 
Given the background above, the aim of this thesis is to quantify the safety level of the ADS-B system 
in its operational environment particularly in dense airspace by developing a comprehensive, 
rigorous and reliable safety assessment framework. Six research objectives have been formulated to 
achieve this aim: 
 Identify the deficiencies of current surveillance systems in supporting increasing air traffic;  
 Identify the capabilities of ADS-B to address the limitations of the current surveillance 
systems;  
 Develop a comprehensive, rigorous and reliable safety assessment framework for ADS-B; 
 Identify the failure modes of the ADS-B system, establish a failure mode register and specify 
failure models;  
 Assess and quantify ADS-B performance in an operational environment; and 
 Derive a mapping between ADS-B performance quantified and the required performance of 
the various applications to be supported by ADS-B. 
 
1.4 Research Methodology 
 
In order to achieve the objectives, a complete step-by-step research methodology is developed 
(Figure 1-1). The methodology describes the flow of the research, methods used (arrow from 
bottom), planned inputs (arrow from left), expected outputs (arrow from right) and the constraints 
(arrow from top) to accomplish each objective. The first part of the research mainly involves 
literature review supported by limited qualitative analysis to justify the need for ADS-B, including its 
capabilities. Each step is explained briefly in the following sub-sections. 
 
1.4.1 Deficiencies in the current surveillance systems to meet the future demand  
 
A detailed literature review is conducted on the existing surveillance system in Chapter 2. Based on 
the review, the limitations of the radar to support ATC in various operational environments are 
identified and verified by analyzing five years of safety data from Avinor, the Air Navigation Service 
Provider (ANSP) in Norway (Chapter 4). 
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1.4.2 Capabilities of ADS-B to close the gaps identified in the current surveillance system 
  
A detailed review of the ADS-B system is conducted in Chapter 3. The inputs are various technical 
documents from ICAO, RTCA, Original Equipment Manufacturers, and discussions with ANSPs (NATS, 
EUROCONTROL). Based on the review, the capabilities of ADS-B system are mapped to the 
limitations in the radar system identified in Chapter 4.  
 
1.4.3 Develop a safety assessment framework for ADS-B 
 
Various existing safety assessment approaches for ADS-B system are reviewed, analyzed and the 
limitations are identified in Chapter 5. The limitations are addressed in the specification of a 
comprehensive, rigorous and reliable safety assessment framework developed for the ADS-B system 
in Chapter 5. The subsequent objectives are addressed using the framework. 
 
1.4.4 Failure modes, failure mode register and failure models for ADS-B 
 
ADS-B is an integrated system, relying on the navigation and communication sub-systems specified 
in Chapter 3. Hence, each subsystem has the probability to affect the ADS-B data integrity. 
Therefore, further literature review is conducted on each sub-system to identify possible failures. 
Furthermore, safety reports on ADS-B from various ANSPs such as Airservices Australia, Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) and NATS are reviewed and analyzed. In addition, analysis of ADS-B 
data and GNSS data from onboard navigation system analysis in Chapter 6 also contribute to the 
failure modes. As a result, a failure mode register is developed for ADS-B is Chapter 7. Each 
identified failure modes is mapped to its corresponding failure model. Finally fault tree analysis (FTA) 
is used to quantify the risks in Chapter 7.  
 
1.4.5 Assessment and quantification of ADS-B safety level in an operational environment 
 
A novel method is developed in Chapter 6 to assess the ADS-B system performance in terms of 
accuracy, integrity, continuity, availability and latency. The ADS-B data is obtained from the NATS 
ADS-B trial; the Cristal Project. Processes and formulae to measure the parameters are developed 
and explained in Chapter 6 in order to quantify the system performance.  
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1.4.6 Derive a mapping between ADS-B performance quantified and the required 
performance of the various applications to be supported by ADS-B 
 
The performance quantification values measured in the previous objective are mapped to the 
requirements of the enhanced airborne surveillance applications envisioned to use ADS-B as the 
source for the applications in Chapter 8. 
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Figure 1-1: Flow of the research, methodology used, planned input, expected output and the constraints to perform the task 
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1.5 Novel Contributions and Dissemination 
 
In order to achieve the objectives identified in section 1.3, the thesis has realised a set of novel 
contributions. These are listed below: 
I. As a result of identification and verification (safety data analysis) of limitations in the current 
surveillance system in Chapter 4, the thesis derives a set of taxonomy (causal factors for 
incidents due to limitations in the current surveillance system). Based on the taxonomy, the 
thesis further developed a causal model for incident/accident due to limitations in the 
surveillance system. The taxonomy provides a new method for ANSPs to categorize incidents 
while the causal model is useful for incident/accident investigations of the relevant nature. 
II. The thesis provides in Chapter 4, theoretical justifications for the use of ADS-B to overcome 
the limitations of the current surveillance system. This is important to realize the areas of 
improvements to enable seamless ATC services. 
III. The thesis develops in Chapter 5, a novel, comprehensive, rigorous and reliable safety 
assessment framework for ADS-B. The framework is important for implementation by ANSPs 
in collaboration with airline operators to ensure ADS-B safety. It can also be implemented as 
part of ADS-B monitoring to ensure ADS-B performance consistency. 
IV. The thesis develops in Chapter 6, a novel validation approach for ADS-B horizontal position 
performance using onboard navigation positioning information. The approach provides a 
reliable reference with significantly higher performance than the radar system with a 
constant update rate of one second, accuracy of +/- 6.3 meters and integrity level of 10-7. 
The approach enables the measurement of absolute errors accumulated in the ADS-B 
horizontal position beyond the onboard GPS receiver until it is received at the ground 
station (which includes errors in the avionics such as FMS, interfaces, ADS-B specific 
components, communication link and ground station) with the assumption that the GPS 
position is error free (based on the availability of SBAS, GBAS and RAIM integrity 
monitoring).  
V. The thesis further develops a novel correlation method in Chapter 6 to correlate the ADS-B 
data with the corresponding GPS data. This method is crucial to conduct horizontal position 
performance assessment particularly in terms of accuracy and latency. The correlation 
method is complicated by the non-deterministic pattern of the ADS-B data update rate and 
the differences between the horizontal position values in ADS-B dataset and GPS dataset. 
VI. The thesis in Chapter 6 develops a latency model and budgeting for the ADS-B Out system. 
This is important to improve the ADS-B position accuracy transmitted to the ATC. 
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VII. The thesis develops in Chapter 6, a mechanism to validate the ADS-B horizontal position 
integrity quality indicator (FOM/NUC/NIC) against the actual system performance. This 
mechanism is important to be implemented at the ADS-B ground station to ensure the 
horizontal position data integrity and hence safety, before being transmitted to ATC for 
operational use. 
VIII. As a result of rigorous ADS-B and the corresponding GPS data analyses in Chapter 7, the 
thesis identifies various anomalies in both systems that could affect the ADS-B data integrity 
broadcast to the users. It is important for the airline operators, ANSPs and equipment 
manufacturer to note and rectify these anomalies to ensure that reliable ADS-B data are 
transmitted to the users.  
IX. Based on extensive search and data analysis, the thesis develops a failure mode register for 
the ADS-B system in Chapter 7. The failure mode register is a living document, vital for 
system maintenance, failure observation, investigation and rectification.  
X. The thesis identifies and quantifies a number of risks as a result of the failure modes for 
ADS-B system in Chapter 7. This is important for the formulation and implementation of 
safety measures against the risks. 
XI. Finally, the thesis maps the ADS-B performance quantified in Chapter 6 to the requirements 
of various established applications to be supported by ADS-B In the future. This gives an 
overall picture of the system performance to the stakeholders. 
 
Based on the work in this thesis, several papers have been published and some are still in the 
process of publication.  
 Ali, B. S., Majumdar, A., & Ochieng, W.Y. 2011. Technological Evolution - A Paradigm Shift in 
Future ATC based on ADS-B. 1st International Conference on Application and Theory of 
Automation in Command and Control Systems (ATACCS). Barcelona, Spain, May 26-27 2011. 
 
 Ali, B. S., Schuster, W., Ochieng, W. Y. & Majumdar, A. 2013. A Study of ADS-B Data 
Evaluation and Related Problems. 2013 International Technical Meeting, Institute of 
Navigation. San Diego, Calfornia, USA. 
 
 Ali, B. S., Majumdar, A., Ochieng, W. Y. & Schuster, W. 2013. ADS-B: The Case for London 
Terminal Manoeuvring Area (LTMA). Tenth USA/Europe Air Traffic Management Research 
and Development Seminar (ATM2013). Chicago, USA. 
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 Ali, B. S., Schuster, W., Ochieng, W. Y. & Majumdar, A. 2013. Framework for ADS-B 
Performance Assessment: the London TMA Case Study. Journal of Institute of Navigation 
(Resubmitted following review). 
 
 Ali, B. S., Majumdar, A., Ochieng, W. Y. & Schuster, W. 2013. ADS-B System Failure Modes 
and Models. Journal of Navigation (Resubmitted following review). 
 
 Ali, B. S., Majumdar, A., Ochieng, W. Y. & Schuster, W. 2013. A safety assessment framework 
for the Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) system. Reliability Engineering 
& System Safety (In-press). 
 
1.6 Thesis structure 
 
This thesis is organized into nine chapters according to the research objectives. Each chapter is 
divided into subsections, starting with a brief introduction and ending with a summary.  
 
Chapter Two: Communication, Navigation and Surveillance Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) 
This chapter describes the role of Communication, Navigation and Surveillance systems to support 
Air Traffic Management (ATM), highlighting various current surveillance technologies, and analysing 
the advantages and disadvantages of each technology to accommodate the increasing air traffic by 
reducing the separation between aircraft.  
 
Chapter Three: Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B)  
This chapter introduces a new surveillance technology: Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast 
(ADS-B), including requirements (operational and system) and architecture (functional and physical). 
It also reviews the system implementation progress worldwide.  
 
Chapter Four: Limitations of the current surveillance systems and the potential of ADS-B 
This chapter identifies and analyses the limitations in the current surveillance systems (identified in 
Chapter Two) using safety data analysis, develops a taxonomy (causal factors) and a causal model for 
incidents/accidents due to the limitations, and finally maps the causal factors derived to the 
capabilities of ADS-B (identified in Chapter Three) to close the gaps. 
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Chapter Five: Safety Assessment Framework for ADS-B 
This chapter reviews existing ADS-B safety assessment approaches and safety cases by various 
ANSPs. Due to the limitations identified in the existing approaches, a novel, comprehensive, rigorous 
and reliable safety assessment framework is developed to assess and quantify ADS-B performance. 
The framework is used to underpin the work in the next two chapters.  
 
Chapter Six: Performance Based Safety Assessment (PBSA) 
This chapter presents the methods and algorithms developed to compute each performance 
parameters (accuracy, integrity, continuity, availability, latency) using real time data, and identifies 
the potential factors that affect the performances, and anomalies in the data with the potential to 
cause failure and significantly affect performance results.  
 
Chapter Seven: Fault Based Safety Assessment (FBSA)  
This chapter develops a method to identify failure modes for ADS-B, identifies the failure modes, 
categorizes the failures into classes, specifies a model for each class and finally quantifies the risks to 
the hazards identified as the result of the failures using Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). 
 
Chapter Eight: ADS-B as the source for Enhanced Surveillance Application 
In this chapter real data performance quantified in Chapter Six is used to validate ADS-B as the 
source for the various enhanced surveillance applications by mapping the performance to the 
application requirements. The output of the mapping is discussed.  
 
Chapter Nine: Conclusion and Recommendations 
This chapter presents the conclusion of the research, recommendations and suggestions for the 
future work. 
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Chapter 2  
Communication, Navigation and Surveillance Air Traffic Management 
(CNS/ATM) 
 
 
This Chapter introduces the concept of Communication, Navigation and Surveillance Air Traffic 
Management (CNS/ATM) and contributes to the achievement of the first research objective; ‘to 
identify the limitation in the current surveillance systems’ in several ways. Firstly it highlights the 
role of the CNS systems in ATM. Air Traffic Management is achieved through the collaborative and 
integration of humans, information, technology, facilities and services, and supported by CNS 
capabilities that are dependent on each other (ICAO, 2006c). Secondly, it discusses in detail the need 
for surveillance systems of Air Traffic Control (ATC) operations. Thirdly the Chapter sets the scene for 
the analysis of the limitations in the current surveillance systems, for further analysis in Chapters 3 
and 4. The Chapter also discusses the separation management concept and the constraints to 
reducing the separation between aircraft. Finally the Chapter concludes with discussions on the role 
of new surveillance technologies in meeting the increasing demand for air travel and hence traffic.  
 
2.1 Background  
 
Conventional air navigation systems such as radars, Instrument Landing System (ILS), VHF 
Omnidirectional Radio Range/Distance Measuring Equipment (VOR/DME), used for airspace 
surveillance, navigation and communication are ground-based systems. However, these systems 
suffer from a number of drawbacks including accuracy limits, range and line-of-sight limitations, are 
site-critical, its requirement for many installations and considerable expense required for acquisition 
and maintenance. While significant advances have been made in hardware and software, the 
technology principle employed is typically more than 40 years old. Furthermore these systems are 
unable to evolve to meet increasing traffic demands around airports, and are difficult to implement 
over large parts of the earth for example, because of remoteness and inhospitable terrain. 
 
In 1983, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) gave the task of studying, identifying 
and assessing new concepts and technologies in the field of air navigation, including satellite 
technology, to a special committee. The Future Air Navigation Systems (FANS) Committee, gathered 
together aviation specialists from around the world. In such a global forum, these specialists 
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developed the blueprint for the system that would meet the needs of the aviation community well 
into the next millennium (ICAO, 1998a). The FANS concept, which came to be known as the 
Communication, Navigation and Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) system, involves a 
complex and interrelated set of technologies, largely dependent on satellites, in order to overcome 
certain limitations of the existing systems. 
By adopting an approach whereby satellites would play a major role in the communications, 
navigation and surveillance, the FANS Committee determined that States could substantially 
increase signal coverage over large parts of the earth with fewer infrastructures. 
 
ICAO in 1992 endorsed CNS/ATM as the sole Air Navigation Services (ANS) system for global 
application (ICAO, 1998b).  
 
2.2 Communication, Navigation and Surveillance /Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM)  
 
ICAO defined CNS/ATM as “Communication, Navigation and Surveillance systems, employing digital 
technologies, including satellite systems together with various levels of automation, applied in 
support of a seamless global air traffic management system” (ICAO, 2000). The aim of CNS/ATM is to 
develop a comprehensive and unified system to support the provision of Air Traffic Services (ATS) to 
meet growth in air travel demand with associated improvements in safety, efficiency and regularity 
of air traffic, providing the desired routes to the airspace users, and homogenizing the use of 
equipment in different regions. CNS/ATM is underpinned by a high level of automation which 
reduces the dependency on the human and eliminates the current constraints to optimise the 
airspace (refer section 2.7.2). The distinct features of CNS/ATM are (ICAO, 2000): 
 Mix of satellite and ground-based systems; which enable internetworking for data transfer 
of communication, navigation and surveillance systems from technical sites to operational 
units to provide complete situational awareness to controllers and pilots; 
 Global coverage; which enables complete ATC services despite the geographical structure 
obstacles; 
 Seamless; whereby continuous and reliable services are available without fail to ensure 
safety; 
 Interoperable systems; whereby the system is designed as redundant architecture to 
provide uninterrupted services; 
 Use of air-ground data link; which enables synchronised situational awareness to controllers 
and pilots; 
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 Use of digital technologies; to mitigate the limitations of analogue technologies such as 
noise interruption and adapt to new digital application systems; 
 Various level of automation; whereby more computer applications are used to aid 
controllers and pilots to perform the various job functions. 
 
Figure 2-1 depicts the paradigm shift in ATM technologies, from the current CNS systems to the new 
CNS/ATM systems that are a mix of satellite technology and the best of the line-of-sight systems. 
The new technologies have the potential to support advanced ATM applications such as Cockpit 
Display of Traffic Information (CDTI) (ICAO, 2003a) that provides situational awareness to pilots and 
In-Trail Procedure (ITP) (EUROCONTROL, 2009a) to give the aircraft more flexibility for efficient 
navigation especially in oceanic en-route areas. This in return, benefits the airlines in terms of fuel 
consumption and most importantly reduces the environmental effects (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2012). Detailed descriptions of the new supported applications are given in Chapter 
8.  
 
ICAO has developed a Global CNS/ATM Plan (ICAO, 2002a). Contracting states are to develop and 
implement a National CNS/ATM Plan (ICAO, 2000) based on the ICAO Global Plan. For a period, 
current technology systems will co-exist with CNS/ATM system until the transition to CNS/ATM is 
complete, an event planned for 2015. The main elements of CNS/ATM are addressed in the following 
sub-chapters. 
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Figure 2-1: Paradigm shift in ATM technologies (modified from (Vismari, 2005)) 
 
2.2.1 Communication 
 
People and systems on the ground must communicate with aircraft during all phases of flight. Good 
communications with timely and dependable availability are the cornerstone of operational safety 
and efficiency. Currently communication is primarily by means of voice. However, such analogue 
transmissions suffer from a number of shortcomings: they do not permit high rates of transmission 
of data and take up a great deal of valuable and diminishing frequency spectrum. This limits 
automation of routine functions and consequently the decision making process for both the pilots 
and controllers. 
 
In CNS/ATM systems, communications will increasingly be carried out using digital data links as these 
allow a high rate of data transfer, high reliability and integrity, improved frequency spectrum 
utilization and crucially, better interfacing with automated systems. There are two types of 
communication systems in place; air-ground communication and ground-ground communication. 
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The current air-ground communication system relies on Very High Frequency (VHF) , High Frequency 
(HF) and Ultra-High Frequency (UHF) analog data links (Radio Frequency) for en-route and terminal 
areas; and Aeronautical Mobile Satellite Service (AMSS) for oceanic and remote continental airspace 
(ICAO, 2000), while the ground-ground communication relies on VHF data link. According to 
(Hansman, 1997), the current flight procedures and route structures have been developed and 
named based on the voice communication capabilities over low bandwidth VHF and HF links, 
resulting in limited coverage. Figure 2-1 shows the evolution of the communication technologies.  
 
Future communication systems are based on digital data links such as High Frequency Data Link (HF 
DL), VHF Data Link Mode 4 (VDL-Mode 4), Mode-S Extended Squitter, and Universal Access 
Transceiver (UAT). Data link technologies enable uplink and downlink of 4 dimensional (4D) 
waypoints (latitude, longitude, altitude, time) and other data to pilots and controllers. Controller-
Pilot Data Link Communication (CPDLC) is an example of a data link application that relies on HF DL, 
VDL and satellite communication (SATCOM). The implementation of the digital data links has the 
potential to change the communication of control instructions in the event of analogue voice link 
failure (Hansman, 1997). Moreover, the analogue voice communication is prone to many limitations 
to the users e.g. limited coverage, accessibility, capability, integrity and security. The voice 
communication performance, based on the radio frequency can reduce due to interference issues, 
frequency congestion and noise. This can happen, even though there are specific aviation frequency 
bands allocated for the ATC use. In addition, due to the different accents of the pilots and 
controllers, voice communication can lead to misinterpretation of information, which may cause 
undesired incidents. Despite its limitations, voice communication via radio frequency is still the main 
mode of communication between pilots and controllers in the ATC environment. Voice 
communication channels are regarded essential for ATC, since they act as a backup during the worst 
case (unavailability of surveillance and navigation functions) to enable continuous air traffic services 
to the users. 
 
The implementation of enhanced modes of data link is envisioned to overcome the limitations 
discussed above. Therefore, the need for reliable digital data link technologies is crucial. However, 
the new digital communication technologies have to comply with the Required Communication 
Performance (RCP) (ICAO, 2006c) set by ICAO. The future communication systems in ATM are 
envisioned to be a mix of voice and data communication via high-speed digital data links. 
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2.2.1.1 Aeronautical Telecommunication Network (ATN) 
 
The first step in implementing CNS/ATM, is the establishment of an efficient networking system for 
the communication of different forms of data including; text, radar, graphics and voice. This requires 
the use of a combination of terrestrial and satellite based systems. The current system, the 
Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunication Network (AFTN), does not have the capability to support the 
future data requirements of CNS/ATM (ICAO, 2000). Therefore, ICAO proposes the use of the 
Aeronautical Telecommunication Network (ATN) that comprises of application entities and 
communication services. These make the ground elements, air-ground networks and airborne data 
networks interact via the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) Open System 
Interconnection (OSI) reference model based protocol and services interface (ICAO, 1999a). ICAO 
has standardized the following data links in the context of ATN (ICAO, 1999c): 
 Aeronautical Mobile Satellite Service (AMSS), using satellites for communication, both 
geostationary and non-geostationary satellites, allowing communication by voice and data 
on a global range. 
 VHF Datalink (VDL), using techniques of data communication in VHF bands. They are of 
types; Mode 2, Mode 3 and Mode 4 with differentiation by their characteristics of 
modulation, control for access to the physical environment and, especially, data transfer 
rates. 
 Mode S Extended Squitter, using the Mode S SSR ability to communicate data in a 
bidirectional manner between air and ground elements with nominal rates of 4Mbits/s 
(uplink) and 1Mbits/s (downlink) (ICAO, 1998b). 
 Universal Access Transceiver (UAT), a broadcast data link operating on 978 MHz, with a 
modulation rate of 1.041667 Mbps (ICAO, 2009b). 
 HF Data Link (HFDL) which is the union between the characteristics of long-range 
electromagnetic propagation in the HF spectrum and digital data modulation, providing data 
communication in remote areas. 
 
Vismari (2007) illustrates the CNS/ATM communication environment based on the ATN in Figure 2-2. 
ICAO categorized the application entities (AE), which are the functionalities of the ATN used by end 
systems (ES) in the air traffic system into air-ground application entity and ground-ground 
application entity (ICAO, 1999a). The air-ground AE enables communication between ES in the 
ground (ATS units) and ES in the air (aircraft). Examples of applications in this category are the:  
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 Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B), which provides the aircraft position 
and other important information to the ES;  
 Controller-Pilot Data Link Communication (CPDLC), which provides the ability to establish a 
peer-to-peer message communication between pilots and controllers;  
 Flight Information Services (FIS), which allows pilots to request and receive flight information 
services; and  
 Traffic Information Service Broadcast (TIS-B), which transmits radar surveillance information 
from the ground to the aircraft in the air. 
 
The ground-ground AE allows communication between ES in the ground (ATS units). The AE in this 
category are the ATS Message Handling Service (ATSMHS), enabling the exchange of messages 
between ATS end users; and the Inter-Communication Center (ICC), which provides message 
communication between ATS centers for notification, coordination, and transfer of control activities. 
 
An application developed based on the ATN, is the SESAR’s and NextGen’s System Wide Information 
Management (SWIM) (SESAR Joint Undertaking, 2011). SWIM is a holistic approach enabling 
information sharing including flight information, weather, aeronautical information and surveillance 
information among the stakeholders and the airspace users using a secure and flexible system (an 
intranet). SWIM infrastructure is interoperable (ground/ground and air/ground) over which the data 
are distributed. Its data communication link may differ from one user to another depending on 
available facilities. For SESAR’s SWIM, the PAN European Network System (PENS) will provide the 
ground/ground data link. 
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Figure 2-2: CNS/ATM Communication Environment (modified from (Vismari, 2007)) 
 
2.2.1.2 Required Communication Performance (RCP) 
 
The communication function is one of the important elements of the ICAO’s Future Navigation 
System – FANS concept (ICAO, 2007e). The Required Communication Performance (RCP) concept 
ensures that the communication system performance implemented within the ATM system is 
acceptably safe and reliable to operate in the ATM operational environment. It also includes the ATC 
ground equipment and aircraft equipage requirements for communication. The RCP concept is 
applicable to any communication capabilities to support the ATM functions despite technology type. 
Hence the concept can be applied to any new communication technology. The RCP concept assesses 
operational communication in the context of an ATM function, taking into account human 
interactions, procedures, and environmental characteristics (ICAO, 2006c). According to National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the concept enables diverse communication 
technologies to be measured in terms of communication process time (i.e. delay), integrity, 
availability, and continuity of function (NASA, 2000). Therefore the concept provides means to 
quantify the communication system performance, essential to ensure the system safety. However, 
accuracy in predicting the process time can only be attained through monitoring during continuous 
operation. The accuracy parameter is not provided under the RCP concept. 
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2.2.2 Navigation 
 
Navigation refers to the ability to determine the correct state of an object then to determine the 
course to steer and arrive at the next desired point (ICAO, 1998a).  
 
The current ground based navigation system consists of the use of VHF Omnidirectional Radio 
Range/Distance Measuring Equipment (VOR/DME), Non-Directional Beacon (NDB) and Long-Range 
Navigation (LORAN) for area navigation (RNAV) while Instrument Landing System (ILS) and 
Microwave Landing System (MLS) are used for precision approaches and landing (ICAO, 2000). In 
addition to these, ground navigation aids also include: Aeronautical Ground Lighting (AGL) system 
(e.g. status of runway, taxiway lighting panel), warning system (e.g. runway in use), internal lighting, 
meteorological equipment status, and alarming and reporting systems. Despite the system’s good 
performance, a small number of significant deviations from cleared tracks still occur. These are 
mainly due to human error such as ATC loop errors (e.g. ATC issues incorrect clearance or flight crew 
misunderstands clearance message) or on-board navigation system error (ICAO, 1990). Onboard 
navigation systems include Inertial Navigation System (INS) and the Global Positioning System (GPS) 
and its augmentations. These systems are described in detail in Chapter 3. The evolution of the 
current navigation systems is shown in Figure 2-1.  
 
Improvements in navigation in CNS/ATM systems include the progressive use of Global Navigation 
Satellite Systems (GNSS), which provides world-wide coverage. It enables the aircraft to determine 
its own position on-board, from the information, broadcast by the GNSS satellites. This advancement 
is envisaged to provide more flexibility to the pilot and to reduce the air traffic controller’s workload. 
The availability of new GNSS constellations (e.g Galileo) and the further development of 
augmentation means (Aircraft based augmentation system (ABAS), Ground based augmentation 
system (GBAS), Satellite based augmentation system (SBAS)) will improve the accuracy, availability 
and the integrity of the navigation signal thus allowing enhanced positioning services in all phases of 
flight, including the airport surface (SESAR, 2008). For example, surface navigation based on GBAS 
(using enhanced positioning based on Galileo/GPS L5) should enable aircraft to navigate 
autonomously on the ground to the gate. The GNSS concept is explained further in Chapter 3. 
2.2.2.1 Required Navigation Performance (RNP) 
 
The need for the optimum utilization of airspace, which in turn depends on very high performance 
navigation systems, has resulted in the concept of Required Navigation Performance (RNP) by ICAO. 
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The RNP is the navigation specification that includes a requirement for on-board navigation 
performance monitoring and alerting to enable an aircraft to fly a specific path between two three-
dimensionally defined points in space. The RNP (ICAO, 1999b) concept applies to navigation 
performance within airspace; hence it covers both the airspace and aircraft that fly within it. The 
purpose of the RNP is to characterize airspace through the navigation performance accuracy value to 
be achieved within the airspace. Accuracy was the only parameter used to quantify the RNP 
characterization in the beginning. According to ICAO, navigation performance accuracy is based on 
the combination of the navigation sensor error, airborne receiver error, display error and flight 
technical error (ICAO, 1999b). It refers to the level of accuracy required for a given block of airspace 
and/or a specific instrument procedure, e.g. a RNP of 10 means that a navigation system must be 
able to calculate its position to within a circle with a radius of 10 nautical miles. The level of RNP that 
an aircraft is capable of determines the separation required between it and other aircraft. Hence, 
the RNP values have to be more stringent for dense airspace, around noise sensitive areas or terrain 
areas compared to oceanic airspace. 
 
The RTCA extended the RNP definition to include integrity, continuity and availability (RTCA, 1998). It 
was then known as Required Navigation Performance for Area Navigation (RNP-RNAV). The 
difference between RNP and area navigation (RNAV) is that the RNAV is a navigation specification 
that does not include a requirement for on-board navigation performance monitoring and alerting. 
 
In order to implement a more practical navigation specification, ICAO developed the Performance 
Based Navigation (PBN). PBN specifies that the aircraft RNP and RNAV system performance 
requirements to be defined in terms of accuracy, integrity, continuity, availability and the 
functionalities required to operate in particular airspace supported by appropriate navigation 
infrastructure (ICAO, 2008). The performance requirements are identified in the navigation 
specification, which also states the choice of navigation sensor and equipment that may be used to 
meet the performance requirements. PBN requirements depends on the ATC environment, 
communication, surveillance, navigational aids infrastructure, non-RNAV means of navigation 
available, functional and operational capabilities required to meet the Air Traffic Management 
application and the degree of redundancy required to ensure continuity of operations. The PBN 
provides specific implementation guidance in order to facilitate global harmonization. In this thesis, 
the term ‘RNP parameters’ will refer to accuracy, integrity, continuity and availability which are 
defined in Chapter 3. 
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2.2.3 Surveillance 
 
Surveillance, which refers to the methods used for keeping track of aircraft, is the third element of 
CNS/ATM. The surveillance function, whose implementation includes sensors, display system and 
operational procedures, provides air traffic controllers with the position of aircraft in order to 
perform separation management and to effectively manage a given airspace. Depending on the type 
of the surveillance sensor, additional information is presented also such as aircraft identification and 
velocity. Furthermore, the surveillance function supports a number of other applications such as 
trajectory prediction, conflict detection and situational awareness. 
 
Requirements for an Air Traffic Control (ATC) surveillance system depend on the applications. 
However, no single surveillance system is capable of meeting the surveillance requirements for all 
phases of flight in all types of airspace with traffic conditions that vary significantly from low to high-
density traffic terminal areas. The current surveillance system in use consists of: Primary Surveillance 
Radar (PSR), Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR), Monopulse Secondary Surveillance Radar (MSSR), 
Surface Movement Radar (SMR) and Multilateration (MLAT) systems. These technologies are 
explained in detail in the following sections. The evolution of the surveillance systems is illustrated in 
Figure 2-1. Recently a new surveillance technology called Automatic Dependent Surveillance (ADS), 
has emerged, and envisioned to support many new surveillance applications to meet the future air 
traffic forecasts. The ADS exploits the navigation and communication functions. The availability of 
different types of surveillance technologies provides flexibility to choose the most affordable and 
effective surveillance system suitable for the required operations, based on the operational 
environment. However, in order to maintain harmonization of the surveillance function, all the 
operational requirements have to be translated into a series of surveillance performance parameters 
irrespective of the surveillance technology. 
2.2.3.1 Required Surveillance Performance (RSP) 
 
The Required Surveillance Performance (RSP) is a set of well-quantified surveillance performance 
requirements such as capacity, availability, accuracy and update rate. Any single or combination of 
surveillance systems meeting the targets set for the parameters is considered operationally 
acceptable (ICAO, 2000). The only RSP document available to date is known as the Blue Book 
(EUROCONTROL, 1997), which is specifically meant for Primary Surveillance Radar (PSR) and classical 
Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR Mode A/C)). Therefore, it is not applicable to any new 
surveillance technology performance requirements. With the emergence of new surveillance 
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technologies, all surveillance systems in the European Union are legally obliged to comply with the 
Single European Sky Essential Requirement (ER), which states: 
 “Surveillance systems shall be designed, built, maintained and operated using appropriate 
and validated procedures in such a way as to provide the required performance applicable in 
a given environment (surface, TMA, en-route) with known traffic characteristics and 
exploited under an agreed and validated operational concept, in particular in terms of 
accuracy, coverage, range and quality of service. 
 The surveillance network within the European Air Traffic Management Network (EATMN) 
shall be such as to meet the requirements of accuracy, timeliness, coverage and redundancy. 
The surveillance network shall enable surveillance data to be shared in order to enhance 
operations throughout the EATMN (EUROCONTROL, 2008a)” . 
This high level requirement will be augmented by an Implementing Rule (IR), the Surveillance 
Performance and Interoperability Implementing Rule (SPI-IR) (EUROCONTROL, 2011d), which 
specifies how the essential rule is to be achieved. The SPI-IR is a legal requirement and includes 
regulations and general surveillance performance requirements for ADS-B OUT (explained in Chapter 
3). This implementing rule will remain in place until a generic global RSP is mandated by ICAO. This 
thesis adopts the surveillance performance requirements stipulated in this implementing rule. 
2.2.4 Air Traffic Management 
 
ATM is a broadly defined function that includes air traffic services, air traffic flow management and 
airspace management. Its objective is to keep aircraft separated and enable aircraft operators to 
meet their planned times of arrival and departure whilst adhering to preferred flight (ICAO, 2002a). 
Integration of the new CNS technologies into the ATM will enable Air Traffic Services (ATS) providers 
to improve efficiency. By being better able to both accommodate an aircraft’s preferred flight profile 
and reduce the minimum separation, aircraft operators and service providers could achieve reduced 
operating costs and minimize delays, while simultaneously freeing up additional airspace and 
increasing capacity. Figure 2-3 summarizes the benefits of the new CNS systems to the ATM. 
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Figure 2-3: A high-level view of benefits of the new CNS system to ATM (ICAO, 2002a) 
 
2.3 Impacts of evolution in CNS  
 
The paradigm shift in CNS, outlined in Figure 2-1, due to developments in technology, directly 
impacts the characteristics of ATM. Such impacts include the ATM system’s ability to effectively 
manage the separation between aircraft due to: an increase in the accuracy, integrity and reliability 
of surveillance data, the larger coverage area, a reduction of congestion in the communication 
channels and the potential for improvements in the detection and resolution of conflicts. The 
impacts of CNS will in turn change the aspects of the provision of air traffic control services, such as 
reduction in control instructions from the controllers as pilots will also be involved in a separation 
situation due to the same level of situational awareness. The evolution in CNS is also seen as a 
means to eliminate the constraints on the safe growth of air transportation. Despite the positive 
impacts, the evolution of CNS/ATM can also lead to unforeseen problems. Oliveira et al (2009), state 
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that the main challenge in CNS is the complexity of the technologies which can potentially introduce 
an unknown number of new failure modes. Therefore, it is crucial to assess and validate the safety of 
these technologies prior to their implementation to support safety-critical applications. The current 
relevant methods for safety assessment include evaluation of risk against threshold value (Absolute 
Method) (ICAO, 1998c), comparison with a reference system (Relative Method) (ICAO, 1998c) and 
safety assessment method based on Fluid Stochastic Petri Nets (FSPN) (Vismari, 2008). However, 
these methods have limitations in terms of quantification of risks and are thus sub-optimal. These 
methods are described and their advantages and drawbacks analysed in Chapter 5. 
 
2.4 Air Traffic Control (ATC) Surveillance Environment 
 
Air Traffic Control (ATC) Surveillance aims at identifying an aircraft’s or vehicle’s three dimensional 
position in space; which (identification), where (position) and when (time), in addition to providing 
other essential data (e.g. intent, velocity) to various ATM systems. 
 
2.4.1 The Need for ATC Surveillance 
 
Surveillance acts as the “eyes” of Air Traffic Control (ATC). The capability to accurately and reliably 
determine the position of an aircraft at a specific time has a direct influence on the separation 
distances required between aircraft (i.e. separation standards), and therefore, on how efficiently a 
given airspace may be utilized.  
 
In areas without surveillance coverage, where ATC is reliant on pilots to verbally report their 
position, aircraft have to be separated by relatively large distances to account for the uncertainty in 
the estimated position of aircraft and the timeliness of the information. Separation requirements 
between aircraft are discussed further in the subsequent chapters. Conversely in terminal areas 
where accurate and reliable surveillance systems are available and aircraft positions are updated 
more frequently, the airspace can be used more efficiently to safely accommodate a higher density 
of aircraft. It also allows aircraft vectoring for efficiency, capacity and safety purposes. 
 
ATC surveillance serves to close the gap between ATC expectations of aircraft movements based on 
clearances or instructions issued to pilots, and the actual trajectories of these aircraft (ICAO, 2007f). 
In this way it indicates to ATC when expectations are not matched, providing an important safety 
function. Surveillance therefore provides “blunder” (false position) detection. 
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The demand for increased flexibility to airspace users by reducing restrictions associated with flying 
along fixed routes requires high performance (accuracy, integrity, reliability) navigation capability on 
board the aircraft. Equally, accurate surveillance is required to assist in the detection and resolution 
of any potential conflicts associated with the flexible use of the airspace, which is likely to result in a 
more dynamic environment. This concept will be applied to enable In-Trail Procedure (ITP) 
(EUROCONTROL, 2009a), which allows a pilot to navigate flexibly in en-route and oceanic areas by 
having complete situational awareness. The ITP concept is explained in detail in Chapter 8. 
 
Surveillance is required to support automated alerting systems such as Short Term Conflict Alert 
(STCA) for the ATC function. Automated alerting systems are based on the principle that the ability 
to accurately track aircraft enables ATC to be alerted when an aircraft is detected to: 
I. deviate from its assigned altitude or route, or  
II. the predicted future positions of two or more aircraft conflict.  
Surveillance also supports minimum safe altitude warnings, danger area warnings and other similar 
alerts (ICAO, 2007f). 
 
Finally, surveillance is also used to update flight plans and improve estimates of future waypoints, 
thereby reducing the workload for pilots in providing voice reports on reaching waypoints to the 
ATC. Therefore, surveillance is a crucial element of air traffic control. 
 
2.4.2 Current ATC Surveillance 
 
Conventional ATC Surveillance is based on voice position reporting by the pilot to the controllers on 
the ground via radio communication. While manoeuvering in the oceanic area, the pilot has to 
report every 20 – 30 minutes to the controller within the control area via VHF or HF frequency, and 
then the controller has to repeat it for verification purposes.  
 
A generic ATC Surveillance system includes sensors (technology), communication links, a surveillance 
data distribution system, a surveillance data processing system, a surveillance data analysis tool, 
display, surveillance applications and users. Such a generic system is illustrated in Figure 2-4. 
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Figure 2-4: Generic ATC Surveillance System 
 
The main components in Figure 2-4 are: 
 Surveillance Data Distribution System – converts the data into a standardized format (e.g. 
ASTERIX) and then transmits the data to other equipment; 
 Surveillance Data Processing System – extrapolates plots to generate track state vector; 
 Surveillance Data Analysis Tool- analyses data performance; 
 Safety Net – tools meant to prevent imminent or actual hazardous situations from 
developing into major incidents or even accidents; 
 Flight Data Processing System – stores, displays and updates flight plan. 
 
Currently, surveillance systems provide controllers with the surveillance picture for their control 
area (sector). In the future, pilots will also have a similar surveillance picture on-board. Therefore, 
this advance will impact the current ATC operations. 
 
2.4.3 Surveillance Sensor Categories 
 
Surveillance sensor technologies can be placed in three categories; Non-Cooperative Independent, 
Cooperative Independent and Cooperative Dependent.  
 
The term ‘Non-Cooperative’ refers to the ability to detect the position of a target without relying on 
the response from the target to the transmitted signal by the sensor. On the other hand, the term 
‘Cooperative’ refers to reliance of the sensor on the target’s reply to the transmitted signal 
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(interrogation) to derive the target position. A piece of equipment (i.e. a transponder) attached to 
the target responds to the sensor interrogation. The transponder is a radio signal receiver and 
transmitter that receives at a frequency 1030 MHz and transmits on 1090MHz.  
 
The term ‘Independent’ refers to the ability of the surveillance system to derive a target’s position 
on its own, while the term ‘Dependent’ refers to reliance of the surveillance system on an external 
system to obtain the target’s position, e.g. dependency on a navigation system such as the Global 
Positioning System (GPS).  
 
Table 2-1 shows the categories of the existing surveillance technologies. Manual position reporting 
by the pilot to the ATC via radio communication is categorized as Cooperative Dependent, due to the 
fact that ATC on the ground is required to respond to the call in order to report the aircraft’s 
position. The pilot is dependent on the on-board navigational system such as GPS or Inertial 
Navigation System (INS) to obtain the aircraft position. In this case the pilot/aircraft acts as the 
surveillance system to transmit the aircraft position to the ATC. 
 
Table 2-1: Categories of existing surveillance technologies 
Surveillance Category Surveillance Technology 
Non-Cooperative Independent  Primary Surveillance Radar (PSR) 
Cooperative Independent  Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) 
Mode A/C 
 Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) 
Mode S 
 Multilateration (MLAT) 
Cooperative Dependent  Manual Position Reporting (voice) 
 Automatic Dependent Surveillance 
Contract (ADS-C) 
 Automatic Dependent Surveillance 
Broadcast (ADS-B) IN/OUT 
 
2.4.4 Surveillance System Performance Parameter and Characteristics 
 
A surveillance system may be characterized in terms of the following parameters (ICAO, 2007f): 
 Coverage volume – the volume of airspace in which the system operates to specification; 
 Accuracy – a measure of the difference between the estimated and true position of an 
aircraft; 
 Integrity – an indication that the aircraft’s estimated position is within a stated containment 
volume of its true position. Integrity includes the concept of an alarm being generated if this 
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ceases to be the case, within a defined time to alarm. Integrity can be used to indicate 
whether the system is operating normally; 
 Update rate – the rate at which the aircraft’s position is updated to users; 
 Reliability – the probability that the system will continue operating to specification within a 
defined period. This is also called continuity; 
 Availability – the percentage of the total operating time during which the system is 
performing to specification. 
 
The parameter values may differ for the various surveillance applications supported by the 
surveillance system during the different phases of flight. For example, more stringent values for the 
update rate and accuracy are required to enable enhanced separation in terminal areas compared to 
en-route oceanic areas. The performance characteristics of each surveillance sensor discussed in the 
previous section is given in Table 2-2. 
 
The same performance parameters can be used to assess different surveillance technologies. 
However, when applied to different technologies, the definition of the parameters may change 
slightly. The performance parameters for ADS-B system are defined in Chapter 3.  
 
Table 2-2: Surveillance Sensor Performance Characteristics (ICAO, 2007f) 
Surveillance 
Technology 
Coverage Accuracy Integrity Update 
period 
Primary 
Surveillance 
Radar (PSR) 
S-band  
60-80 NM 
 
L-band 
160-220 
NM 
In range : 0.1 NM RMS or 0.2 
NM 2 σ 
In azimuth : 0.15 degrees RMS 
or 0.3 degrees 2 σ  
No integrity 
report provided. 
 
4 - 15 
seconds 
Secondary 
Surveillance 
Radar (SSR) 
(Mode A/C) 
200 NM-
250 NM 
In range : 0.03 NM RMS 
In azimuth : 0.07 degrees RMS 
or 0.14 degrees 2 σ for random 
errors. 
No integrity 
report provided. 
 
 
4 - 15 
seconds 
Secondary 
Surveillance 
Radar (SSR) 
(Mode S) 
200 NM-
250 NM 
Same as SSR(Mode A/C) No integrity 
report provided. 
 
4 - 12 
seconds 
Multilateratio
n (MLAT) 
200 NM 10-500 meters No integrity 
report provided 
1 - 5 
seconds 
ADS-B 200 NM-
250 NM 
Determined by the aircraft 
avionics and independent of 
range from sensor. For GPS, 
95% less than 0.1NM 
Position integrity guaranteed to 
1*10-7 due to RAIM algorithm in 
avionics. Integrity value is 
downlinked in the ADS-B 
message. 
0.5 - 2 
seconds 
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2.4.5 Required Surveillance Applications 
 
Surveillance technologies are meant to make possible various ground and airborne surveillance 
applications (RTCA, 2002) to support air traffic control, airspace management and aircraft navigation 
in en-route, terminal and airport surface areas. Surveillance data from different surveillance 
technologies have different levels of quality and performance (i.e. accuracy, integrity, update rate). 
The capabilities of the surveillance sources are used as a baseline to develop surveillance tools to 
support the ground and airborne surveillance applications required. The surveillance applications in 
three categories are shown in Table 2-3. 
 
Another essential surveillance application to aid pilots and controllers to prevent imminent or actual 
hazardous situations from developing into major incidents or even accidents is called the safety net 
(shown in Figure 2-4 as part of ATC surveillance system). Safety net tools for preventing collision 
between aircraft or collision with terrain/obstacles are available for the controllers in the ground 
and for the pilot in the cockpit (Skybrary, 2011), including: 
 Ground-based safety net that uses surveillance data to provide warning times of up to two 
minutes. Upon receiving the warning alert, controllers are expected to immediately assess 
the situation and take appropriate action. 
 Ground-based safety net tools include: 
o Short Term Conflict Alert (STCA); 
o Area Proximity Warning (APW);  
o Minimum Safe Altitude Warning (MSAW);  
o Approach Path Monitor (APM). 
 Airborne safety nets provide alerts and resolution advisories directly to the pilots. Warning 
times are generally shorter, up to 40 seconds. Pilots are expected to immediately take 
appropriate avoiding action.  
 Airborne safety net tools include: 
o Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS); 
o Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS). 
The radar supports ground surveillance application tools (e.g. STCA, MSAW, etc.) for the air traffic 
controllers to manage the airspace and aircraft separation. The emergence of new surveillance 
technology with higher performance in comparison to the radar system enables the possibility to 
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implement new airborne surveillance application tools. These include the Cockpit Display of Traffic 
Information (CDTI), In-Trail Procedure (ITP) and Aircraft Separation Assurance System (ASAS) for 
improved aircraft navigation operations and self separation. In addition, new enhanced 
communication technologies (e.g. Mode-S Extended Squitter, UAT, and VDL-Mode 4) have also 
enabled other airborne applications such as Traffic Information Service Broadcast (TIS-B) and Flight 
Information Service Broadcast (FIS-B) for enhanced situational awareness.  
 
Table 2-3: Surveillance application categories 
Category Application 
Ground-based surveillance a) ATC surveillance in airspace with  
radar coverage 
b) ATC surveillance in airspace without radar 
coverage 
c) Airport surface surveillance 
d) Aircraft derived data for ground-based 
ATM tools. 
Airborne-based surveillance  a) Situational awareness 
 Enhanced traffic situational awareness 
on the airport surface 
 Enhanced traffic situational awareness 
during flight operations 
 Enhanced visual acquisition 
 Enhanced successive visual 
approaches 
b) Airborne spacing and separation 
 Enhanced sequencing and merging 
operations 
 In-trail procedure 
 Enhanced crossing and passing 
operations 
Other  a) Ramp control/gate management 
b) Noise monitoring 
c) Remote airport charges issuing 
d) Enhanced situational awareness of 
obstacles 
e) Search & Rescue (SAR), emergency 
response 
 
2.4.6 The Current Surveillance System 
 
The current surveillance system consists of the following: Primary Surveillance Radar (PSR), 
Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR), Monopulse Secondary Surveillance Radar and Multilateration. 
Each country or region implements the surveillance systems required by taking into account the 
technical performance, geographical structure, contextual environment and cost. For example, it is 
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much more cost effective to implement Multilateration instead of SSR as both have a similar 
requirement on the aircraft to have a Mode-S transponder onboard, a mandatory requirement by 
ICAO. The Multilateration sensors are more flexible and cheap as they can be installed on existing 
infrastructures while the SSR has to be installed on a piece of land and with the associated high cost. 
In the case of unavailability of surveillance sources, the Air Traffic Control Services are delivered 
using Procedural Control via radio communication. 
 
2.4.6.1 Primary Surveillance Radar (PSR) 
 
The Primary Surveillance Radar (PSR) involves a beam of energy that is transmitted through an aerial 
and reflected back from any aircraft in its path to provide information on bearing (azimuth) and 
distance (range) of the aircraft (Wassan, 1994). Unfortunately, the reflections may also be from fixed 
objects (e.g. buildings), which tends to create clutter (Aeronautical Surveillance Panel (ASP), 2007) 
causing uncertainty on the target display. The PSR ground station consists of a transmitter, receiver 
and rotating antenna. According to ICAO, the future use of PSR in en-route airspace is expected to 
reduce due to its high cost and the mandatory requirement for aircraft to be equipped with a 
transponder to support the SSR that has the capability to supersede the PSR. However, PSR is still an 
important technology for security purposes in both civil and military airspace, despite its inability to 
uniquely identify targets, their altitude and the need for the transmission of high power pulses that 
limit its range. PSR remains crucial in high traffic density terminal areas to provide surveillance of 
aircraft not equipped with a transponder and objects on the runways or taxiways. Figure 2-5 
illustrates PSR system operation.  
 
Figure 2-5: Primary Surveillance Radar (ICAO, 2007f) 
  33 
2.4.6.2 Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) 
 
The Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) sends out interrogation signals at 1030MHz from the ground 
station to each aircraft within its range (200- 250 NM) and then awaits a reply at 1090MHz from the 
aircraft transponder. The aircraft’s transponder responds to interrogations, enabling the aircraft’s 
range and bearing from the ground station to be calculated independently by the SSR (ICAO, 2004c), 
see Figure 2-6. The system provides an update rate of (4-12) seconds. The SSR requests two types of 
data from an aircraft transponder: Mode A/C or Mode S. Mode A data represents a four digit aircraft 
identity while mode C data represents aircraft altitude (Wassan, 1994). Mode S is an enhancement 
of mode A/C by the addition of the selective addressing of targets by the use of unique 24-bit 
address. It also provides a two-way data link between the ground stations and the aircraft for 
information exchange (ICAO, 2007f). The SSR overcomes all the drawbacks identified for PSR. 
However, it is unsuitable for aerodrome surface surveillance due to the accuracy limitations imposed 
by the transponder delay tolerance. An important achievement with SSR is the Mode S technology 
that will enable many new surveillance technologies to evolve in the future. For example, 
Multilateration technology was developed as a result of the Mode-S technology evolution. 
There are two classes of SSR in use currently (ICAO, 2007f): 
 Classical SSR - This SSR system relies on the presence or absence of the SSR transponder 
replies within the beam-width. Performance can be quite poor, particularly for azimuth 
accuracy and resolution. This type of system is also subject to significant multipath 
anomalies due to the poor antenna pattern. Range accuracy depends on the variability of 
the fixed delay in the aircraft transponder. 
 Monopulse SSR - The system measures the azimuth position of an aircraft within the 
horizontal antenna pattern using diffraction techniques. These techniques improve azimuth 
accuracy and resolution. In addition, these radars typically have large vertical aperture 
antennas and hence, are less subject to multipath effects. 
2.4.6.2.1 Transponder 
 
EUROCONTROL defines a transponder as the airborne radar beacon receiver/transmitter portion of 
the Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System (ATCRBS) which automatically receives radio signals 
from interrogators on the ground. It then selectively replies with a specific reply pulse or pulse group 
only to those interrogations being received on the mode to which it is set to respond 
(EUROCONTROL, 2011e). The transponder is mandatory equipment for the SSR operation.  
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2.4.6.2.2 Interrogation Modes 
 
The SSR has four modes of interrogation/reply: Mode A, Mode C, Mode S and intermode. Ground 
stations can either be Mode A/C ground stations, which can interrogate and receive replies only on 
Mode A/C, or Mode S ground stations, which can interrogate and receive replies on all modes. There 
are two classes of transponders: Mode A/C transponders and Mode S transponder. The former can 
respond to Mode A, Mode C and intermode interrogations only, whilst the latter can respond to all 
modes.  
 Mode A 
Mode A interrogation generates a Mode A reply from the aircraft transponder which is the 
individual aircraft identification (also known as callsign or squawk). This identification is used 
by the ATC for operational purposes. 
 
 Mode C 
Mode C interrogation generates a Mode C reply from the aircraft transponder, which is the 
encoded pressure-altitude (known as barometric altitude). Pressure-altitude is the reference 
for vertical separation in ICAO airspace.  
 
 Intermode 
Operational compatibility between Mode S and Mode A/C aircraft and ground elements is 
achieved by the use of intermode (all-call communication) and by the use of the lockout 
protocols. Intermode transactions allow Mode S ground stations to simultaneously 
interrogate both Mode S and Mode A/C transponders in order to determine the Mode S 
aircraft. Intermode interrogations also allow the ground station to ensure that it receives 
replies exclusively from either Mode A/C aircraft or Mode S aircraft but not both 
simultaneously. The lockout protocols permit a Mode S ground station to control a Mode S 
transponder after its address has been determined so that it replies only to particular 
subsets of the possible intermode interrogations (ICAO, 2004c).  
 
 Mode S 
A Mode S reply contains a 24bit aircraft address, altitude or other data depending on the 
request by the ground station and aircraft capability. Mode S interrogation and replies are 
protected by a robust error correction scheme to ensure high reliability information is 
transmitted to the ground. The Mode S transponder also has the capability to report 
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pressure-altitude in either 100ft or 25ft increments depending on the aircraft altimeter 
capability. 
 
Mode S SSR can be categorized into two levels; Mode S “Elementary Surveillance” (ELS) and Mode S 
“Enhanced Surveillance” (EHS). The difference between these two levels is the amount of 
information given to the ATC by the SSR with the respective capabilities. Europe has issued a Mode S 
mandate requiring all aircraft in certain airspace to be Mode S equipped (ICAO, 2007f). The 
European mandate also requires Mode S ELS or Mode S EHS, to be supported. 
Mode S Elementary Surveillance (ELS) provides: 
 Unique 24 bit aircraft address 
 SSR Mode A 
 Special Position Indicator (SPI) 
 Aircraft Identification (Callsign or Registration) 
 Altitude with 25ft resolution 
 Flight Status (airborne or ground) 
 Transponder Capability Report 
 Common-Usage Ground-Initiated Comm B (GICB) Capability Report; 
 ACAS Resolution Advisory 
 
In addition to that of the ELS, the Mode S Enhanced Surveillance (EHS) provides: 
 Indicated Air speed (or Mach Number) 
 Magnetic Heading 
 Vertical Rate (climb, descend) 
 Selected Altitude 
 Ground Speed 
 Roll Angle 
 Track Angle Rate 
 True Track Angle 
 
The Mode S capability provides more aircraft state information to the ATC on the ground, thereby 
reducing radio communication with the pilot. However, not all the information is displayed on the 
controller’s working position. The controllers can choose the information required on the display to 
perform their tasks. Apart from that, the transponder technology evolution (specifically Mode S) has 
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encouraged the emergence of new surveillance technologies such as Multilateration and ADS-B. In 
addition, the safety net tool on-board, ACAS, also emerged as a result of this technology. 
 
Figure 2-6: Secondary Surveillance Radar (ICAO, 2007f) 
 
2.4.6.3 Surface Movement Radar (SMR) 
 
The Surface Movement Radar (SMR), also known as Airport Surface Detection Equipment (ASDE), is 
primary radar intended for aerodrome surface surveillance. Similar to the PSR technology concept, 
the SMR technology detects all objects within its range without uniquely identifying a target. The 
system provides a one-second update rate and raw digitized video to the surveillance data processor 
(ICAO, 2004a). The raw video is processed and displayed on an ATC screen for monitoring purposes. 
The system also faces signal attenuation problems during heavy rain or snow, which causes 
displayed targets to fade on the ATC screen. 
 
2.4.6.4 Multilateration (MLAT) 
 
The Multilateration (MLAT) technology relies on signals from an aircraft being detected by four or 
more MLAT ground stations to locate the aircraft. It uses the Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA) 
technique to establish surfaces which represent constant differences between the target and pairs 
of receiving stations and determines the position of the aircraft by the intersection of these surfaces 
(Owusu, 2003).The MLAT system is used as a surveillance tool for airport surface and terminal areas. 
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The MLAT system requires the aircraft to be equipped with a mode-S transponder. Fortunately, this 
is facilitated by the mandatory requirements of ICAO for aircraft to be equipped with a transponder 
to support the SSR technology. The MLAT sensor has coverage of 200 NM with accuracy between 10 
to 500 meters. The system accuracy depends on the geometry of the target in relation to the 
receiving stations and also the relative time of signal receipt. The system provides an update rate of 
(1-5) seconds. The only disadvantage identified with this technology is the need for a minimum of 
four ground stations to detect the signals from an aircraft to determine its location. 
 
2.4.6.5 Procedural Control 
 
Currently, most flights are planned via intermediate way-points rather than direct routes, hence 
limiting the opportunity to obtain changes to cleared flight profiles. This has an adverse effect on 
aircraft operating costs. Flights operating outside radar and VHF coverage at present are monitored 
on the basis of the current flight plan (air traffic control clearance) and the pilot-reported position 
(air-report). The flight plan describes the assigned route along which the aircraft is expected to fly. 
The position reports, transmitted via HF at relatively infrequent intervals, enable the controller to 
monitor the aircraft's progress for conformance to its air traffic control clearance (ICAO, 1990). The 
application of procedural ATC ensures an adequate level of safety, at the expense of optimal flight 
profiles and system capacity. However, the ATC services to aircraft operating in non-radar 
environments employ varying degrees of automation and use different procedures for controlling 
traffic. As a result, pilots are required to be familiar with the individual control aspects of all flight 
information regions (FIRs) their flights traverse. 
 
In order to maintain the required level of safety in the provision of ATC services, any surveillance 
systems deployed should co-exist with either voice or data communication service between pilot 
and ATC with at least similar levels of reliability (i.e. continuity) as assigned to the surveillance 
system. The two systems should be designed carefully so that no single point of failure can occur in 
both systems simultaneously. A single point of failure may occur by having a single power source for 
the ground remote stations or single links from the ground remote stations to the ATC Centre (ICAO, 
2010). In order to achieve the required level of reliability, redundant links on separate circuits need 
to be implemented. 
Based on the review of the current surveillance technologies in this Chapter, a number of 
advantages and disadvantages are identified and verified (based on safety data analysis and input 
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from Subject Matter Experts (SMEs)) in Chapter 4 .These disadvantages are a major obstacle to 
ensuring that the increasing air travel demand can be met.  
 
2.4.7 Limitations of Current Surveillance Systems 
 
Based on the review of current surveillance systems in the previous sections, the limitations of the 
systems are summarized: 
 The PSR is unable to uniquely identify targets and their altitudes. The system requires 
transmission of high power pulses to detect the target, which results in low coverage. 
 The Classical SSR has low azimuth accuracy and resolution. It is also prone to multipath 
effects. 
 The SMR is prone to signal attenuation which causes the target display to fade during 
extreme weather conditions. 
 The MLAT system accuracy is dependent on the geometry of the target in relation to the 
receiving stations and also the relative time of signal receipt. 
 All of the current surveillance systems are not suitable for remote and oceanic airspace due 
to difficulty in siting the sensors.  
 
2.5 Choice of Surveillance Technologies by Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) 
 
The need to have surveillance system is explained in section 2.4.1. However, in addition to the 
limitations identified in section 2.4.7, a number of factors and constraints impinge on the choices of 
surveillance technologies implemented by an ANSP in a particular State. This can be a single 
surveillance technology or combination of more than one technology. The factors and constraints 
are outlined below (ICAO, 2007f). 
 
2.5.1 Cost 
 
The cost of surveillance system is a major factor in the choice of surveillance technology due to the 
emergence of new surveillance technologies with significantly lower cost compared to the radar 
system. In many States, the availability of the lower cost systems has enabled surveillance in areas 
where it was previously uneconomical e.g. the implementation of ADS-B system in non-radar or 
oceanic airspace whereby it is very costly to have radar system installed and maintained. However, 
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when the chosen surveillance technology is of a cooperative nature, the system deployment also 
involves airline operators and the ANSP. Therefore, the issue of who bears the cost and who benefits 
also needs to be considered. 
 
2.5.2 Mixed aircraft equipage 
 
The level of equipage for aircraft that must navigate under particular airspace constraints limits the 
type of surveillance technology to be deployed. Non-cooperative aircraft can only be detected by 
primary radar while cooperative aircraft equipped with Mode S or ADS-B capable transponders, can 
be detected by SSR, MLAT or ADS-B ground receivers. Consideration should also be given to general 
aviation and military aircraft equipage flying over the airspace.  
 
A temporary solution for this environment is airspace segregation. The ANSP in a particular state can 
segregate their airspace such that equipped aircraft can operate in defined airspace whilst non-
equipped aircraft operate in a different airspace. 
 
2.5.3 Geography 
 
Implementation of surveillance technologies should also take into account the obstacles to radio 
propagation for any particular surveillance technology in the operational area. SSR Mode-S radar has 
a long-range capability due to its high gain antenna. It can support surveillance of upper airspace up 
to 250 NM if the geographical location is free from close obstacles (line of sight). Multilateration is 
particularly effective in areas with line of sight problems due to its ability and scalability to fill a 
smaller specific area of surveillance, where long-range radar is ineffective. The choice of ADS-B is not 
affected by geographic constraints and it fills the gaps identified in either radar or multilateration 
systems to provide surveillance coverage. 
 
2.5.4 Existing Ground Networking Infrastructure 
 
Availability of complete ground networking infrastructure in a particular ATC operational area makes 
it easier and cheaper to install ADS-B and multilateration ground stations. This provides an 
advantage when considering the implementation of these two surveillance technologies. However, 
in the case of ADS-B, aircraft equipage also needs to be taken into account. 
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2.5.5 Homogeneous Surveillance Infrastructure 
 
Despite the factors above, it is wise to choose a technology (from the same vendor of the current 
equipment of the existing system similar vendor) that can easily integrate with the existing ATC 
system. This allows savings in engineering support, training, documentation management and 
system planning. In addition, there will be no upgrading cost of the current ATC system. For 
example, the Surveillance Data Processing System (SDPS) that supports multiple surveillance 
technologies results in both operational and cost benefits.  
 
2.5.6 Required Functionality 
 
Different surveillance technologies may be chosen depending on the functional needs. Each 
technology has different functional capabilities beyond the provision of aircraft position and altitude 
data. Mode S radar is able to provide information of selected altitude; a multilateration system is 
able to provide a precise position report independent of GPS; while ADS-B is able to provide a high 
update rate of a high accuracy velocity vector. In the case of ATC surveillance in dense traffic 
airspace, high update rate and high accuracy surveillance data are required to perform reduced 
separation. To support military surveillance needs, the use of primary surveillance radar is required 
to track unidentified aircraft in the airspace. 
 
2.5.7 Equipage Mandate 
 
The choice of ADS-B as a surveillance system depends on a particular State’s ability to mandate that 
for aircraft to operate in their airspace, they must be equipped with an ADS-B capable transponder 
or ADS-B emitter. The State’s ability to issue a mandate may depend on several factors such as cost 
as well as on political considerations. However, the choice of SSR, Mode S radar and multilateration 
systems has no constraint of mandate, as ICAO has made it mandatory for commercial aircraft to be 
equipped with Mode S capable transponders (ICAO, 2007f). 
 
2.5.8 Airspace Capacity Requirement 
 
As a result of increasing air travel demand (see Chapter1), airspace capacity needs to be increased. 
One method by which this can be achieved is by applying reduced separation standards and this 
requires high performance (accuracy, integrity, update rate) surveillance technology. At present, the 
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separation standards are stipulated in ICAO Doc 4444 (ICAO, 2007c) . However, these separation 
standards (3 nautical miles and 5 nautical miles) are based upon the utilization of PSR, SSR and 
Mode-S radar. Hence, the choice of surveillance technology should also be based on the new 
surveillance technologies; ADS-B and multilateration, which are envisioned for higher performance 
to support reduced separation.  
 
2.6 Surveillance Integration 
 
When more than one surveillance system is implemented in an operational area, the surveillance 
data from the different sensors need to be incorporated into an ATC system for both situational 
awareness and any ATC separation functions. According to ICAO, these can be done in three ways 
(ICAO, 2007f): 
 A separate ATC display for each surveillance system. However this approach is impractical 
for the air traffic controllers in performing their tasks. 
 A priority system is displayed and other sources discarded, with the priority source provides 
useable data. 
 A fully fused position calculation whereby data from different surveillance sensors are used 
to calculate the best estimate of aircraft position. 
The third approach, ‘data fusion’, is effective for airspace with redundant surveillance coverage and 
envisions generating higher accuracy position data. However the integrity of each position plot from 
each sensor has to be carefully checked to perform the data fusion process.  
 
Air Services Australia performed surveillance integration for airspace with MSSR and ADS-B coverage 
by providing different symbols on the ATC display for data from each sensor. Priority (rank) is given 
in this case to the sensors depending on its integrity level and availability in the surveillance area. 
 
2.7 Separation Management 
 
Aircraft separation is performed primarily to prevent collisions and also can assist to optimize the 
safe use of airspace. Currently the surveillance and the communication systems play an important 
role in aiding air traffic controllers perform separation management on the surface and in the air. In 
areas without surveillance coverage, for example, in oceanic areas and remote areas, ATC is 
dependent on the pilots reporting their position verbally via radio frequencies. Due to uncertainty in 
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the reported position and the low position update rate, the aircraft are separated by relatively large 
distances (Aeronautical Surveillance Panel (ASP), 2007). On the other hand, in the terminal area, 
where the surveillance systems are available, reduced separation can be performed. However, with 
the increasing demand for air travel, the current surveillance systems are unable to improve the 
separation in order to optimize the airspace capacity. Based on analysis (Joint Planning and 
Development Office (JPDO)-Air Navigation Services Working Group (ANSWG), 2008) of NextGen 
capabilities, implementation of ADS-B across the United States National Airspace System could 
provide 30% of capacity growth to achieve future traffic levels (three times the 2004 traffic levels). 
Table 2-4 shows the current separation management procedures in comparison to the future 
separation procedures with ADS-B in place. 
 
Table 2-4: Current and Future Separation Management 
Current Separation Procedures Future Separation Procedures (ADS-B) 
 Use single sensor reported position 
and correlation with primary data 
 Position information from Global 
Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) via 
ADS-B 
 
 Update rate 4.5s-12s  Update rate 1s-2s 
 
 Aircraft velocity is estimated from the 
history of reported position 
 Real time aircraft velocity from modern 
Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) 
system via ADS-B 
 
  Trajectory based operation and delegated 
separation procedures introduced. 
 
2.7.1 Use of ATC Surveillance System for Separation 
 
Surveillance systems such as PSR, SSR and ADS-B may be used either alone or in combination in the 
provision of air traffic control services, including provision of separation between aircraft, provided 
that (ICAO, 2007c): 
 reliable coverage exists in the area; 
 probability of detection, accuracy and integrity of the surveillance systems are satisfactory; 
and 
 in the case of ADS-B, the availability of the data from participating aircraft is adequate. 
In addition to this, safety assessment of the surveillance systems is crucial before it can be used to 
provide separation. Since the focus of this thesis is the ADS-B system, further requirements of the 
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system to aid aircraft separation are discussed in Chapter 3. These requirements are tested and 
validated using real time ADS-B data in Chapter 6. 
 
2.7.2 Constraints to Separation Minima Management 
 
In order to manage separation, a number of constraints need to be considered. 
 Human factors e.g. limitation on controller workload 
 Technologies (Communication, Navigation, Surveillance) e.g. availability of the technologies 
 Operational procedures e.g. approved reduced separation minima 
 Contextual environment e.g. extreme weather conditions 
 Ability of the Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) e.g. to provide required resources 
 
Hence in this thesis, the constraints caused by the limitations of the current surveillance 
technologies are discussed further, analyzed and a solution presented, in Chapter 4 based on the 
findings in Chapter 3. 
 
2.8 Summary 
 
The ability to meet increasing air travel demand is determined by a number of capacity drivers; the 
controller’s capacity, tools to aid the controller’s task, the extent of pilot’s situational awareness, 
aircraft capability and contextual environment including the weather conditions and airport 
capacity. In a structural interview with Harry Daily from the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), he argued 
that the ability of the ANSP to provide the appropriate level of air navigation services is also one of 
the critical factors in meeting the future air travel demand. The controller’s workload and task time 
directly impacts the number of aircraft that can be managed by them in their airspace. Hence, 
airspace capacity utilization depends on the capacity of the controllers to manage the airspace 
safely. Majumdar and Polak (2001) developed an approach to estimate the capacity of European 
airspace by simulating the air traffic controller’s workload. However, the controller’s workload can 
be improved by having reliable and accurate tools to assist the controller’s tasks.  
 
In addition, shared surveillance information between the controllers and pilots can enhance the 
situational awareness and reduce the procedural control. As a result there will be less 
communication between the pilot and controller. The enhanced situational awareness of the pilot 
also enables more flexible flight routings especially in oceanic airspace. This will reduce the flight 
  44 
time and enable a more economical flight by saving fuel. In addition, a more complete situational 
awareness onboard will also eliminate difficulties in navigation during extreme weather conditions.  
 
The ability of the surveillance and navigation tools to provide accurate aircraft position information, 
intent data, speed and the higher update rates will permit to set reduced separation minima. 
Consequently, airspace utilization can be optimized. In order to support the advanced tools and 
technologies, aircraft and airports have to be equipped with necessary equipment and 
infrastructure. As a result, a safe and efficient gate-to-gate operation can be achieved and the 
increasing air travel demand can be met. 
 
Therefore, in order to achieve these, the next chapter will introduce, discuss and analyze in detail a 
new surveillance technology (Automatic Dependant Surveillance Broadcast) recognized as the key to 
resolve most of the problems encountered in the current surveillance systems.  
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Chapter 3  
Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) 
 
 
This Chapter introduces the Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) system. It 
identifies the role of ADS-B in the global CNS/ATM, and reviews the requirement, system design, 
functionalities, implementation, as well as supported airborne and ground applications. 
Furthermore, it analyses the system’s strengths and drawbacks to support ATC surveillance. This 
chapter is the backbone of this thesis and feeds into the analyses conducted in Chapters 4, 6 and 7. 
 
3.1 Background 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, ICAO endorsed the Future Air Navigation System (FANS) CNS/ATM 
concept, which is largely based on the satellite technologies in 1992. ADS-B is one of the enablers of 
this concept, aimed to improve airspace capacity. It is envisioned to overcome the limitations of the 
radar system (discussed in Chapter 2 and verified in Chapter 4) and to modernize the ATM system. It 
is the key driver of the Single European Sky (SES) ATM Research (SESAR) and the USA Next 
Generation Air Transportation System (NextGEN) programs. 
 
3.2 Principle of ADS-B Operation 
 
RTCA (2002) defines ADS-B as a function on an aircraft or a surface vehicle operating within the 
surface movement area that periodically broadcasts its position and other information without 
knowing the recipients and without expecting acknowledgements as the system only supports one-
way broadcasts. The system is automatic in the sense that it does not require external intervention 
to transmit the information. It is characterized as dependent due to its dependence on aircraft 
navigation avionics to obtain the surveillance information. ADS-B is a cooperative system, because it 
requires common equipage for aircraft, or vehicles on the airport surface to exchange information. It 
provides aircraft state information such as horizontal position, altitude, vector, velocity and 
trajectory intent information. The latter is critical for trajectory prediction which is the basis of the 
trajectory-based operations concept of SESAR and NextGen.  
 
  46 
The ADS-B system architecture is divided into two subsystems, “ADS-B Out” and “ADS-B In”. ICAO 
(2003b) defines the term “ADS-B Out” as the broadcast of ADS-B transmissions from the aircraft, 
without the installation of complementary receiving equipment to process and display ADS-B data 
on the cockpit displays. The complementary subsystem is “ADS-B In”, which provides air-to-air 
situational awareness to the pilots. ADS-B Out has the capability to operate independently to 
provide air-ground surveillance services to the ATC. On the other hand, implementation of ADS-B In 
requires fully operational ADS-B Out as a pre-requisite, certification of cockpit displays, 
consideration of pilot human factors and other activities which have a longer deployment schedule.  
 
An ADS-B equipped aircraft uses an on-board navigation system to obtain the aircraft position from 
GNSS. The system then broadcasts periodically the position, velocity and intent data to other ADS-B 
equipped aircraft and ADS-B ground stations within its range via a data link service. The ground 
stations transmit the received ADS-B reports to a surveillance data processing system to process the 
data for ATC use. Figure 3-1 illustrates the ADS-B system. 
 
ADS-B Messages
ADS-B
GROUND
STATION
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FL 280
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FL 300
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Navigation
Satellite
System
ATC Display System
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and/or inertial navigation
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Figure 3-1: Automatic Dependant Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) (Owusu, 2003) 
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3.3 Key differences between Radar and ADS-B  
 
The main difference between radar and ADS-B surveillance is the means of determining the aircraft 
position and state vector information. As discussed in Chapter 2, radar determines the position from 
the travel time of a ground-emitted beam reflected by the aircraft and detected by the ground-
based station, independent of any aircraft systems. Aircraft speed, direction, turn rate and other 
state vector information are estimated from consecutive position reports. ADS-B uses position 
information and state-vectors computed onboard by the aircraft navigation system and broadcast 
this information via data link. The altitude information is obtained in both cases from an air data 
computer or barometric altimeter onboard the aircraft. The advantages and disadvantages 
(Aeronautical Surveillance Panel (ASP), 2007, ICAO, 2007f, Comsoft GmbH, 2007) of the ADS-B 
system are summarized in Table 3-1.  
 
Table 3-1: Advantages and disadvantages of ADS-B system 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Provides the same real-time information to 
both pilots in aircraft cockpits and ATC in the 
ground.  
As with any secondary surveillance 
technology, successful surveillance requires 
the cooperation of the targets. However, 
ADS-B not only relies on a functional 
transponder, but also on the integrity of the 
aircraft navigation system. If this fails, the 
aircraft will not be able to broadcast its 
position, or worse, it may broadcast invalid 
positions. 
Enables efficient airspace usage. 
 
It is relatively easy to broadcast fake ADS-B 
messages simulating non-existent aircraft. 
Both of these cases are broader, but not 
substantially different in risk from a classical 
secondary radar transponder reporting a 
wrong Mode-C altitude. 
ADS-B can be implemented rapidly for a 
relatively low cost compared to radar. 
For complete coverage, all potential targets 
have to be equipped with ADS-B capable 
transponders.  
Provides a much greater margin in which to 
implement conflict detection and resolution 
than is available with any other system.  
 
Since ADS-B messages are broadcast, they 
are available to all aircraft with the right 
equipment. Except for regulatory action, 
there is no way to restrict the availability of 
aircraft positions. This may lead to security 
issues. 
Enhance aviation safety through features 
such as automatic traffic call-outs or 
warnings of imminent runway incursion.  
It is totally dependent on aircraft avionics.  
ADS-B technology can be scaled and adapted The service outages are expected due to 
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Advantages Disadvantages 
for use in general aviation, ground vehicles 
and in airspace where radar is ineffective or 
unavailable.  
poor GPS geometry when satellites out of 
service. 
General aviation (GA) aircraft can use ADS-B 
datalinks to receive flight information 
services such as graphical weather depiction 
and textual flight advisories. In the past, 
these services have been unavailable or too 
expensive for widespread use in GA.  
The ground receiver sensors require 
optimum site with unobstructed view to 
aircraft.  
Reduced cost for ground station 
maintenance. According to the FAA 
(FirebirdV8, 2006) the maintenance cost for 
a radar station costs as much to maintain 20 
Ground Based Transceivers (GBT) for ADS-B. 
Signal jamming due to the use of same 
frequency (Mode S) by many systems such as 
SSR, TCAS, MLAT and ADS-B, particularly in 
dense airspace.   
 
Enables pilot to receive traffic information 
with aircraft identification, direction and 
relative altitude. 
 
Provides ability to change observation area 
along with option to take closer look on 
individual aircrafts. 
 
Reduces ATC workload.  
Increases situational awareness of the pilot.  
 
The disadvantages identified in Table 3-1 may contribute to failures of the ADS-B system. The 
failures may lead to either corruption or loss of ADS-B data. For example, signal spoofing may cause 
the onboard navigation receiver to estimate the aircraft position to be somewhere other than where 
it actually is or to be located where it is but at a different time. The corrupted navigation data will be 
transmitted to the ADS-B transponder, which will subsequently be broadcast to the users. This may 
impose a safety threat to the ATC and other aircraft navigation operations which rely on the ADS-B 
system. In addition, failure of the onboard navigation system may lead to loss of ADS-B position 
information to the users. Apart from that, security issue is also foreseen due to the nature of the 
ADS-B system, which broadcast aircraft information to all equipped recipients. This allows tapping of 
the surveillance information with harmful intention to the aircraft.   
 
3.4 ADS-B Infrastructures 
 
The system infrastructure includes ground and airborne infrastructures, that must be certified based 
on the ICAO/RTCA standards. Figure 3-2 and Figure 3-3 illustrate the avionics for ADS-B Out and ADS-
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B In. Table 3-2 and Table 3-3 show the ground and airborne components, their functionalities and 
the required standards. The aircraft equipage requirement for ADS-B differs according to the 
implementation of ADS-B Out and ADS-B In. The operational ADS-B Out is a pre-requisite for the 
ADS-B In implementation. Table 3-4 presents the requirements for both ADS-B Out and ADS-B In.  
 
To enable ADS-B equipped aircraft to operate in non-radar airspace, it has to be certified to 
Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) 20-24 standard (EASA, 2008) (airworthiness and operational 
approval of the “Enhanced Air Traffic Services in Non-Radar Areas using ADS-B Surveillance”). 
According to (Rekkas, 2013) the EU Regulation 1207/2011 applies to enable aircraft to operate in 
radar airspace. However, this regulation is not adopted globally. The aircraft included in this thesis 
are certified to AMC 20-24 (EASA, 2008) and operate in the London Terminal Area, one of the most 
dense radar airspaces in the world. 
 
According to the Surveillance Performance and Interoperability Implementing Rule (SPI-IR) 
(EUROCONTROL, 2011d), aircraft with airworthiness certification on or after 8 January 2015 are to 
be equipped with secondary surveillance radar transponders with the capabilities specified in Annex 
IV of the SPI-IR (forward-fit). While aircraft with airworthiness certification before 8 January 2015, 
are to be equipped with the same by 7 December 2017 (retrofit). The requirements stipulated in 
Annex IV of the SPI-IR enable full implementation of ADS-B Out by the aircraft operators. However, 
to date no regulation has been placed on the Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) to implement 
ADS-B ground infrastructures. It is expected that this rule will follow in the near future due to the 
need to implement ADS-B globally. 
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Figure 3-2: ADS-B Out avionics 
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Figure 3-3: ADS-B In avionics 
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Table 3-2: ADS-B Ground infrastructure components 
Components Function Standard 
ADS-B receiver  and 
antenna 
Receive ADS-B messages broadcast 
from aircraft 
ED-129 Technical Specification 
for 1090MHz Extended Squitter 
ADS-B Ground Station  
GPS Clock Time stamp received ADS-B 
messages 
ICAO Annex 10 
Communication Link Transmit message from ground 
station to ATC surveillance data 
processing unit 
Any form of secured dedicated 
private network connection such 
as lease line, fiber optic. 
ADS-B situational 
display 
Display aircraft position and state 
vector in a similar manner as radar 
Controller Working Position 
(CWP) standard similar to radar 
displays 
 
Table 3-3: ADS-B Airborne infrastructure components 
Component Function Standard 
Navigation Source (e.g. GPS) Derive and transmit aircraft 
position and state vector 
information to ADS-B emitter 
• TSO C-129A, TSO 
C-129 or TSO C- 
129A; or 
• TSO C-145/C-146 
or TSO C-145A/C- 
146A 
ADS-B Avionics (standalone box 
for UAT) 
*For 1090ES ADS-B, this 
function will be performed by 
the transponder (MODE-S ES 
transponder) 
Encode and broadcast  ADS-B 
message 
TSO-154c (UAT) 
TSO-166b(1090ES) 
Antenna  for ADS-B , 
Transponder, GPS 
 
To support ADS-B OUT, a single 
antenna at the bottom of the 
aircraft is required. 
To support ADS-B IN, antenna 
diversity is required, whereby two 
antennas; one at the top and one 
at the bottom of the aircraft is 
required. 
TSO-154c (UAT) 
TSO-166b(1090ES) 
Antenna Duplexer 
 
To enable one antenna sharing 
between transponder and ADS-B 
unit. 
 
Barometric Altimeter Generate aircraft altitude  
Altitude Encoding Altimeter Synchronize altitude information 
transmitted in the ADS-B message 
and altitude transmitted by the 
transponder 
 
Control Panel To enable pilot to key in or select 
aircraft identification, SPI, 
emergency pulse 
 
Flight Management System 
(FMS) 
To manage flight plan and 
connected to other avionics  
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Table 3-4: Aircraft equipage requirements for ADS-B Out and ADS-B In 
ADS-B Out ADS-B In 
Precision GPS Source- Standards vary 
worldwide but enhanced standards such as 
TSO-C145 or TSO-C146 will work anywhere. 
ADS-B Out system 
 
A transmitting radio- e.g. ADS-B qualified 
Mode-S transponder (1090ES) or dedicated 
ADS-B data radio (978 MHz), only used 
below 18K feet in the US airspace 
TIS-B data transmission at both 1090ES and 
978 MHz 
Simple Controls -Module to enter a squawk 
code and verify that ADS-B is working 
FIS-B graphical weather data is transmitted 
only at 978 MHz. The system is smart 
enough to know the exact location and 
provides a total weather map with 
prioritization around the current position. 
Data link - 1090ES data link is commonly 
referred to as “Mode S-Extended Squitter” 
or 978 MHz data link is commonly referred 
to as “UAT (Universal Access Transceiver)”. 
Receiver or transceiver for ADS-B In function. 
 
 
It is noted that ADS-B is highly dependent on navigation and communication systems. At present 
GPS is widely used and supported as the navigation source for ADS-B. Three types of data links are 
used in States; Mode S-Extended Squitter (1090ES), Universal Access Transceiver (UAT), and VDL-
Mode 4 of which 1090ES is the most widely deployed. 
 
3.4.1 On-board navigation source for ADS-B 
 
This section will focus on the GPS, at present the most widely used navigation source for ADS-B. 
However, it should be noted that there is no mandate on using GPS as the navigation source. Any 
on-board navigation system which satisfies the required standards is acceptable. 
3.4.1.1 Requirements 
 
The minimum requirements for the navigation source for ADS-B are specified in the Technical 
Standard Orders TSO-C129, TSO-C145, TSO-C146 and TSO-C196. According to the RTCA, all GPS 
equipment compliant with the ‘Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Global Positioning 
System / Wide Area Augmentation System Airborne Equipment’ are expected to satisfy the 
requirements for U.S. ADS-B applications.  
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The navigation source should have the capabilities to provide position accuracy (e.g. Horizontal 
Figure of Merit – HFOM) and integrity (e.g. Horizontal Protection Level (HPL) (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2010). In addition, the integrity level should be equal to or less than 10-7 per flight-
hour with integrity time to alert equal to or less than 10 seconds. The system is also required to be at 
least compatible with GNSS receivers that perform receiver autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) 
and fault detection and exclusion (FDE), along with the output of corresponding measurement status 
information, as well as integrity containment bound and 95% accuracy bound indications 
(EUROCONTROL, 2011d). 
3.4.1.2  Architecture 
 
GPS can be divided into three elements: ground, space and user segments (Royal Academy of 
Engineering, 2011) : 
 The ground or control segment is used to upload data to the satellites, to synchronize time 
across the constellation and to track the satellites to enable orbit and clock information. 
 The space segment consists of the GPS satellites in six orbital planes. 24 satellites make a full 
constellation, although as of November 2013 there are 31 in active service (US Air Force, 
2013).  
 The user segment consists of the receivers and associated antennae, to receive and decode 
the signal and compute Position, Navigation and Time (PNT) and related information. 
3.4.1.3  Measurements 
 
GPS is a ranging system with three carrier frequencies, all multiples of a fundamental frequency 
(Table 3-5). The distance is derived primarily by measuring the time difference between the 
transmission of a coded signal from the satellite and reception at the receiver. This range is known 
as the pseudorange rather than range since it includes a number of system unknowns such as clock 
biases and propagation delays which must be solved for or estimated. The carrier phase of the 
signals can also be used to derive the range, providing a more accurate position, but with inherent 
ambiguity. Ranges to at least four satellites are required to determine position and time.  
 
Table 3-5: GNSS RF Carrier Frequencies (Royal Academy of Engineering, 2011) 
 GPS Frequencies 
L1  1575.42 MHz 
L2  1227.6 MHz 
L5  1176.45 MHz 
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The navigation message is transmitted from the satellite to the user and gives the satellite identifier 
together with information on satellite health, predicted range accuracy, ionosphere and clock 
correction coefficients as well as orbital ephemeris to allow the receiver to calculate the satellite 
position. The message also contains an almanac which gives status, location and identifier 
information for all satellites in the constellation.  
3.4.1.4  Backup 
 
In the case of unavailability of GPS, Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) can be used as a backup 
positioning source for ADS-B. INS, also known as Inertial Reference Unit (IRU), is an independent 
system comprised of gyros and accelerometers that provide aircraft state, position and velocity 
information in response to signals resulting from inertial effects on the system components. Once 
initialized with a known position and heading, INS continuously calculates the aircraft position and 
velocity. However, there is currently no requirement to provide a backup navigation source for the 
ADS-B system. 
 
3.4.2 Data link technologies for ADS-B 
 
Data link technologies enable uplink and downlink of data between aircraft and ground-based ATC. 
Three types of potential ADS-B data links are proposed (ICAO, 2003c): the Mode-S Extended Squitter 
(1090ES), the Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) and the VHF Digital Link (VDL) Mode 4. The data 
link characteristics are discussed in the following sub-sections and their differences summarized in 
Table 3-6. Mode-S 1090ES is explained in greater detail in Section 3.5, given its mandate by ICAO as 
the global datalink for ADS-B. Furthermore, its importance is underlined by the fact that all aircraft 
analyzed in Chapter 6 are equipped with 1090ES. 
3.4.2.1  Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) 
 
The Universal Access Transceiver is a bi-directional data link developed to support ADS-B. It also 
supports the Flight Information Service Broadcast (FIS-B) such as weather and flight service 
information for aircraft. In addition UAT is capable of supporting transmission of radar information 
via the Traffic Information Service Broadcast (TIS-B) to ADS-B equipped aircraft. This enables to 
provide situational awareness of unequipped aircraft. The datalink utilizes the 978MHz frequency. 
UAT data link networks are being installed as part of the FAA’s NextGen, typically for general 
aviation users.  
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3.4.2.2  VHF Digital Link (VDL) Mode 4 
 
VHF Digital Link Mode 4 (VDL4) is a digital datalink designed to operate in the VHF frequency band 
using one or more standard 25 KHz VHF communications channels. It is capable of providing digital 
communications and surveillance services between aircraft and ground vehicles, as well as ground 
stations (EUROCONTROL, 2001-2013b). VDL4 is based on the Self Organizing Time Division Multiple 
Access (STDMA) technology. This concept allows VDL4 to operate without a centralized co-
coordinating station, thus eliminating the need for ground infrastructure. However, ground stations 
serve an important role in providing other services that enhance VDL4 operations. VDL4 supports 
broadcast and point-to-point communication with a minimum of overhead information, essential for 
time critical data exchange and low-end users.  
3.4.2.3  Mode-S Extended Squitter (1090ES) 
 
The Mode-S Extended Squitter (1090ES) has been developed as an extension to the Mode S 
technology (described in Chapter 2) for Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR). It supports Mode A/C 
radar, Mode S radar, MLAT, TCAS and ADS-B. The data link transmits at 1090MHz. It is used widely in 
the United States and Australia for ADS-B Out service for commercial aircraft in non-radar airspace. 
European countries and China are using the data link for ADS-B trial operations in radar and non-
radar airspace. It suffers from multipath (e.g. reflections from buildings, aircraft etc.), also making it 
unsuitable for airport applications. There are also concerns about overloading at this frequency, 
which is, for example, also occupied by TCAS. 
 
Table 3-6: Comparison between 1090ES, VDL4 and UAT 
1090ES VDL4 UAT 
Single channel Multi channel Single channel 
Frequency 1090MHz Frequency 108 – 137MHz Frequency 978MHz 
Random access Time slot access Time slot access 
Fixed and limited channel data 
bandwidth 
Bandwidth 19.2kbps Bandwidth 2-3 MHz 
Fixed ADS-B reporting rate Variable ADS-B reporting rate Fixed ADS-B reporting rate 
Extension to Mode S New system New system 
Support air-air broadcast, 
uplink, downlink 
Support air-air broadcast, 
uplink, downlink 
Support air-air broadcast, 
uplink, downlink 
ICAO standard exist ICAO standard exist ICAO standard exist 
Mandatory equipment Test equipment Test equipment 
  56 
3.4.2.4 Data link performance 
 
Data link performances is assessed in terms of the transmission range (air-to-air and air-to-ground), 
bandwidth (BW) and the vulnerability of the data link to external factors (interference, multipath, 
FRUIT, signal jamming). NATS and the EUROCONTROL Experimental Centre have conducted trials to 
compare the link performance of Mode-S 1090ES, UAT and VDL4 on the Heathrow airport surface 
for a selected set of trajectories and receiving ground station positions. The trial results (NATS, 2002) 
indicate that: 
 During the static trial, messages were lost from the 1090ES when aircraft equipped with the 
same data link (1090ES) passed close to the test vehicle. The likely cause assumed is co-
channel interference from the passing aircraft transponder rather than a temporary 
obstruction by the aircraft structure. The messages from UAT were not affected. 
 1090ES and UAT showed a reduction in the reception probability when the test vehicles 
were close to the Distance Measuring Equipment (DME). This is assumed due to: 
o Corruption from the DME; 
o Signal blocked by the obstruction; or 
o Reflection or multipath due to the obstruction. 
However, VDL4 did not suffer from performance degradation.  
 1090ES and UAT were not available in certain sectors of the airport, where there was an 
obstruction between the ground stations and the test vehicle. VDL4 on the other hand was 
unaffected by the obstructions. This shows that the 1090ES and UAT signals were blocked 
due to the obstruction.  
 1090ES showed a lower performance with reception probability of 94.7% compared to UAT 
at 99.9% and VDL4 at 100%. This is assumed due to other users of the same frequency 
(1090ES) on the airport surface. Further studies are required to confirm this hypothesis. 
 UAT had better link reliability than 1090ES but suffered from line of sight problems. VDL4 
had the highest link reliability. 
The performance of 1090ES is assessed in Chapter 6 for air-to-ground broadcast service for various 
ADS-B installations and aircraft make-models. 
 
3.5 ADS-B using Mode S 1090MHz Extended Squitter (1090ES) 
 
Mode S technology has two types of squitter, a short (56 bit) DF11 acquisition squitter and the 
extended (112 bit) DF17 squitter. The squitter is a reply format transmission without being 
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interrogated by another means such as radar. The downlink format (DF) and uplink format (UF) are 
the two functional components of Mode S. UF is a specific interrogation originating from SSR or 
other aircraft requesting specific information from the aircraft. DF is the reply from the aircraft to 
the UF interrogation. The DF17 extended squitter is similar to elementary and enhanced surveillance 
(explained in Chapter 2) except that it does not need interrogation, i.e. it simply ‘broadcasts’. The 
DF17 extended squitter includes the airborne position (BDS 0, 5), surface position (BDS 0, 6), 
extended squitter status (BDS 0, 7), identity and category (BDS 0, 8) as well as airborne velocity (BDS 
0, 9). Binary Data Store (BDS) is a register within the transponder maintaining avionics data in 256 
different 56 bit wide registers. It can be loaded with information and read-out by the ground system. 
Each register contains the data payload of a particular Mode S reply or extended squittter. The BDS 
registers are also known as Ground Initiated Comm B (GICB) registers (ICAO, 2004d). The registers 
which are not updated within a fixed period are cleared by the transponder. Registers are identified 
by a two digit hex number. For example, BDS 05h (or also represented as BDS 0, 5) is the position 
squitter (SELEX System Integration, 2013). In addition to the 56 bits, the Mode S short acquisition 
squitter includes: 
 8 bit CONTROL; 
 24 bit ICAO aircraft address; and 
 24 bit PARITY, 
1090ES includes an additional 56 bits data field used to carry ADS-B information. Table 3-7 presents 
the 1090ES ADS-B message type DF17, register and broadcast rate of each register. Figure 3-4 
presents the data format. 
 
Table 3-7: 1090ES Extended Squitter ADS-B message, register and broadcast rates (RTCA, 2011) 
   Broadcast Rate 
Transponder 
Register 
Event-Driven 
Message 
Priority 
1090ES ADS-B Message On-the-
Ground, 
not moving 
On-the Ground 
and moving 
Airborne 
BDS 0,5 N/A Airborne Position N/A N/A 2/1 second (0.4-0.6 sec) 
BDS 0,6 N/A Surface Position LOW RATE 
1/5 seconds 
(4.8 -5.2 
sec) 
HIGH RATE 
2/1 second 
(0.4-06 sec) 
 
N/A 
BDS 0,8 N/A Aircraft Identification 
and Category 
LOW RATE  
1/10 
seconds 
(9.8- 10.2 
sec) 
HIGH RATE 
2/1 second 
(4.8-5.2 sec) 
HIGH RATE 
2/1 second 
(4.8-5.2 sec) 
BDS 0,9 N/A Airborne Velocity N/A N/A 2/1 second (0.4 - 0.6 
sec) 
BDS 6,1 TCAS RA = 1 
Emergency = 2 
Aircraft Status 
(Emergency/Priority 
Status, Subtype=1) 
(TCAS RA Broadcast, 
TCAS RA or Mode A Change 
0.7 – 0.9 seconds 
No TCAS RA, No Mode A Change 
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   Broadcast Rate 
Transponder 
Register 
Event-Driven 
Message 
Priority 
1090ES ADS-B Message On-the-
Ground, 
not moving 
On-the Ground 
and moving 
Airborne 
Subtype=2) 4.8 – 5.2 seconds 
BDS 6,2 N/A Target State and Status 
(TSS) 
N/A N/A 1.2 – 1.3 seconds 
BDS 6,5 N/A Aircraft Operational 
Status 
4.8 – 5.2 
seconds 
No change 
NICSUPP/NAC/SIL 
2.4 - 2.6 seconds 
TSS being broadcast or 
not  
No change 
TCAS/NAC/SIL/NICSUPP 
2.4 – 2.6 seconds 
Change in 
NICSUPP/NAC/SIL 
0.7 - 0.9 seconds 
TSS being broadcast  
Change in 
TCAS/NAC/SIL/NICSUPP 
2.4 – 2.6 seconds 
TSS not broadcast  
Change in 
TCAS/NAC/SIL/NICSUPP 
0.7 – 0.9 seconds 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-4: ADS-B Extended Squitter Data Format (modified from (EUROCONTROL, 2007)) 
 
The extended squitter illustrated in Figure 3-4 is composed of a preamble (8 bits) or also known as 
control bit, aircraft ICAO address (24 bits), parity check (24 bits), capability (3 bits), downlink format 
(5 bits) and ADS-B message (56 bits). The preamble bit is required to allow synchronization on 
reception. The parity check represents the error detection code with the capability bit indicating the 
capability of the Mode S transponder. The downlink format value is 17, representing the message 
type – ADS-B. The ADS-B message is defined in Table 3-6. It is also defined in Mode S Extended 
Squitter Standards and Recommended Practises (SARP) (Annex 10 Am. 77) (ICAO, 2002b)  and Mode 
S Specific Services (ICAO, 2004d). The total duration of the extended squitter message is 120 μs (8μs 
preamble and 112μs data block). The data block is transmitted using Pulse Position Modulation 
Parity check (24 bits) 
ADS-B data (56 bits) 
Aircraft (ICAO) address (24 bits) 
Capability (3 bits) 
Downlink format DF17 (5 bits) 
Preamble (8 bits) 
DATA BLOCK PREAMBLE 
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(PPM). PPM is a relatively simple modulation scheme for a 1090MHz receiver to decode in the 
presence of non-overlapping (in time) replies (Institute of Air Navigation Services, 2003). 
 
The minimum content of an ADS-B message is composed of the following (De Oliveira et al., 2009) : 
 Emitter Category – defining characteristics of the end users, for example light, medium 
or heavy aircraft, helicopters, UAV (Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle), land vehicles and 
obstacles. 
 Emitter Identifier - corresponding to the 24 bit  network address in ATN 
 Latitude, Longitude, Flight Level – corresponding to the 3D position of emitter end user. 
 Aircraft Identification – corresponding to the aircraft identification code (Squawk code) 
 Data quality indicators – describing the integrity and accuracy of the data. 
In addition to the above parameters, the ADS-B message also contains velocity, time stamp and 
intent information (in the latest version based on DO-260B (RTCA, 2011)). 
 
3.5.1 ADS-B position encoding and decoding – Compact Position Reporting (CPR) 
algorithm 
 
ADS-B position data are provided in the World Geodetic System (WGS-84) format, latitude and 
longitude. Compact Position Reporting (CPR) was developed for ADS-B messages broadcast on the 
1090ES Extended Squitter (ES) datalink to reduce the number of bits required to transmit the 
latitude and longitude information. Position resolution for ES messages is approximately 5.1 meters 
for an airborne target and 1.3 meters for a surface target (Sensis Corporation, 2009). The 
circumference of the earth is approximately 40 000 kilometers so 40 000 000 m/5.1 m = ~7 800 000 
discrete position values. 7 800 000 position values would require 23 bits in a message. Longitude is 
expressed over a range of 360° so longitude would require the full 23 bits. Latitude is expressed over 
a range of 180° so only 3 900 000 discrete position values or 22 bits would be required. Similarly, 
surface position would require 25 bits for longitude and 24 bits for latitude. CPR transmits position 
with 17 bits each for latitude and longitude plus 1 “CPR format” bit. Table 3-8 tabulates the message 
bits required for ADS-B position encoding with and without CPR for airborne and surface targets. 
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Table 3-8: Message bits required for position encoding with and without CPR (Sensis Corporation, 
2009) 
  Without CPR With CPR Bits saved with CPR 
Airborne Position 
Latitude 22 17  
Longitude 23 17  
CPR Format 0 1  
Total 45 35 10 
Surface Position 
Latitude 24 17  
Longitude 25 17  
CPR Format 0 1  
Total 49 35 14 
 
CPR saves 10 bits per position message for airborne targets and 14 bits per position message for 
surface targets. Position messages are envisioned to broadcast twice per second under most 
conditions. Therefore, CPR saves 20 bits/second for airborne targets and 28 bits/second for surface 
targets (Sensis Corporation, 2009). 
 
3.6 System Architecture 
 
The optimum ADS-B architecture is unknown because it depends on the type of the data links 
planned to be used by the regions. As discussed in section 3.4.2, ICAO proposes 1090ES as the global 
data link for ADS-B while UAT and VDL4 will be used at the regional level. The ADS-B system analyzed 
in this thesis, and hence the architecture is based on 1090ES. ICAO enumerated a number of 
functional requirements related to various surveillance applications without stipulating those to be 
supported by ADS-B (ICAO, 2003a). The surveillance applications envisioned to be supported by the 
ADS-B system are described in section 3.7. Figure 3-5 depicts the high level architecture of a 
complete ADS-B system. 
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Figure 3-5: High Level Architecture of ADS-B (ICAO, 2003a) 
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The ADS-B system depicted in Figure 3-5 is composed of a message generation unit (which merges 
the data coming from aircraft sensors such as the navigation sensor, barometric altimeter and pilot 
inputs including aircraft identification and flight intent information), a transmitter (for transmission 
of the message), a data link (which carries out message distribution), a receiver (that receives the 
message), and a message processing unit (this prepares the ADS-B report for the use of various 
surveillance applications as described in section 3.6.2). Thus, unlike radar surveillance technology, 
which does not require a means of communication, ADS-B incorporates communication 
requirements to deliver the surveillance functions. In addition, ADS-B relies on the on-board 
navigation equipment to obtain aircraft positioning information. This shows a strong dependency 
between surveillance, navigation and communication functions in ADS-B technology. Therefore, it is 
important to apply the Required Communication Performance (RCP), Required Surveillance 
Performance (RSP) and Performance Based Navigation (PBN) requirements to ADS-B system design 
and its implementation. The ADS-B system is integrated with many other external systems such as 
GNSS which provides the navigation data; barometric altimeter that provides the aircraft altitude; a 
module that allows the pilot to manually key-in message such as flight intent, aircraft identification; 
and others. The application functions linked to the ADS-B system in Figure 3-5 represents the 
surveillance applications that utilize the ADS-B data to provide either air-air surveillance such as 
Cockpit Display of Traffic Information (CDTI), Aircraft Separation Assurance System (ASAS) or air-
ground surveillance for the ATC. 
 
3.6.1 System Integration 
 
ADS-B system is a complex system, being highly dependent upon navigation and communication 
technologies. The ADS-B system is integrated with the following sub-systems to generate the ADS-B 
report, for broadcast to the ground-based ATC and to other ADS-B equipped aircraft within its 
configured range:  
 Navigation system 
 Barometric altimeter 
 Pilot input module (FMS/Control Panel) 
 Data link medium 
 Transmitter 
 Receiver 
Each of these subsystems is prone to failures, and in order to assure safety, a detailed understanding 
of failure modes of each is required. Chapter 7 identifies, analyses and quantifies these failures. The 
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data generated by the individual avionic systems listed above are integrated in the ADS-B Emitter/ 
ADS-B capable transponder into a report which is broadcast to ground stations and other ADS-B 
equipped aircraft within the coverage area. Figure 3-6 shows a Context Diagram illustrating the data 
sources, elements and flow for ADS-B. 
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Figure 3-6: Context Diagram for ADS-B data source, element and flow 
 
3.6.2 ADS-B report generation 
 
An ADS-B message is a block of formatted data which composes an ADS-B report in accordance with 
the properties of the ADS-B data link (RTCA, 2002).The data link determines the size and type of 
information that can be broadcast. ADS-B reports are specific information provided by the ADS-B 
Report Assembly Function to external applications supported by ADS-B. The report contains 
identification, state vector, and status/intent information. The elements of the ADS-B report used 
and the frequency with which they must be updated vary by application. The portions of an ADS-B 
report that are provided vary by the capabilities of the transmitting ADS-B system. Figure 3-7 
illustrates the report generation process and the corresponding modules. 
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Figure 3-7: ADS-B Report Generation Process 
 
3.7 Supported Applications 
 
ADS-B supports two types of applications:  
 Aircraft-to-aircraft applications i.e., applications that transmit data from one aircraft or 
vehicle to others in the air and on the ground; and  
 Aircraft-to-ground applications i.e., applications that require data to be broadcast from an 
aircraft or vehicle to fixed ground users (RTCA, 2002). 
These applications can be categorized into three groups as shown in Table 3-9. The ADS-B data 
elements required to support enhanced air navigation and surveillance applications are summarized 
in Table 3-10. 
Table 3-9: ADS-B supported applications 
Category Application 
Ground-based 
surveillance 
applications 
1) ATC surveillance in airspace with radar coverage 
2) ATC surveillance in airspace without radar coverage 
3) Airport surface surveillance 
4) Aircraft derived data for ground-based ATM tools 
Aircraft-based 
surveillance 
applications 
1) Situational awareness 
 Enhanced traffic situational awareness on the airport surface 
 Enhanced traffic situational awareness during flight operations 
 Enhanced visual acquisition of traffic 
 Enhanced successive visual approaches 
2) Airborne spacing and separation 
 Enhanced sequencing and merging operations 
 In-trail procedure 
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Category Application 
 Enhanced crossing and passing operations 
Other applications 1) Ramp control/gate management 
2) Noise monitoring 
3) Flight following (for flying schools) 
4) Remote airport charges issuing 
5) Enhanced situational awareness of obstacles 
6) Search and Rescue (SAR) 
 
Table 3-10: ADS-B information required to support ADS-B applications (RTCA, 2002) 
Information 
Element 
Aid to 
Visual 
Acquisition 
Conflict 
Avoidance 
and 
Collision 
Avoidance 
Separation 
Assurance & 
Sequencing 
Flight Path 
Deconfliction 
Planning 
Simultaneous 
Approaches 
Airport 
Surface 
(A/V to 
A/V & 
A/V to 
ATS) 
ATS 
Surveillance 
Identification       
Call Sign       
Address       
Category       
State Vector       
Horizontal 
Position 
      
Vertical 
Position 
      
Horizontal 
Velocity 
      
Vertical 
Velocity 
      
Heading       
NIC       
Mode Status       
Emergency/ 
Priority Status 
      
Capability 
Codes 
      
Operational 
Modes 
      
State Vector 
Quality 
      
Air-Reference 
Vector 
      
Intent       
 
3.8 ADS-B performance parameters, indicators, requirements and standards 
 
ADS-B performance is measured in terms of accuracy, availability, integrity, continuity and latency of 
the surveillance data provided by the system (EUROCONTROL, 2011d). These parameters are 
defined in the following subsections. The quality indicators representing the surveillance data 
accuracy and integrity are derived from the onboard navigation source that feed the ADS-B system 
with aircraft position and velocity. Therefore, the ADS-B surveillance data performance mainly is 
driven by the onboard navigation system. In addition, the surveillance data performance also relies 
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on the performance of the communication system that broadcasts the ADS-B surveillance data to 
users. Furthermore, various other factors affect the surveillance data performance. These are 
investigated in Chapter 6 and 7. ICAO in collaboration with the RTCA, FAA, EUROCONTORL and Air 
Services Australia has developed various requirements and standards to ensure adequate system 
performance and interoperability. Chapter 5 addresses how the performance parameters relate to 
safety. The requirements and standards discussed in this section only apply to ADS-B Out. To date, 
the complete standards or requirements for ADS-B In are still to be developed. 
 
3.8.1 ADS-B performance parameters 
3.8.1.1  ADS-B Accuracy 
 
ADS-B accuracy is defined as a measure of the difference between the aircraft position reported in 
the ADS-B message field and the true position. It is also defined as noise where the noise is assumed 
to follow a Gaussian distribution and the RMS value is quoted (ICAO, 2006b). ADS-B accuracy is also 
analysed based on the quality indicator representing position estimate accuracy included in the ADS-
B message. The quality indicator derivation and definition are described in the next sub-section. In 
this thesis, the ADS-B horizontal position accuracy is assessed (Chapter 6).  
 
Horizontal position accuracy is assessed as the horizontal position measurement error distribution. 
For ADS-B, horizontal position accuracy is defined as the radius of a circle centred on the reported 
position of the target such that the probability of the actual position of the target being inside the 
circle is 95% (ICAO, 2006b). This is illustrated in Figure 3-13. 
 
Vertical accuracy is defined as the vertical position measurement error distribution. For ADS-B, 
barometric altimeter on the aircraft provides the altitude to the ADS-B emitter and transmitted to 
the ADS-B ground station (ICAO, 2006b). In addition, ADS-B also provides geometric altitude derived 
by the onboard navigation system. However, the altitude data from the barometric altimeter is the 
current standard requirement for ATC operations even though the geometric altitude provides 
greater accuracy. Therefore, accuracy of the vertical position can be measured with reference to the 
geometric altitude. 
 
The contributing elements to ADS-B accuracy include accuracy of the onboard navigation function 
that provides the positioning data to the ADS-B system, onboard latency and delay in the ADS-B 
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communication function. Other factors that influence ADS-B horizontal position accuracy are 
investigated in Chapter 6. 
3.8.1.2 ADS-B Integrity 
 
ADS-B integrity is the level of trust that errors will be correctly detected. Integrity risk is the 
probability that an error larger than a given threshold in the information is undetected for longer 
than a predefined time to alert (ICAO, 2006b). ADS-B horizontal position integrity is the level of trust 
that can be placed in the navigation source to provide the input to the ADS-B reported position. This 
is represented by the integrity quality indicator derived from the navigation source position integrity 
indicator. The derivation of the integrity quality indicator included in the ADS-B message is explained 
in section 3.8.2. ADS-B position integrity is also analysed based on the quality indicator. 
 
3.8.1.3  ADS-B Continuity 
 
ADS-B continuity is the probability that the system performs its required function without 
unscheduled interruption, assuming that the system is available when the procedure is initiated 
(ICAO, 2006b). ADS-B continuity includes: 
 the continuity of functions affecting all aircraft (e.g. satellite function, ground data 
acquisition function): expressed in terms of number of disruptions per year;  
 the continuity of system affecting only one aircraft (e.g. transponder function): expressed 
per flight hour; and 
 the continuity of navigation sources (including satellite constellations) of sufficient quality in 
the region which affects many aircraft.  
3.8.1.4  ADS-B Availability 
 
ADS-B availability is the ability of the system to perform its required function at the initiation of the 
intended operation. Availability is measured by quantifying the proportion of time the system is 
available with respect to the time the system is planned to be available. Periods of planned 
maintenance are not included in the availability measure (ICAO, 2006b). ADS-B availability includes: 
 the availability of functions affecting all aircraft (e.g. external positioning function, ground 
data acquisition function) ;  
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 the availability of system affecting only one aircraft (e.g. transponder function): expressed 
per flight hour; and 
 the availability of navigation sources (including satellite constellations) of sufficient quality in 
the region will affect many aircraft. 
 
3.8.1.4  ADS-B Latency 
 
ADS-B latency is the delay between the aircraft position determination by the on-board navigation 
system and the position reception by the ground station. The latency measure directly affects the 
position accuracy. Latency measures for each aircraft are analysed in Chapter 6. The factors that 
contribute to ADS-B latency, latency budgeting and latency models are also identified and derived in 
Chapter 6. 
 
3.8.2 Generation of surveillance data performance indicators 
 
The ADS-B system obtains aircraft horizontal position in the World Geodetic System-84 (WGS-84) 
coordinates from the onboard GPS. The ADS-B reports delivered to ATC contain indicators of the 
position accuracy (Navigation Accuracy Category for Position (NACp)) and integrity (Navigation 
Integrity Category (NIC)). These indicators are based on the GPS integrity monitoring capability 
(RAIM) which reports the Horizontal Protection Level (HPL) with a 10-7/hr integrity risk (encoded as 
NIC) and Horizontal Figure of Merit (HFOM) as a 95% horizontal accuracy bound (encoded as NACp). 
HFOM is also known as Estimated Position Uncertainty (EPU).  
 
The NIC parameter specifies a position integrity containment radius (Rc). NIC is reported such that 
ATC or other aircraft may determine whether the reported geometric position has an acceptable 
level of integrity for the intended use (Federal Aviation Administration, 2010). Table 3-11 tabulates 
the applicable NIC values.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  68 
Table 3-11: NIC Values (Federal Aviation Administration, 2010) 
NIC Containment Radius 
0 Unknown 
1 RC < 37.04 km (20nm) 
2 RC < 14.816 km (8nm) 
3 RC < 7.408 km (4nm) 
4 RC < 3.704 km (2nm) 
5 RC < 1852 m (1nm) 
6 RC < 1111.2 m (0.6nm) 
RC < 926 m (0.5nm) 
RC < 555.6 m (0.3nm) 
7 RC < 370.4 m (0.2nm) 
8 RC < 185.2 m (0.1nm) 
9 RC < 75 m  
10 RC < 25 m  
11 RC < 7.5 m  
 
The NACp specifies the accuracy of the aircraft’s horizontal position information (latitude and 
longitude) transmitted from the aircraft’s avionics. Table 3-12 provides the applicable NACp values. 
 
Table 3-12: NACp values (Federal Aviation Administration, 2010) 
NACp  Horizontal Accuracy Bound  
0  EPU ≥ 18.52 km (10nm)  
1  EPU < 18.52 km (10nm)  
2  EPU < 7.408 km (4nm)  
3  EPU < 3.704 km (2nm)  
4  EPU < 1852 m (1nm)  
5  EPU < 926 m (0.5nm)  
6  EPU < 555.6 m (0.3nm)  
7  EPU < 185.2 m (0.1nm)  
8  EPU < 92.6 m (.05nm)  
9  EPU < 30 m  
10  EPU < 10 m  
11  EPU < 3 m  
 
The block diagram in Figure 3-8 illustrates the interface and data flow between a GPS receiver and 
ADS-B system on-board. 
 
 
 
Figure 3-8: Data flow between navigation source and ADS-B equipment 
 
GPS Receiver ADS-B Emitter ATC or other 
Aircraft 
HPL & 
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NIC, NAC & 
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In addition to the NACp and NIC, ADS-B system performance is determined by the Source Integrity 
Level (SIL) parameter (Smith et al., 2006). SIL is defined as the probability of the integrity 
containment radius used in the NIC parameter being exceeded without detection (ICAO, 2006b). The 
GPS HPL is encoded as the NIC at a SIL corresponding to 10-7per hour, which is equivalent to SIL=3. 
ADS-B surveillance safety is assured by the NIC/SIL integrity parameters (ICAO, 2006b). Figure 3-9 
illustrates the coded performance parameter for ADS-B based on GPS as a navigation source. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-9: Coded performance parameters for ADS-B (modified from (ICAO, 2006b)) 
 
3.8.3 ADS-B Performance Requirements 
 
Performance requirements for surveillance are determined by the application, including the airspace 
in which the aircraft operates. For example, reduced separation minima for the terminal area 
require better performance than in the en-route sector. The general requirements for the 
performance stipulated in the SPI-IR (EUROCONTROL, 2011d) and ED-142 (EUROCAE, 2010) are 
summarized in Table 3-13. 
 
Table 3-13: Summary of ADS-B surveillance performance requirements 
Item Integrity Accuracy Continuity Latency 
Overall ADS-B 
system 
≤10-5 per flight 
hour (with 
respect to NIC) 
with time to 
alert ≤10 
seconds 
<150 meters 
for 3NM 
separation 
Update rate of  
≤ 2 seconds 
Total Latency   ≤ 1.5 second in 
95% of transmissions. 
 
Uncompensated Latency   ≤ 0.6 
second in 95% of transmissions. 
 
Uncompensated Latency   ≤ 1.0 
second in 99% of transmissions. 
Estimated / 
Measured Position 
Rc 
Integrity 
Containment Radius 
–Rc (NIC) 
True 
Position 
95% Bound on 
Position Accuracy 
(NAC) 
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3.8.4 ADS-B Performance Standards 
 
ADS-B standards for avionic and ground station equipment are discussed in Section 3.4. In this 
section, ADS-B performance standards are discussed. The main standards are developed by the RTCA 
and used globally by Regulators, ANSPs, airline operators and aviation equipment manufacturers. 
The standards relevant to the work in this thesis include ADS-B performance standards for 
operations, system and safety and interoperability. These standards are described as below: 
3.8.4.1  Operational Performance Standard 
 
The operational performance standard is provided in the ‘Minimum Operational Performance 
Standards (MOPS) for the 1090 MHz Extended Squitter Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast 
(ADS-B) and Traffic Information Services Broadcast (TIS-B) ‘or also known as RTCA DO-260B. This 
revision supersedes DO-260 and DO-260A. This document contains the minimum operational 
performance for airborne equipment for Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) and 
Traffic Information Service-Broadcast (TIS-B) utilizing the 1090 MHz Mode-S Extended Squitter 
(1090ES). Compliance with these standards by manufacturers, installers and users is recommended 
as one means of assuring that the equipment will satisfactorily perform its intended functions under 
conditions encountered in routine aeronautical operations. To date most of the operational aircraft 
flying were certified under the DO-260 standard. The equipage upgrade specifically for aircraft will 
only take place at the beginning of 2015. This is discussed in section 3.4. All the aircraft included in 
this thesis are certified under DO-260. The technical differences between DO-260, DO-260A and DO-
260B were analysed by the ADS-B Study and Implementation Task Force (ICAO, 2012a). The findings 
are summarized in Table 3-14.  
 
The improvements made from RTCA DO-260 to DO-260B results in additional information. This 
information is meant to increase the user confidence on the ADS-B information and as a door to 
enable the development of further ATM automation application for enhanced surveillance functions. 
However, it is important to note that these improvements in the standards do not improve the 
individual performance parameters. The only improvement noted will be due to the change in SDA 
(proposing direct connection between onboard navigation system and ADS-B transponder) which 
will reduce latency of the ADS-B message, contrary to the system architecture proposed in the 
earlier standard.  
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Table 3-14: Differences between DO-260, DO-260A and DO-260B 
 DO-260 DO-260A DO-260B Availability of data in Asterix CAT 21 
Introduction of Navigation Integrity 
Category (NIC) to replace Navigation 
Uncertainty Category (NUCP) 
NUCP is used NIC is used to replace NUCP More level of NIC available. 
Vertical component removed 
NIC is shown in v1.0 and above. More 
level of NIC (shown as PIC) is available in 
v2.1 
Quality Indicator for Velocity (NUCR and 
NACV) 
NUCR is used Replaced with NACV. 
Definition remains the same 
Vertical component removed Available in v0.23 and above 
Surveillance Integrity Level 
and Source Integrity Level (SIL) 
Not available Surveillance Integrity Level is 
used 
Renamed as Source Integrity 
Level. Definition is changed to 
exclude avionics fault. 
Available in v1.0 and above 
System Design Assurance (SDA) Not available Not available To address probability of 
avionics fault 
Available in v2.1 
Navigation Accuracy Category (NACP) Not available Derived from HFOM and 
VFOM 
Relies only on HFOM Available in v1.0 and above 
Geometric Vertical Accuracy 
(GVA) 
Not available 
 
Not available Derived from VFOM Available in v2.1 
Barometric Altitude Integrity Code 
(NICBARO) 
Not available To indicate integrity of 
Barometric altitude 
 
Same as DO-260A Available in v1.0 and 
above 
Length / Width of Aircraft Not available Provide an indication of 
aircraft size 
Same as DO-260A Available in v1.0 and above 
Indication of capabilities Only show 
status of TCAS 
and CDTI 
More information available 
including capability to send 
Air Reference Velocity, 
Target State and Trajectory 
Change reports 
Additional information on type of 
ADS-B in (i.e. 1090ES in or UAT in) 
Available in v1.0 and above, except 
availability of 1090ES/UAT in and 
information on GPS antenna offset 
Status of Resolution Advisory  Information on whether 
Resolution Advisory is active 
Same as DO-260A Available in v1.0 and above 
GPS offset  Indication on whether GPS 
offset is applied 
Information on GPS antenna 
offset is provided 
GPS offset status is available in v1.0 and 
above. Information on GPS offset is not 
available in ASTERIX 
Intention Not available Able to indicate intended 
altitude and heading 
Same as DO-260A Intended altitude is available in v0.23. 
Intended heading is not available in 
ASTERIX 
Target Status Not available Not available Indication of Autopilot mode,  
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 DO-260 DO-260A DO-260B Availability of data in Asterix CAT 21 
Vertical Navigation 
mode, Altitude Hold mode, 
Approach Mode and LNAV 
Mode 
Resolution Advisory Not available Not available Availability of Active Resolution 
Advisories; 
Resolution Advisory 
complement record, Resolution 
Terminated; 
Multiple Threat encounter; 
Threat Type indicator; and 
Threat Identity data 
Available in v1.0 and above 
Mode A Broadcasted 
using test 
message in 
USA only 
Broadcasted 
using test 
message in USA 
only 
Broadcasted 
worldwide as a 
regular message 
Available in v0.26 and 
above 
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The new information available under DO-260A/B would benefit the users in terms of operational 
decisions as follows (ICAO, 2012a):  
 The additional quantum levels of NIC would provide the ANSPs more flexibility in deciding 
whether the NIC is considered as ‘good’. For example, if it is decided that Rc<0.6NM can be 
used for radar separation, instead of Rc<0.5NM, more aircraft could benefit from the ADS-B 
services. Instead in DO-260, the level immediately after HPL<0.5NM is HPL<1.0NM.  
 The SIL will allow the user to further assess the integrity of the reported position. 
 The SDA will indicate the robustness of the system, and allowing the ANSPs to decide on a 
minimum SDA for ADS-B services. 
 The NICBARO which indicates the integrity of the barometric height may potentially be used to 
develop new ATM tools in this feature. 
 The width / length which indicate the size of the aircraft may be used as an input for 
generating alerts on airport surface movement control. 
 Indication on GPS offset may be one of the inputs for generating alerts on airport surface 
movement control. Indication on the availability of 1090ES/UAT will allow the controller to 
anticipate a potential request for in-trail procedure clearance. Indication of the resolution 
advisory status allows the controller to know whether the pilots were alerted about the 
potential conflict. 
 The intent heading and flight level can be used as an input to the trajectory prediction 
algorithm in the Short-Term Conflict Alert. 
 The target status allows the controller to know the mode that the aircraft is in. 
 The Resolution Advisory will help the controller know the advisories that are provided to the 
pilots by the ACAS. This will prevent the controller from giving instructions that are in 
conflict with the ACAS. 
 The Mode A allows flight plans to be coupled with the ADS-B tracks. 
 
3.8.4.2  System Performance Standard 
 
The system performance standard is provided in the ‘Minimum Aviation System Performance 
Standards (MASPS) for Automatic Dependant Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B)’ or also called RTCA 
DO-242A. This document supersedes DO-242 and provides an up-to date view of the system-wide 
operational use of ADS-B. This revised ADS-B MASPS concentrates on four major areas of 
development:  
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 Separating the accuracy and integrity components of the Navigation Uncertainty Category 
(NUC) into the new fields Navigation Accuracy (NAC) and Navigation Integrity Category (NIC);  
 Reorganization of the State Vector, Mode-Status, and On-condition reports;  
 Restructuring the content and manner in which intent information is broadcast; and  
 Clarification that system requirements at the MASPS level are based on operational ranges 
and not particular applications. 
 
3.4.8.3  Safety & Interoperability Performance Standard 
 
The safety and interoperability performance standard is provided separately for non-radar and radar 
airspace in Safety, Performance and Interoperability Requirements for the ADS-B Non-Radar-
Airspace (NRA) Application (RTCA DO-303) and Safety, Performance and Interoperability 
Requirements for Enhanced Air Traffic Services in Radar-Controlled Areas Using ADS-B Surveillance 
(ADS-B-RAD) (RTCA DO-318). These documents provide the requirements for ADS-B Out safety and 
interoperability in non-radar and radar airspace respectively. 
 
It is important to understand that the requirements stipulated in the various standards by RTCA, 
EUROCAE or ICAO are meant to affirm the required functions and performance level. However the 
standards do not provide the methods/mechanisms to implement those requirements. They are 
totally dependent on the equipment manufacturers. Hence, there is no standardized method 
available on how to develop the mechanism to enable the required functions within the system. The 
willingness of the equipment manufacturers to invest in the research and development of the 
system functionalities are also influenced by the mandate of the ADS-B system. Various versions of 
the equipment may induce different problems due to the different methods developed by the 
different manufacturers. 
 
3.9  Implementation 
 
A fully operational ADS-B system (ADS-B Out and ADS-B In) requires all aircraft to be equipped with 
certified ADS-B avionics, certified ADS-B ground stations with complete airspace coverage, globally 
agreed operational procedures and most importantly a mandate. These in turn depend on the airline 
operators to equip aircraft, ANSP to provide the ground infrastructures and Regulators (ICAO, FAA, 
and EUROCONTROL) to provide the operational procedures and mandate to the stakeholders. In 
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addition, the willingness of equipment manufacturers to develop the required functionalities to 
support the required ADS-B application is crucial. Before the system can be made fully operational, 
collaborative effort from both the ANSP and airline operators must made compulsory. This is vital to 
assess and ensure the required system performance including safety to support the intended 
surveillance applications. 
 
According to the FAA and EUROCONTROL, ADS-B is envisioned to modernize the air transportation 
system with improved safety, capacity and efficiency. Despite the anticipated benefits of ADS-B, its 
adoption rate is tied to each operator’s own cost/benefit analysis. The higher the benefit over the 
cost, the greater the likelihood of early adoption. In addition, political interference also plays a major 
role in the adoption and implementation of ADS-B. ADS-B component costs vary from several 
thousand to several tens of thousands of dollars depending on overall system capability. According 
to “FreeFlight Systems”, an ADS-B component provider in the United States, the component cost for 
smaller aircraft can be as little as $10,000 while for larger aircraft, the cost can go up to more than 
$100,000. According to (Esler, 2007) two key ingredients for optimizing the cost/benefit are to: 
 buy the right technical standard order (TSO) which is approved by the regulators and 
includes pre-testing which minimizes short term costs; and  
 get double-duty out of the ADS-B components.  
Due to the involvement of various parties and costs, the implementation processes are carried out in 
phases. The progress of ADS-B implementation in recent years has been driven by voluntary effort of 
the various parties and in some cases a regional mandate (e.g. in Australia). Without a global 
mandate, it will not be possible to provide a complete ADS-B service. Instead, ATC will have to 
operate in mixed mode operational environment (radar and ADS-B), which will disable the ADS-B In 
function. However, full mandate will be achieved following the SPI-IR forward-fit and retrofit rule as 
discussed in section 3.4. Figure 3-10 illustrates the global plan for the deployment of ADS-B services. 
Table 3-15 summarizes the progress made by the main players.  
 
Figure 3-10: ADS-B Worldwide Planning and Deployment (Boeing, 2009)
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Table 3-15: Summary of current ADS-B implementation progress 
Country Project Progress & Mandate 
USA NextGen  
 
   
 
Australia   
 
 
 
 
 
Europe SESAR, 
CASCADE 
 
 
 
 
 
Canada   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010 2015 - 2020 2013 
FAA publishes an 
ADS-B out rule 
Ground infrastructure 
in place 
Mandate will be for 
100% equipage of 
ADS-B out 
2003 2007 2008 2012 
Instrumental in forming 
APANPIRG ADS-B 
Implementation Task Force 
Installed 28 sets of ground 
equipment providing high 
altitude coverage 
Ground surveillance 
trial at Bundaberg 
complete 
Existing equipage 
being certified for use 
in Non-radar airspace 
and radar upper 
airspace (voluntary) 
Low altitude 
program delayed 
Mandate of ADS-B 
Out equipage in Jun 
2012 
2009 2012 
Proposed Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (ENRPM) activity October 
2008 through February 2009 
Potential mandate for 
production aircraft 
Mandate for all aircraft (full 
retrofit) for entry into 
airspace 
2015 
Nov 
2008 
Tactical use of surveillance 
separation within coverage 
volume 
Airspace segregation 
FL350 to FL400 
inclusive in Hudson 
and Minto Sectors 
Later ADS-B 
implementation in 
other remote areas 
where there is no 
radar coverage  
 
Aug 
2008 
Mid 
2009 
Nov 
2010 
AIC to be issued 
stating this plan and 
the requirements for 
tactical surveillance 
-Transport Canada 
approval required 
 
-Enter correct ICAO 
Flight ID from field 7 
on the flight plan 
 
-Include “ADS-B” in 
field 18 of the filed 
ICAO flight plan 
T
r
a
n
s
p
o
r
t
 
C
a
n
a
d
a
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3.9.1 ADS-B Out Deployment 
 
Based on the summary in Table 3-15 and Figure 3-14, it is clear that the first stage of ADS-B 
implementation focuses on ADS-B Out in non-radar airspace. Australia is leading in this initiative. 
This is due to Australia’s difficult topography which causes difficulties to site radars to provide 
complete surveillance coverage in the region’s airspace. In December 2009, Airservices Australia 
commissioned the ADS-B Upper Airspace Project (UAP), providing ADS-B coverage across the whole 
continent. Since then, 29 ADS-B sites have been added, in addition to 14 sites in Tasmania which are 
now fully operational. Aircraft avionics are being assessed and approved for operational use. ADS-B 
data from non-approved aircraft is filtered out at each site. Currently, over 1200 aircraft are 
approved and receiving the operational and safety benefits of ADS-B services in Australia. Australia 
has also made ADS-B equipage mandatory for all aircraft (domestic and foreign) operating at or 
above FL290 as of December 2013 (SKYbrary, 2013). 
 
ADS-B deployment in Canada is focusing on non-radar airspace. To date, ADS-B has enabled 
surveillance coverage for 250,000 square nautical miles of airspace over Hudson Bay in Northern 
Canada. The majority of the flights in this airspace link Europe and North America, while many 
transit to Asia, including those using polar tracks. The service commenced in January 2009. The 
controllers are currently using ADS-B tactically by applying reduced separation between equipped 
aircraft on an opportunity basis. This means each aircraft will have the appropriate protected 
airspace around it applied based on its capability (SKYbrary, 2013). The next step for NAV CANADA is 
to segregate airspace vertically and deploy ADS-B in other remote areas without radar coverage. 
 
ADS-B deployment is also ongoing in the United States (U.S.) as the key enabler of the NextGen 
project. In the U.S., ADS-B service is provided via two type of datalinks; 1090 MHz Extended Squitter 
(1090ES) and UAT. The U.S. ADS-B Final Rule requires aircraft operating above FL180 to broadcast on 
the 1090ES link. While for aircraft flying below FL180; both links are supported. Depending on 
aircraft equipage, both ADS-B Out and In are supported. However, no mandate is in place yet for 
ADS-B In. In May 2010, the U.S. ADS-B Final Rule was published, requiring ADS-B Out equipage in 
U.S. airspace where a transponder is currently required with compliance by 1 January 2020 
(SKYbrary, 2013).  
 
Twenty integrated ADS-B and WAM systems including more than 200 stations are deployed for 
operational use at various sites in Europe. According to (Rekkas, 2013), this number is expected to 
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increase significantly over the next few years based on the existing contracts and firm commitment 
by the ANSPs. ADS-B is deployed as mean of surveillance in non-radar airspace in Europe including 
Iceland and Italy. WAM/ADS-B systems are deployed in Armenia, Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, 
Latvia, Netherlands (North Sea), Portugal (Azores), Romania, Spain, Sweden and UK (East Midlands, 
Edinburgh and North Sea). Other ANSPs have implementation plans from 2013 onwards: Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Denmark (ADS-B only in Faroe island, Greenland; WAM/ADS-B in mainland and North Sea) 
Finland, France (ADS-B only in overseas territory), Greece, Norway (North Sea), Portugal (Madeira, 
Porto, Lisbon), Sweden (country-wide). The deployment of WAM/ADS-B ground systems by the 
CRISTAL Projects of CASCADE is close to completion. The projects cover both non-radar and radar 
airspace. The ANSPs involved in this project are: 
 AVINOR, Norway 
 BULATSA, Bulgaria 
 DCA, Cyprus 
 DFS, Germany 
 HCAA, Greece 
 ISAVIA, Iceland 
The projects are anticipated to be completed in 2014. 
 
3.9.2 ADS-B In Deployment 
 
The deployment of ADS-B Out by the airlines has been on-going for the past few years. Airborne 
deployment includes aircraft equipage and certification. In non-radar airspace, several hundreds of 
aircraft are already certified based on the AMC 20-24 (EASA, 2008). On a global scale, the EASA ADS-
B NRA Airworthiness approval was applied by Australia and Canada. More than 1300 aircraft are 
approved for operations and more than 5500 are monitored over Europe to be compliant with the 
requirements of the AMC 20-24 (EASA, 2008). In radar airspace, the aircraft are required to be 
certified with the EU Regulation 1207/2011. ADS-B is certified to complement radar in high density 
airspace, airport surface and the ADS-B Out requirements of ATSAW and initial spacing applications. 
To date, 70 aircraft monitored in Europe are compliant with the EU Regulation 1207/2011. The 
number will increase in the next few years driven by the relevant mandate dates. 
 
ATSAW or ADS-B In has been operational in Europe since February 2012 under the ATSAW Pioneer 
project of CASCADE in cooperation with airlines, ANSPs and avionics manufacturers to provide an 
airborne traffic situation to the flight crew. The objective of the ATSAW project is to assist airlines to 
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equip the aircraft with certified ATSAW equipment and use it in their operations.  The ATSAW 
equipage is voluntary and no mandate is envisaged in Europe. The project is conducting two 
operational applications; ATSAW during flight operations (ATSAW AIRB) and the ATSAW In Trail 
Procedure (ITP) over the North sea (Shanwick FIR and Reykjavik FIR). The project is anticipated to be 
completed by end of 2013. Six airlines equipped 28 aircraft with the ATSAW equipment: 
 British Airways 
 Delta 
 Lufthansa 
 Swiss International Airlines 
 US Airways 
 Virgin Atlantic 
The ATSAW Pioneer project marked the first operational use of surveillance in the cockpit in Europe 
and paves the way for the deployment of other “ADS-B In” applications.  
 
According to Rekkas (2013), internationally harmonized standardization work plan involves co-
ordination between EUROCONTROL, FAA, EUROCAE, RTCA, Australia, Canada, Japan, ICAO and also 
civil-military interoperability. These should enable global interoperability and ensure that equipped 
aircraft can use their installations worldwide.  
 
3.9.3 ADS-B Performance Monitoring 
 
ADS-B monitoring is being undertaken by Airservices Australia, EUROCONTROL and the FAA to assess 
the equipage rate and ADS-B performance. Airservices Australia is monitoring ADS-B performance at 
a number of levels. In the first level, site monitoring is conducted to check the receiver sensitivity 
and antenna cable in real time. This is conducted by injecting an ADS-B signal into the antenna and 
then checking if the signal is received at the correct signal strength and whether the message is 
received reliably by the ATC system (Airservices Australia, 2013). At the second level, a significant 
number of ground station parameters (Airservices Australia, 2013) are monitored remotely and if 
the parameter performance exceeds predefined thresholds, alerts are generated. At the third level, 
all failures, service outages and repair/return to service times for each ADS-B site are recorded. The 
last level is currently under development. Airservices Australia is developing a tool to capture and 
report the avionics performance for each airframe. The report will contain the following information: 
 24 bit code 
 Associated flight ID 
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 Minimum and maximum FOM (NUC / NIC) 
 Number of position “jumps” 
 Number of zero integrity reports 
 Registered operator and aircraft type (for Australian aircraft) 
 ADS-B data version 
 
The reports are recorded in the Airservices System Issue Database (ASID). Finally the anomalies 
identified are sent as a feedback to the relevant airlines, operators or manufacturers for further 
analysis and mitigation.  
 
In Europe, EUROCONTROL monitors ADS-B performance based on the traffic identified for the 13000 
aircraft participating in the monitoring project. The data for the aircraft is obtained from the 
following ADS-B ground stations: 
 Athen (HCAA), Greece 
 EUROCONTROL Experimental Centre (EEC), Bretigny, France 
 Langen (DFS), Germany 
 Schiphol (LVNL), Netherlands 
 Toulouse (DSNA), France 
 Warlingham (NATS), UK 
 Charles de Gaulle airport (DSNA), France 
 Schiphol airport (LVNL), Netherlands 
 
 To date, 20 billion reports have been analyzed to monitor the ADS-B data accuracy against 
multiradar data accuracy for all the participating aircraft. Aircraft compliance with the EASA AMC 20-
24 is also monitored. Anomalies identified in the participating aircraft are resolved in co-operation 
with the related airlines, operators and avionics manufacturers (Rekkas, 2013). 
  
The FAA has developed an active monitoring system called the Surveillance and Broadcast (SBS) 
monitor to ensure the ground equipment at each ADS-B site delivers the required services to the 
FAA (Office of Inspector General, 2011). However, the FAA has not developed automated means and 
procedures to analyze the large amount of performance data recorded by the SBS monitor or 
assigned sufficient human resources to carry out analysis (Office of Inspector General, 2011). In 
addition, the FAA has not ensured the network design for the SBS monitor works as intended and is 
a reliable tool that can help it to avoid and resolve outages (Office of Inspector General, 2011). A 
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recent update by the FAA (2013) indicates that the SBS monitor is planning to include avionics 
compliance monitoring in the future. 
 
The review shows that, Airservices Australia’s approach is the most advanced for monitoring the 
deployment of ground and airborne equipment deployment for all aircraft in the airspace. 
EUROCONTROL and the FAA have still to improve the current monitoring approach to ensure ADS-B 
safety for ATC operations. Significantly, the Airservices Australia’s approach can be enhanced to 
enable safety monitoring and mitigation by adopting the methods proposed in this thesis, including 
the ADS-B position integrity validation in Chapter 6 and ADS-B failure mode analysis in Chapter 7. 
 
Further information on ADS-B implementation and operation guidance are provided in (ICAO, 
2007a), though it does not detail the implementation and validation processes for ADS-B. In 
summary, the following factors should be considered and developed for ADS-B implementation: 
 New surveillance procedures; 
 A study on specific operational requirements for each region;  
 Ground infrastructures implementation; 
 Mandatory aircraft equipage; and 
 Training for pilots and controllers to operate in the new operational environment, as their 
functional roles may change with full ADS-B implementation. This is discussed in section 
3.9.5.2. 
 
3.9.4 Challenges for ADS-B Implementation 
 
According to Boeing (2009), a number of crucial challenges have been identified in ADS-B 
implementation efforts. The first is to have international interoperability by implementing an 
optimal single ADS-B link for traffic surveillance of all aircraft. Next, in order to globally implement 
ADS-B, the current surveillance standards need to be revised and extended. In addition, a transition 
strategy for surveillance has to be carefully designed. Another known challenge is the cost to equip 
the aircraft and deploy the ground infrastructure borne by airlines and ANSPs respectively. Finally, a 
global mandate is crucial to provide complete ADS-B Out and ADS-B In services. 
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3.9.5 How can ADS-B fit into the ATC System?  
 
The objective of ATM is “to enable aircraft operation to meet their planned times of departure and 
arrival and adhere to their preferred flight profiles with minimum constraints, without compromising 
the agreed levels of safety” (EUROCONTROL, 2006a). The current ATM system (ICAO, 2000) is 
illustrated in Figure 3-11. Due to the technological advancements, the ATM system has incorporated 
airborne components; airborne CNS and Aircraft Collision Avoidance System (ACAS). This section 
focuses on ATC and airborne ATM components. These components are inter-reliant to ensure the 
safe control, monitoring and management of the air traffic. Figure 3-12 shows the functional 
components in a new ATC paradigm (proposed in this thesis) combining ATC and Airborne 
Communication, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS), as depicted in Figure 3-11. 
 
 
Figure 3-11: Air Traffic Management (ICAO, 2000) 
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Figure 3-12: New ATC System Component (proposed in this thesis) 
 
3.9.5.1  New ATC System Loop Model 
 
Hansman (1997) states that in the current ATC operation, the role separation between controllers 
and pilots is functional and ambiguous. Controllers have the responsibility for traffic separation 
while the pilot is responsible for the safety of the flight. The pilot will defer to controllers on the 
traffic issues as the controllers have more information on it. Likewise, controllers will often defer to 
pilots on weather information. Hence it is obvious that the functional role of pilots and controllers is 
directly determined by the availability of reliable information in hand. Bearing this in mind, the 
implementation of new surveillance technology such as ADS-B and TIS-B, and datalink technologies, 
will enable both pilots and controllers to have access to the same situational information. Therefore, 
this may create conflict in the role separation between pilots and controllers. Emergence of the new 
technologies is expected to support new surveillance applications envisaged to balance both 
controller and pilot workload, optimize capacity, increase efficiency and improve safety. It is 
envisioned that the ADS-B system will be the primary surveillance source in the future. This will 
create controller dependency on the aircraft to obtain the surveillance data. Conversely, pilots will 
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have less dependency on the controllers due to enhanced situational awareness. Radar surveillance 
and procedural control via communication aids will act as a backup system. Therefore, the ATC role 
structure has to be carefully designed and clearly enforced upon the implementation of the new 
technologies.    
 
A new ATC loop model is proposed in this thesis as a result of the emergence of ADS-B technology, 
which has resulted in the emergence of many new application tools such as ASAS and CDTI. The 
model combines the ground and airborne ATC functional components. The components are 
interdependent. The model illustrates interaction between ATC components, tools and users. In 
addition the model also introduces data fusion component to fuse the current ground surveillance 
data with the ADS-B data. Data fusion is foreseen to enhance the data integrity and retain the data 
flow continuity in the air and on the ground. Figure 3-13 depicts the new ATC loop model for the 
future operation. 
Aircraft (ADS-B 
equipped)
Radar / ground 
based
surveillance
UAT / Mode- S ES / VDL-4
ADS-B inADS-B out
TIS-B
CDTI ASAS
Pilot
ACAS
FIS
FIS-B
FMS
GNSS
Communication
(VHF / HF)
Ground Data 
Link
Data Fusion
ATC Display
ATCo
STCA
FDPS | DPSD
 
Figure 3-13: New ATC Loop Model 
 
3.9.5.2  Potential change in the role of controller and pilot  
 
The components of the model are mapped to the ATC functions, controller (ATCo) role and pilot role 
in Table 3-16. The potential change in the role of the ATCo and pilot are analysed and mapped based 
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on the new ATC loop model in Figure 3-13 for all phases of flight. Based on the mapping, with the 
existence of ADS-B and its applications, the role of ATCo will be more focused on monitoring rather 
than controlling in the future, while pilots will be able to self navigate. Based on the mapping, 
further analysis is made using a widely used approach for functional modelling, Structured Analysis 
and Design Technique (SADT). The approach was introduced by Ross of Soft Tech Inc. in 1973 and is 
further described by Lissandre (1990)and Lambert (1999). In the SADT diagram, each functional 
block is modelled with five main elements; functions, input, control, mechanism and output. Figure 
3-14 illustrates the ATC functional blocks analyses with the new applications and technologies as 
input. The role shift in Table 3-15 and ATC functional blocks in Figure 3-14 provide an insight and 
paves the way to the future ATC operations with enhanced ground surveillance applications and 
airborne surveillance applications in place. The application input to each function in Figure 3-14 
could be expanded as new applications emerge as a result of complete ADS-B implementation 
worldwide. 
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Table 3-16: ATC paradigm shift based on phases of flight 
 
ATC Functions Current Role | Support Technologies New Role | Support Technologies 
Conformance 
monitoring 
ATCo DPSD , 
FDPS 
ATCo  DPSD , 
FDPS 
ATCo DPSD , 
FDPS 
ATCo COMM
S 
 
ATCo DPSD , 
FDPS 
ATCo  DPSD , FDPS 
 
ATCo DPSD , 
FDPS 
ATCo DPSD , 
FDPS 
Hazard 
Monitoring 
ATCo DPSD 
 
ATCo  DPSD 
 
ATCo DPSD 
 
  ATCo DPSD 
 
ATCo  DPSD 
 
ATCo DPSD 
 
ATCo DPSD 
 
Sequencing ATCo DPSD , 
FDPS, 
COMM
S 
ATCo  DPSD , 
FDPS 
COMM
S 
ATCo DPSD , 
FDPS, 
COMM
S 
ATCo  FDPS, 
COMM
S 
 
ATCo DPSD , 
FDPS, 
COMMS 
 
ATCo  DPSD , FDPS 
COMMS 
Pilot ASAS,CDTI,
ADS-B, TIS-
B 
Pilot ASAS,CDTI, 
ADS-B, TIS-
B 
Spacing ATCo DPSD , 
FDPS, 
COMM
S 
ATCo  DPSD , 
FDPS 
COMM
S 
ATCo DPSD , 
FDPS, 
COMM
S 
ATCo  FDPS, 
COMM
S 
 
ATCo DPSD , 
FDPS, 
COMMS 
 
ATCo  DPSD , FDPS 
COMMS 
 
Pilot ASAS,CDTI,
ADS-B, TIS-
B 
Pilot ASAS,CDTI,
ADS-B, TIS-
B 
Merging ATCo DPSD , 
FDPS, 
COMM
S 
ATCo  DPSD , 
FDPS 
COMM
S 
ATCo DPSD , 
FDPS, 
COMM
S 
ATCo  FDPS, 
COMM
S 
ATCo DPSD , 
FDPS, 
COMMS 
 
ATCo  DPSD , FDPS 
COMMS 
 
Pilot ASAS,CDTI, 
ADS-B, TIS-
B 
Pilot ASAS,CDTI, 
ADS-B, TIS-
B 
Conflict Detection  ATCo DPSD, 
FDPS 
ATCo  DPSD , 
FDPS 
ATCo DPSD , 
FDPS 
Pilot ACAS 
 
ATCo DPSD, FDPS 
 
 
Pilot 
 
ACAS, CDTI Pilot ACAS, 
CDTI 
Pilot ACAS, CDTI 
Short-term 
conflict detection 
ATCo DPSD,S
TCA  
ATCo DPSD,S
TCA  
ATCo DPSD,S
TCA  
Pilot ACAS,  
visual 
ATCo DPSD, STCA  
 
 
Pilot 
 
ACAS, CDTI Pilot ACAS, 
CDTI 
Pilot ACAS, CDTI 
Conflict 
Resolution & 
Intervention 
ATCo COMM
S 
ATCo  COMM
S 
ATCo COMM
S 
ATCo COMM
S 
ATCo COMMS ATCo  COMMS ATCo COMMS ATCo COMMS 
Flight-Replanning ATCo FDPS, 
COMM
S 
Pilot FMS,C
OMMS 
Pilot FMS,C
OMMS 
Pilot FMS,C
OMMS 
ATCo FDPS, 
COMMS 
 
Pilot FMS,COMMS Pilot FMS,COM
MS 
Pilot FMS,COM
MS 
Conformance to 
ATC vector 
Pilot COMM
S 
Pilot COMM
S 
Pilot COMM
S 
Pilot COMM
S 
Pilot COMMS, 
ASAS 
Pilot COMMS, 
ASAS 
Pilot COMMS, 
ASAS 
Pilot COMMS, 
ASAS 
Onboard collision 
avoidance 
Pilot ACAS Pilot ACAS Pilot ACAS Pilot ACAS Pilot ACAS, CDTI Pilot ACAS, CDTI Pilot ACAS, CDTI Pilot ACAS, CDTI 
Information feed 
& support 
ATCo COMM
S 
ATCo COMM
S 
ATCo COMM
S 
ATCo COMM
S 
ATCo FIS-B ATCo FIS-B ATCo FIS-B ATCo FIS-B 
 Airport Surface En-route 
Terminal 
En-route 
Domestic 
Oceanic / remote 
area 
Airport Surface En-route Terminal En-route Domestic Oceanic / remote 
area 
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Conformance to ATC 
vector
Comms
ASAS
Pilot
-Conformance 
Monitoring
-Hazard Monitoring
ATC Display
ATCo
STCA
-Sequencing
-Spacing
-Merging
Comms
ATC Display
Pilot ATCo
ASAS
CDTI
On-board collision 
avoidance
CDTI
Pilot
ACAS
-Conflict detection
-Short term conflict 
detection
ATC Display
Pilot ATCo
ACAS
CDTI
STCA
Conflict resolution & 
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Data Link
ATCo Comms
Flight Replanning
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FDPS
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Pilot ATCo
Information feed & 
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Data Link
FIS
FIS-B
Pilot ATCo
 
 
 
Figure 3-14: ATC Functional blocks
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3.10 Summary 
 
This Chapter has introduced the ADS-B system along with detailed description of the requirements, 
system architecture including functions and how they are supported. The Chapter also discussed the 
progress of system implementation worldwide and proposed a new ATC loop model with the 
implementation of ADS-B. The model is important for ATC operations during the transition period 
and complete implementation of ADS-B. Finally the Chapter proposes a paradigm shift in the ATC 
operational tasks between the pilots and controllers, envisaged upon complete ADS-B 
implementation in the future. The next chapter will provide a theoretical solution for the limitations 
in the current surveillance system (Chapter 2) based on the potential capabilities of ADS-B identified 
in this Chapter. 
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Chapter 4  
Current limitations and potential of ADS-B 
 
 
This Chapter identifies the limitations of the current surveillance systems and the associated 
potential incidents, and presents a theoretical case for the potential of ADS-B to overcome the 
current limitations. 
 
From the findings in Chapter 2 and discussions with Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) 
personnel, a set of causal factors is derived that lead to incidents due to the limitations in the 
current surveillance systems. The causal factors are validated by Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) and 
safety data from ANSPs. This is followed by an assessment of the capabilities of the ADS-B system 
(reviewed in Chapter 3) to address the limitations of the current surveillance systems, and to provide 
the necessary support to Air Traffic Control (ATC) services in achieving the required level of safety. 
 
4.1 Background 
 
Chapter 2 has reviewed the current Air Traffic Management (ATM) surveillance systems, including 
Primary Surveillance Radar (PSR), Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR), Monopulse Secondary 
Surveillance Radar (MSSR) and Multilateration (MLAT). Surveillance systems provide Air Traffic 
Control Operators (ATCOs) with aircraft position in order to perform separation and airspace 
management, underpinned by situational awareness and functions such as trajectory prediction and 
conflict detection. Currently, the primary surveillance system that supports ATM, and in particular 
ATC, is radar. Brooker (2004) discusses radar inaccuracies and the impacts on mid-air collision risks. 
His work is supported by a review of quantitative en-route safety assessment methods (Brooker, 
2002) and safety assessment methodology for Communication, Navigation, Surveillance / Air Traffic 
Management (CNS/ATM) systems based ATC (Vismari, 2011) and (ICAO, 1998c). It is clear from this 
assessment that radar system performance is insufficient to meet the anticipated increase in air 
traffic (underpinned by a reduction in separation minima) and to cater for new ATC applications 
(such as enhanced situational awareness for pilots and controllers, trajectory prediction and conflict 
detection). The current surveillance system is thus fundamentally limited and cannot accommodate 
any further increase in air traffic. The limitations in the current surveillance systems are particularly 
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acute in the provision of ATC services in low altitude, remote and oceanic areas and include 
unavailability of service in oceanic and remote areas; limited service during extreme weather 
conditions and outdated equipment without spare parts (ICAO, 2000). The impacts of these 
limitations manifest in the occurrence of incidents and accidents. The ICAO defines these two types 
of occurrences (ICAO, 2001b) as below: 
 An accident is “an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft, which takes place 
between the times that any persons board the aircraft with the intention of flight and that 
all such persons have disembarked, in which any person suffers death or serious injury, or in 
which the aircraft receives substantial damage”; 
 An incident is “an occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of an 
aircraft which affects or could affect the safety of operation.  Such incidents and accidents 
are reported by ANSPs to civil aviation regulators”.  
 
Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) (reviewed in Chapter 3) is expected to address 
the limitations of the current systems. Both, the FAA’s Next Generation Air Transportation System 
(NextGen) and the European Commission’s Single European Sky (SES) and its ATM Research (SESAR) 
programme recognise ADS-B as the key to the respective goals to modernise ATM operations and 
address the deficiencies in the current surveillance systems. Unlike the radar system which operates 
independently, the ADS-B system relies on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) such as GPS to 
determine an aircraft’s current state (location, time and related data) and derive aircraft intent 
information. The ADS-B system has the potential to support surveillance services not only in the 
terminal and en-route airspace, but also in remote and oceanic areas. Furthermore, it should enable 
many new surveillance applications such as synchronised situational awareness (crew-crew, crew-air 
traffic controller, ATC-ATC, etc). These benefits have the potential to enhance the current 
operational paradigm of ATM in non-radar and remote areas without jeopardising the required level 
of safety. 
 
4.2 Methodology 
 
Currently, there is no evidence in the public domain research literature on the analysis of the 
limitations of the current surveillance systems and the capability of the ADS-B system to overcome 
them. The literature provides the limitations in the current surveillance systems without proposing 
any potential solutions. Therefore, a comprehensive methodology in Figure 4-1 is developed to 
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facilitate the resolution of the current limitations.  The following sections explain the methodology in 
detail. 
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surveillance system
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ADS-B to close the 
gaps identified
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Figure 4-1: Methodology to derive, validate and resolve limitations in the current surveillance 
systems 
 
4.3  Analysis of the current limitations 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the current surveillance systems in use consist of Primary Surveillance 
Radar (PSR) (Wassan, 1994, Aeronautical Surveillance Panel (ASP), 2007), Secondary Surveillance 
Radar (SSR) (Wassan, 1994, Dawson, 2004), Monopulse Secondary Surveillance Radar (MSSR) 
(Dawson, 2004), Surface Movement Radar (ICAO, 2004a) and Multilateration (MLAT) (Owusu, 2003). 
Each country or region implements surveillance systems taking into account of technical 
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performance, geographical structure, contextual environment and cost. For example, MLAT sensors 
are more flexible and relatively inexpensive as they can be installed on existing infrastructures such 
as high rise buildings or communication towers while the SSR has to be sited on dedicated land 
which incurs space rental and higher maintenance costs. No additional is incurred by the airline 
operators as both systems have the same requirement to have a Mode-S transponder onboard, a 
mandatory requirement by ICAO (Surveillance and Conflict Resolution Systsms Panel, 2004). 
 
Based on the review of the current surveillance technologies in Chapter 2, a number of advantages 
and disadvantages are identified (Table 4-1). These disadvantages are a major obstacle to ensuring 
that the increasing air travel demand can be met. 
 
Table 4-1: Advantages and disadvantages of the current surveillance technologies 
Technology Advantages Disadvantages 
PSR Provides surveillance of aircraft or 
vehicles not equipped with 
transponder. 
 Disability to uniquely identify targets and 
their altitudes 
 Need for transmission of high power pulses 
that limit its range 
 Signal clutter 
 Signal attenuation 
 Not suitable for oceanic and remote airspace  
SSR SSR overcome all the drawbacks 
identified in PSR. 
 False Replies Unsynchronised with 
Interrogator Transmissions (FRUIT) in multi-
radar environments 
 Garbling in dense airspace  
 Not suitable for aerodrome surface 
surveillance due to the accuracy limitations 
imposed by the transponder delay tolerance 
 Dependency on transponder and on the need 
to have it switched on – i.e. not suitable to 
identify non-equipped aircraft. 
 Not suitable for oceanic and remote airspace  
SMR Provide surveillance of vehicles 
not equipped with transponder 
and objects on the runways or 
taxiways  
 Signal attenuation 
 Target not uniquely identified  
MSSR -Reduce garbling and FRUIT  
-Its accuracy provided for a 
reduction of separation minima in 
en-route  ATC from 10 nm to 
5 nm  
 Dependency on transponder  
 Not suitable for oceanic and remote airspace  
MLAT Ability to support mode S 
elementary  
 System accuracy depends on the geometry of 
the target in relation to the receiving stations 
and also the relative time of signal receipt 
 Dependency on transponder  
 Not suitable for oceanic airspace  
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One way to minimize the drawbacks identified in each of the current surveillance systems is to 
combine these technologies in a sophisticated manner (Olivier et al., 2009, Bloem et al., 2002) taking 
advantage of the strengths of each system. For example, in an area with a line-of-sight problem or 
limited radar coverage, integration of the radar and MLAT systems is a potential solution, taking 
advantage of the flexibility of installing MLAT sensors on existing infrastructure. On the other hand, 
in an area with multiple radar coverage, their combined usage should also enable a more reliable 
coverage within the radar airspace. However, the relative high cost of radar is a major barrier to the 
realisation of this approach. In summary, although integration is useful to some limitations, others 
remain, including unavailability of coverage in oceanic areas and remote regions. 
 
4.4 Taxonomy and Causal Factor Model for Incidents/Accidents 
 
The term system limitation in this thesis refers to insufficient capability or inadequacy of a system to 
perform in the different phases of operation with the required performance in terms of accuracy, 
integrity, continuity and availability (Surveillance and Conflict Resolution Systems Panel, 2004) which 
could lead to incidents or accidents. The limitations identified in the current surveillance systems, 
might be due to particular functional requirements overlooked during the system design phase, e.g. 
extreme cases such as coverage in remote areas, the need for high-performance situational 
awareness for flight crew and controllers, degraded visual conditions during extreme weather 
(Herrera et al., 2009), especially for Visual Flight Rules (VFR) flights and requirements to meet future 
air traffic volumes. Today there is no single surveillance system that satisfies the Required 
Surveillance Performance (RSP) (Surveillance and Conflict Resolution Systems Panel, 2004) required 
for the future traffic volumes, without jeopardising safety. 
 
4.4.1 Taxonomy: Causal Factors for Incidents/Accidents due to Limitations in the Current 
Surveillance Systems 
 
Definitions of ‘taxonomy ‘are inconsistent in the literature (Wilke and Majumdar, 2012). However, 
‘scheme of classification’ (Wilke and Majumdar, 2012) is adopted as the definition of taxonomy for 
the purpose of this thesis.  The scheme in the context of this thesis refers to a set of causal factors, 
while the classification refers to incidents or accidents due to the limitations in the current 
surveillance systems. In this thesis, the term ‘causal factor’ refers to the factors that contribute to 
the causes of an incident or accident. The new taxonomy is derived and validated using the research 
methods based on literature review, structured communication with Subject Matter Experts (SMEs), 
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on the job experiences, review of existing taxonomies and safety report analysis. Figure 4-2 
illustrates the processes applied to derive and validate the taxonomy.  
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Figure 4-2: Methodology for derivation and validation of the new taxonomy 
 
In the first part of the process, an extensive literature review on the current surveillance systems 
functions and their limitations to support increasing air traffic is conducted and summarized in Table 
4-1. The inputs used include documents on technology, system requirements and safety, from ICAO, 
EUROCONTROL and RTCA. The findings from the literatures comprise of existing required 
surveillance functions and those overlooked during system design and implementation to provide 
complete ATC services for the users in all operational contexts. Secondly, structured communication 
with a number of aviation safety personnel from ANSPs (i.e. Irish Aviation Authority, Avinor Norway 
and NATS UK), were surveyed to identify any limitations of the current surveillance system (e.g. 
limited surveillance coverage in oceanic and remote areas) to provide complete ATC services. 
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Thirdly, the researcher’s five years of working experience with ATC systems enabled greater 
understanding of the current surveillance system functions and the new functions required to 
accommodate future air traffic requirements. Finally, ICAO generic aviation taxonomy, 
Accident/Incident Data Reporting (ADREP) (ICAO, 2006a) and ESARR2 (EUROCONTROL, 2009b) safety 
reporting requirements are reviewed for relevance to this thesis. ADREP provides a step-by-step 
guidance to generate an incident / accident report. For example, for a loss of separation incident, 
the following information is required to complete the ADREP reporting template: 
 Minimum horizontal separation estimated. (Est minimum horiz sep) 
 Minimum horizontal separation prescribed. (Req minimum horiz sep) 
 Minimum horizontal separation recorded. (Min horiz sep recorded) 
 Minimum vertical separation estimated. (Est vert separation) 
 Minimum vertical separation prescribed. (Req vert separation) 
 Minimum vertical separation recorded. (Vertical sep recorded) 
 
It is widely accepted that ADREP is a comprehensive safety reporting aid. However, it does not 
provide comprehensive guidance to the investigator on the analysis process. ADREP defines ATM 
specific occurrences as ATM or CNS service issues, including failure or degradation of all the facilities, 
equipment, personnel, procedures, policy, and standards involved in the provision of State approved 
Air Traffic Services. This classification scheme is too general for the investigator to make any 
conclusion on the potential factors of a particular ATM related occurrence. However, based on the 
ESARR 2 reporting requirements, the ATM specific occurrence reporting has improved through 
breaking down the category into Occurrence Related to the ATM Support Functions; 
Communication, Surveillance, Data Processing, Navigation or Information. ESARR 2 further provides 
severity classification to indicate the severity of the ATM Support Functions that limits or disables 
the ATM services to the users. Even though this is seen as a good improvement, the categorization 
still does not help the investigators to narrow down the analysis to identify the causal factors of the 
ATM Support Functions. EUROCONTROL states that safety reports produced by ANSPs in ECAC are 
not always categorized into the different types of occurrences required (e.g. failure of 
communication, navigation, surveillance functions etc.) (EUROCONTROL, 2010a). Therefore, the new 
taxonomy provides the potential causal factors due to the limitations in the current surveillance 
functions that may lead to occurrences.  
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The outputs from the four processes explained above, feeds to the derivation of the new taxonomy 
as below:  
 C1- Lack of situational awareness 
 C2- Limited surveillance coverage 
 C3- Inaccurate positioning information 
 C4- Low update rate (position data) 
 C5- Loss of communication 
 C6- Unsynchronised surveillance information between flight crew and ATC 
 C7- Visual deficiencies in extreme weather conditions 
The taxonomy developed in this thesis only focuses on the surveillance function. Figure 4-3 shows 
how the new taxonomy improves the taxonomies stipulated by ADREP and ESARR2 for ATM Specific 
Occurrence Category. It is important to note that, mitigation efforts can only be proposed upon 
identification of specific causal factors of an event to avoid repeating the safety occurrences. 
 
In the last step of the process, the new set of taxonomy in Figure 4-3 and the causal model 
developed based on the taxonomy in Figure 4-4 are validated by surveillance and ATM safety experts 
from Avinor, Norway and also using safety data analysis in section 4.5. The experts’ profiles are 
tabulated in Table 4-2. 
 
Table 4-2: New taxonomy validation by Aviation Experts from Avinor Norway 
Name Job Title Years of Experience in 
ATM 
Area of  Expertise 
Bjørn Hovland Project Manager 17 years Surveillance systems 
Trude Myhre Senior Safety analyst 3 years Safety Engineering 
Tommy Kjelsrud Senior Safety analyst 7 years Safety Engineering 
Kjersti Disen Senior Safety advisor 22 years SMS,QMS 
Anne Chavez Safety manager 30 years SMS,QMS 
 
Safety reports from ANSP are analysed to identify occurrence due to the limitations in the current 
surveillance systems. The causes of the identified occurrences are further analysed to identify the 
contributing causal factors. Then the causal factors identified from the safety reports are grouped 
and mapped to validate the new taxonomy (see Table 4-7). 
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Figure 4-3: Improvement of ADREP and ESARR2 for ATM specific occurrence category with the new 
taxonomy 
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4.4.2 Causal Factor Model for Incidents/Accidents due to Limitations in the Current 
Surveillance Systems 
 
Credible incident/accident analysis requires a comprehensive taxonomy together with historical 
occurrences analysis information or experience, and a causal or risk model. In order to transform the 
taxonomy derived in this thesis into an applied analytical and investigation methodology, a new 
causal factor model for incidents/accidents resulting from the limitations in the current surveillance 
systems is developed. The new model is developed using a modified Ishikawa or fishbone diagram 
(Stolzer et al., 2008) in Figure 4-4.  
 
 
Figure 4- 4: Causal Factor Model for Incidents/Accidents due to Limitations in the Current 
Surveillance Systems 
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C5 
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From the literature (EUROCONTROL, 2005), four main aviation incident categories; loss of 
separation, level bust, runway incursion and terrain incursion are identified as the main effects of 
the causal factors derived. The incidents are then mapped to potential accidents; mid-air collision, 
ground collision and collision with obstacles. The derived causal factors are mapped to identify their 
potential relevance to the incidents and accidents. The method used to develop the model is reverse 
engineering, whereby in the Ishikawa method, the causes of an encountered effect/problem are 
identified. In this thesis, the causal factors are derived earlier and then their potential effects are 
identified. The structure of the model is a fishbone. The incident and accidents are placed to the 
right of the spine respectively and the related causal factors are placed on the main bones extending 
from the spine of the diagram. Occurrence of a potential incident/accident can be due to individual 
existence of any causal factor on the main bones. The model is flexible as more causal factors may 
be added as the subject matter evolves in the future with the emergence of new surveillance 
technologies.  
 
Amongst others, the two main models for aviation accident-incident investigation are the Integrated 
Risk Picture (IRP) Risk Model (Perrin and Kirwan, 2000) and the Causal Model for Air Transport Safety 
(CATS) (Ale, 2009). The IRP Risk Model represents the risk of aviation accidents with a particular 
emphasis on the contribution of ATM. For each of the five accident categories, it embeds separate 
causal factors such as technical failure and human error (see Figure 4-5).  
 
 
Figure 4- 5:  Integrated Risk Picture (IRP) Risk Model (Perrin and Kirwan, 2000) 
 
The model does not clearly mention which ATM component function may have caused the event. 
The risk of each accident category is quantified by providing a structured breakdown of their causes 
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with their probability of occurrence. Although the model focuses on ATM contribution to accidents; 
it only considers events involving interaction with ATC.  
 
The CATS model, models causal factors (human error, technical failures, environmental and 
management influences) in certain characteristic accident categories including loss of control, 
collision and fire. The causes and consequences of such accidents differ according to the phases of 
flight in which they occur. In contrast to the IRP model, CATS attempts to quantify the risks of all 
possible aviation accidents by taking into account all possible causal factors. It considers aviation 
accident to be the result of complex combination of many different causal factors.  
 
The IRP and CATS models are largely similar, except the scope of CATS model is broader and the risk 
calculation method more detailed. The causal model proposed in this thesis in Figure 4-5 represents 
specific causal factors for accidents/incidents due to the existing limitations in the current 
surveillance systems. The model differs from the IRP Risk and CATS models as these only consider 
technical failures of the CNS/ATM systems that may contribute to accidents, while the model 
proposed in this thesis specifically considers the limitations of the surveillance systems that may lead 
to unanticipated incidents. This understanding is crucial in order to avoid unanticipated events that 
could jeopardise safety. Table 4-3 highlights the differences between the proposed model and the 
IRP and CATS models. 
 
Table 4-3: New Causal Model, IRP, CATS 
Model Application Focus Output Focus on ATM 
supporting 
function 
limitations 
IRP Accidents with ATM 
contribution that involves ATC 
interaction. In particular mid-
air collision, runway collision, 
taxiway collision, CFIT and 
wake turbulence accident. 
Each accident can be 
explained by either 
single or 
combination of 
causal factors.  
Qualitative 
and 
quantitative 
None 
CATS All accidents Complex 
combination of all 
possible causal 
factors. 
Qualitative 
and 
quantitative 
None 
New 
Causal 
Factor 
Model 
Incidents and accidents due to 
limitations in the surveillance 
system function 
Each incident can be 
explained by either 
single or 
combination of 
causal factors 
Qualitative Focus on 
Surveillance 
function only 
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4.5 Safety Data Analysis 
 
The aim of the safety data analysis is to validate the taxonomy identified in Section 4.4 based on the 
analysis of comprehensive safety reports on accidents / incidents involving aircraft from ANSPs. 
 
The key requirements for the data are:  
 a detailed explanation of the causal factors of the events; 
 sufficient reporting duration (to meet the analysis objective) and 
 a consistent quality of reporting. 
The possible outcomes of the analysis are: 
 all the causal factors can be mapped on one-to-one basis to the safety report; 
 only part of the causal factors can be mapped to the safety reports; or 
 the causal factors are insufficient to cover all the factors identified in the safety reports. 
After reviewing safety reports from various ANSPs and regulators, it was found that data from the 
Norwegian ANSP, Avinor, was best suited for this analysis due to its completeness and organised 
structure. In addition, structured communication with SMEs from EUROCONTROL indicated that, 
based on their working experience with the European countries on safety issues, the Norwegian 
ANSP, has an excellent reputation for reporting of safety occurrences. All the safety reports are 
stored in the MESYS database, which contains original reports and the findings of investigations. This 
reporting system complies with the EUROCONTROL Safety and Regulatory Requirements (ESARR 2) 
(EUROCONTROL, 2009b). Based on these facts, the organisation was evaluated as a reliable source of 
reporting and five years (2008 – 2012) of incident data were gathered accordingly. 
 
The Norwegian ANSP operates 46 airports in Norway, with 12 of these in cooperation with the 
armed forces. Their operations also include air traffic control towers, control centres and technical 
infrastructure for aircraft navigation and surveillance. Figure 4-6 shows the radar locations 
maintained by the ANSP. Most of Norway’s airspace has redundant radar coverage. Table 4-4 
presents Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) and Visual Flight Rules (VFR) aircraft movements for all the 46 
airports in Norway for the period 2008 to 2012. The trend indicates a gradual increase from 2009 to 
2012 after a significant drop from 2008 to 2009. 
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Figure 4-6: Radar locations for Norwegian airspace (Avinor, 2011) 
 
Table 4-4: IFR and VFR Traffic for Norwegian airspace (2008-2012) 
Year Traffic 
2008 870365 
2009 834883 
2010 841859 
2011 869348 
2012 893813 
 
4.5.1 Safety Data Analysis Results 
 
A descriptive statistical analysis (Table 4-5) on the five years of safety data shows that with the 
exception of 2010 and 2011, with the same level of incidents, the number of incidents has been 
increasing significantly. However, the number of accidents decreased significantly from 2010 to 2011 
(from 9 accidents to 3 accidents) despite the increase in air traffic. The accident figure increased 
again from 2011 to 2012 by 4 accidents. 
 
Table 4-5: Incident, Serious Incident and Accident for the year 2008-2012 (Norwegian Airspace) 
Occurrence Class 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Accident 3 4 9 3 7 
Incident 882 1391 1506 1505 1775 
Serious Incident 10 9 9 10 13 
Total 895 1404 1524 1518 1795 
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From the analysis of safety reports, three main causes of incidents/accidents (known as occurrence 
type in the safety report and severity classification in the ESARR2 taxonomy) can be directly 
associated to occurrence related to the ATM functions (defined in Figure 4-3): 
 Insufficient separation- In the absence of prescribed separation minima, a situation in which 
aircraft were perceived to pass too close to each other for pilots to ensure safe separation 
(EUROCONTROL, 2009b). 
 Lack of or reduced ability to provide ATM services-  An event in which elements in the ground 
ATM system performances are unserviceable, insufficient, unavailable or corrupted so that 
the safety of traffic, ensured through the provision of air navigation services, is impaired or 
prevented (EUROCONTROL, 2009b). 
 Inability to provide Air Traffic Services (ATS) - An event in which elements in the ground ATS 
system are unavailable (EUROCONTROL, 2009b). 
These categories are defined in detail in ESARR2 (EUROCONTROL, 2009b) and the MESYS database 
design is in line with the ESARR2 template. Figure 4-7 presents the occurrence type and number for 
the period 2008-2012.  
 
Figure 4-7: Occurrence number and type for 2008-2012 
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Occurrences caused by ‘insufficient separation’ were at the lowest level in 2009 (5 incidents) and 
highest in 2012 (25 incidents). The incidents caused by ‘lack of or reduced ability to provide ATM 
services’ were at the highest level in 2009 (17 incidents) and lowest in 2008 and 2011 (1 incident 
each year). Overall, the ‘insufficient separation’ category has the highest count over the five years 
(77 incidents). There is no significant pattern shown in the occurrence of incidents due to ‘lack of or 
reduced ability to provide ATM services’. However, incidents caused by ‘inability to provide Air 
Traffic Services’ and ‘insufficient separation’ show a continuous increase from 2008 to 2010 and 
2010 to 2012 respectively. No incidents were recorded in 2011 and 2012 for ‘inability to provide Air 
Traffic Services’ category. The statistics in Figure 4-7 include occurrences related to all the ATM 
supporting functions.  However, the occurrences of interest in this thesis are only those related to 
the surveillance function. A review of the safety reports is used to refine the analysis and identify the 
occurrences related to surveillance function. Figure 4-8 shows the number of occurrences related to 
surveillance functions and the other ATM supporting functions. The figure shows that of the 18 
occurrences from ‘inability to provide Air Traffic Services’, 10 are due to the surveillance function. Of 
the 77 occurrences from ‘insufficient separation’, 55 are due to the surveillance function and of the 
29 from ‘lack of or reduced ability to provide ATM services’, 11 are due to the surveillance function. 
The other ATM supporting functions are communication, data processing, navigation and 
information functions as stated by ESARR2. 
 
Figure 4-8: Occurrence related to ATM supporting functions 
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Based on the narratives for the occurrences associated with the surveillance function identified in 
Figure 4-8, the causal factors for each occurrence type are identified and categorised as follows: 
 Contextual Environment- External air transport environment includes the physical 
environment outside the immediate work area such as weather (visibility/turbulence), 
terrain, congested airspace and physical facilities and infrastructure including airports as 
well as broad organizational, economic, regulatory, political and social factors (ICAO, 
1993). This definition is adopted in this thesis. 
 Human Error- Literature search and structured communication with a safety expert from 
EUROCONTROL, Peter Stastny, and the ATM Safety researcher Lucio Vismari from Sao 
Paulo University revealed that ICAO does not have an agreed definition for Human Error. 
Therefore,  the nearest definition relevant to this research is by Isaac and Ruitenberg 
(1999) in which human error in ATM/ATC is defined as “intended actions which are not 
correctly executed”. Hollnagel et al. (1995) refined this definition by adding that, “human 
error, can denote a cause, as well as an action”. This refined definition is adopted in this 
thesis. 
 System Limitation- Defined in Section 4.4. 
 
Table 4-6 shows the percentage of causal factor categories for each occurrence type related to the 
surveillance function, over the five years. The results show that 80% of ‘Inability to provide Air Traffic 
Services’ occurrences are due to ‘system limitation’. For ‘insufficient separation’, 45.45% of the 
causal factors are categorised as ‘system limitation’ with ‘human error’ being 52.73%. The 
corresponding figures for ‘lack of or reduced ability to provide the ATM services’ occurrences are 
54.55% and 45.45%. In summary, the results show that ‘system limitation’ is the highest contributing 
factor to the occurrences due to ‘lack of or reduced ability to provide the ATM services’ and ‘Inability 
to provide Air Traffic Services’.  
 
Table 4-6: Categorisation of causal factors for occurrence related to surveillance function 
Occurrence Type Categorisation of Causal Factors 
Contextual 
Environment 
Human 
Error 
System 
Limitation 
Lack of or reduced ability to provide Air 
Traffic Services 
0% 45.45% 54.55% 
Inability to provide Air Traffic Services 10% 10% 80% 
Insufficient separation 1.82% 52.73% 45.45% 
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A set of questions were raised to verify and identify the underlying causes of the findings in Figures 
4-7 to 4-8 and Table 4-6 from an operational point of view. Structured communication with five ATM 
personnel (Table 4-2) was conducted on 24 March 2013 at Avinor, Norway to discuss the questions. 
The results are presented in Table 4-7. 
 
Table 4-7: Questionnaire to Avinor 
Questions Response from Avinor 
The analysis in Figure 4-7 shows continuous 
increase in occurrence due to ‘Inability to 
provide ATS’ (2008-2010). Further analysis in 
Table 4-6 shows that 80% of the causes for the 
occurrences are due to ‘System Limitation’ 
related to surveillance function. What are the 
plausible reasons for this?  However, this, 
significantly improved to zero occurrence in the 
last two consecutive years, 2011 and 2012. What 
are the plausible reasons for this drastic 
improvement?  
Before 2010, technical issues involving ATC 
systems where considered as occurrences, hence 
logged in the MESYS database. However, after 
2010, they were no longer recorded in the 
MESYS. This may have been the justification for 
the improvements seen in 2011 and 2012. In 
addition, there was no radar fall out experienced 
in the two years. Avinor feels it has more stable 
technical systems in the past few years. A 
number of occurrences of radar fade out were 
experienced within the years (2008-2010) 
particularly in the North of Norway. 
Figure 4-7 shows a continuous increase from 
year 2008 – 2012 except for a small decrease in 
2009 for occurrence due to ‘Insufficient 
Separation’.  Based on the analysis in Figure 4-8, 
70% of the occurrences are related to the 
Surveillance Function.  Further analysis on the 
70% of the occurrences, indicated that 52.7% are 
due to Human Error and 45.45% are due to 
System Limitation. What is your view on this?  
No comments were given on the Human Errors 
found; instead, Avinor stated that, the figures 
found should reflect the error. Avinor added that 
any degradation of a system that supports 
separation services to aircraft results in larger 
aircraft separation. Hence, this is also considered 
as an occurrence. 
The number of occurrences due to ‘Lack of or 
reduced ability to provide ATM services’ has 
been decreasing from 2009 -2012. What is the 
plausible reason for this improvement?  
Avinor stated that the following reasons may 
have contributed to the improvements seen: 
 More stable systems in the past few 
years; 
 Exclusion of technical issues from 
MESYS; 
 Under-reporting in some units; and 
 No automatic comparison of reporting 
with “actual” incidents. 
 
The safety data analysis and the questionnaire indicate that the incidents identified are mainly 
related to the limitations in the current surveillance system and that the incident numbers are also 
partially influenced by the reporting culture. 
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Therefore the incidents identified under the ‘system limitation’ category (Table 4-6) from the safety 
reports, are analysed further to extract their causal factors, and then grouped and mapped to the 
causal factors identified in Section 4.4 in Table 4-8. 
Table 4-8: Mapping of causal factors (safety report) to derive causal factors 
Causal factors identified from safety reports 
(Norwegian ANSP 2008-2010) for ‘Occurrences’ 
due to the ‘system limitation’ category 
Number of 
occurrence 
Derived causal factors as the 
consequences of limitations in 
the current surveillance 
systems 
1. Short Term Conflict Alert (STCA) not triggered 
due to high speed of aircraft 
1 C1 - Lack of situational 
awareness 
2. Lack of ATC awareness on traffic 3  
3. Lack of pilot awareness on surrounding traffic 3  
1. No situational awareness in certain oceanic 
sectors due to unavailability of radar coverage 
2. VFR aircraft not detected 
3. No radar for operational use in certain areas 
due to difficulty to site radar 
4. Aircraft not visible on a specific radar display 
due to a line-of-sight problem between 
aircraft antenna position and radar station 
when aircraft is in high altitude 
5. No ATC surveillance coverage in uncontrolled 
airspace 
6. No radio communication and track 
identification on radar display 
3 
 
2 
3 
 
2 
 
 
 
1 
 
2 
C2- Limited surveillance 
coverage 
1. Inaccurate track display on radar screen 
2. Inaccurate information on aircraft speed 
1 
1 
C3- Inaccurate positioning 
information 
1. Delay on track update on radar display 3 C4- Low update rate (position 
data) 
1. Radio communication problem 
2. Unavailability of radio coverage in certain 
oceanic and remote areas 
3. Radio frequency congestion 
2 
2 
 
1 
C5- Loss of communication 
1. Unsynchronised traffic information between 
TCAS (aircraft) and ATC 
3 C6- Unsynchronised 
surveillance information 
between flight crew and ATC 
2. Misinterpretation of actual aircraft position - 
ATC 
3. Unsynchronised situational awareness 
between pilot and ATC 
2 
 
 
2 
 
1. Surface Movement Radar (SMR) provides 
poor visibility of track during extreme 
weather condition 
1 C7- Visual deficiencies in 
extreme weather conditions 
2. Unavailability of limited radar coverage due to 
extreme weather condition 
1  
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Another important finding from this analysis is that some causal factors identified from the safety 
reports categorised as due to system limitation, have a correlation with human error. In such cases, 
the effect of system limitation may lead to human error. Table 4-9 and 4-10 show examples of this 
scenario. It is not possible to show the correlation statistically as the variables of correlation are 
based on the interpretation of the safety reports.  
 
Table 4-9: Example scenario (Avinor safety report) that shows correlation between system 
limitation and human error 
Occurrence Occurrence 
Type 
Causal factor 
identified from 
safety report 
Causal factor 
categorisation 
Analysis based on the report 
narrative 
Incident Insufficient 
Separation 
Unsynchronised 
traffic 
information 
between TCAS 
(aircraft) and ATC 
 
System 
Limitation 
Due to the effect of limitation in both 
systems TCAS and ATC Surveillance 
system, there is a tendency for the 
pilot or the controller to make an 
error. The ATC might give a wrong 
separation instruction based on the 
radar estimation or the pilot may 
navigate at wrong separation due to 
TCAS alert. 
 
This scenario can be associated with the Ueberlingan accident.   
“On 1 July 2002 at 21:35:32 hrs a collision between a Tupolev TU154M, which was on a flight from 
Moscow/ Russia to Barcelona/ Spain, and a Boeing B757-200, on a flight from Bergamo/Italy to 
Brussels/Belgium, occurred north of the city of Ueberlingen (Lake of Constance). Both aircraft flew 
according to IFR (Instrument Flight Rules) and were under control of ACC Zurich. After the collision 
both aircraft crashed into an area north of Ueberlingen. There were a total of 71 people on board of 
the two airplanes, none of which survived the crash”   (German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accidents 
Investigation, 2004). 
Table 4-10: Analysis of the Ueberlingen Accident 
Occurrence Occurrence 
Type 
Causal factor 
identified from 
safety report 
Causal factor 
categorisation 
Analysis based on the report narrative 
Accident Insufficient 
Separation 
Unsynchronized 
traffic 
information 
between TCAS 
(aircraft) and ATC 
instructions 
 
System 
Limitation  
The imminent separation infringement was 
not noticed by ATC in time. The instruction 
for the TU154M to descend was given at a 
time when the prescribed separation to 
the B757-200 could not be ensured 
anymore. The TU154M crew followed the 
ATC instruction to descend and continued 
to do so even after TCAS advice them to 
climb. This manoeuvre was performed 
contrary to the generated TCAS RA. 
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The analysis of the Ueberlingen accident in Table 4-10 shows that the unsynchronised surveillance 
information from ATC with the TCAS system led to the human error which finally caused the 
catastrophic event. The incident would have been avoided if both the pilot and ATC had the same 
level of situational awareness of the traffic.  
 
In summary, this analysis shows that the limitations in the current surveillance systems are 
significant as it is the main contribution to all the occurrences related to the surveillance function. 
Hence, improved and high performance surveillance systems are required to support increasing air 
traffic based on the required performance by ICAO. The next section reviews the capabilities of ADS-
B system to overcome the limitations in the current surveillance system to support future air traffic. 
 
4.6  Safety improvement potential of ADS-B 
 
High performance ADS-B positioning information (in terms of accuracy, integrity and update rate) in 
real time is required to enable many ground and airborne applications in the future (Butterworth-
Hayes, 2012). The capabilities of ADS-B are outlined in Chapter 3.  This can be verified by the 
functionalities supported by the airborne applications. For example, on the airport surface, a traffic 
display (CDTI) in the cockpit showing all aircraft taxiing on the maneuvering area and within the 
terminal area, coupled with a background airport map from Flight Information Service Broadcast 
(FIS-B) would improve the pilot’s situational awareness, reduce the risk of runway incursions and 
assist the pilot to navigate around an unfamiliar airport (AirservicesAustralia, 2007). Furthermore, it 
will improve safety during extreme weather and reduced visibility conditions (Herrera et al., 2009). 
In the case of reduced or unavailability of radio communication between pilots and controllers, 
availability of traffic display (CDTI) and assistance to perform separation (ASAS) will aid safe aircraft 
navigation. 
 
The use of In-Trail Procedure (ITP) in a Controller-Pilot Data Link Communication (CPDLC) 
environment is accepted and positively rated by the flight crew and controllers (EUROCONTROL, 
2009a). ADS-B provides safety measure for this application by providing traffic display (CDTI), as a 
complement to more specific ITP information to improve situational awareness in support of flight 
level changes. The CRISTAL-ITP Project (EUROCONTROL, 2009a) concluded that the quality of the 
ADS-B OUT information from the reference aircraft in terms of update rate, accuracy and integrity as 
received was sufficient to support ITP flight trial. The data recorded from the trial also showed that 
the received ADS-B OUT information was compliant with Airborne Traffic Situational Awareness—In-
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Trail Procedure Safety Performance Requirements (ATSA-ITP SPR) (RTCA, 2008). This will enable 
aircraft surveillance in oceanic and remote areas (which did not exist with the current surveillance 
system) resulting in increased safety for aircraft navigation within these areas.  
 
Over the past 20 years, the threat of a mid-air collision occurring on a commercial flight has 
tremendously decreased and is very rare (Zwegers, 2010). This is primarily due to the 
implementation of TCAS.  However, the TCAS system was not designed for small GA aircraft due to 
its size and prohibitive cost (Zwegers, 2010). Therefore, mid-air collisions involving General Aviation 
(GA) still occur, especially with student pilots onboard. 
 
ADS-B data can be used to improve TCAS surveillance and traffic display. This technique is known as 
hybrid surveillance (RTCA, 2006a). The use of ADS-B data (passive surveillance) enables TCAS traffic 
displays to more accurately depict the bearing and velocity of surrounding aircraft. In addition, the 
identity information received through ADS-B allows identification of other aircraft. Furthermore 
ADS-B enables TCAS to track aircraft at a range of more than 100NM compared with 40NM using 
TCAS active surveillance (AirservicesAustralia, 2007). Hence ADS-B improves situational awareness 
and safety for the TCAS application. Despite these advancements, the collision avoidance function 
within TCAS remains unchanged with Hybrid Surveillance; ADS-B information is not used as input to 
calculate resolution advisories. It is envisaged that in the future, ADS-B data to be used in the TCAS 
collision avoidance function taking advantage of its high performance (accuracy and update 
interval). 
 
This is supported by research conducted by the Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University (ERAU). ERAU 
conducted a case study with 100 training aircraft fully equipped with ADS-B in a dense airspace. The 
study (Zwegers, 2010) indicated that ADS-B has dramatically decreased the risk of mid-air collision in 
a very congested airspace by: 
 providing pilots with real-time traffic information with high accuracy, in which to implement 
conflict detection and resolution, especially below radar coverage (low altitude and ground 
information), thereby avoiding mid-air collision and runway incursion; 
 providing pilots with graphical and textual weather information; and 
 providing ANSP with real-time information of aircraft location for planning purpose 
(spreading out aircraft to minimise congestion) and flight following (tracking). 
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Furthermore, recordings of ADS-B data can be used by the stakeholders (airline operators, ANSP and 
regulators) to increase safety and efficiency practices (e.g. incident/accident investigation, pattern 
flow in/out airspace study, address noise complaint).  
 
4.6.1 How ADS-B can improve the limitations in the current surveillance system? 
  
It is clear that the performance of ADS-B is such that it has the potential to support the increase in 
air travel demand which current surveillance systems, given their operational limitations, cannot 
achieve. Table 4-11 shows a comparison of the ADS-B system and the current surveillance system 
based on the surveillance applications required by ICAO to accommodate the increasing air travel 
demand.  
 
Table 4-11: A Comparison of the ADS-B system and the current surveillance system based on 
applications required by ICAO to accommodate increasing traffic 
Surveillance 
Application 
Current Surveillance System ADS-B System 
Improved 
situational 
awareness of 
the air traffic 
Limited situational awareness in 
remote and oceanic areas, restricted to 
line of sight and subject to severe 
signal fading and interference. 
Situational awareness in a particular area depends 
on the movement of ADS-B equipped aircraft in 
that area at time (t).  
Aircraft are independent of ATC to obtain 
situational awareness. 
Radar 
equivalent 
Able to detect both cooperative (SSR) 
and non-cooperative (PSR) target 
within limited range. 
Provides improved accuracy and higher position 
update rate, which will enhance the surveillance 
service. Only detects ADS-B equipped targets. 
Enhanced 
visual 
acquisition 
Limited visual acquisition. 
Conventional “see and avoid” has 
reached its limit due to the increasing 
speed of aircraft, the poor visibility in 
modern cockpit and flight crew 
workload in some phases of flight. 
Provides enhanced visual acquisition capability with 
respect to “see and avoid” procedure which applies 
to VFR/VFR and IFR/VFR operations. This is 
provided by use of Cockpit Display of Traffic 
Information (CDTI) application.  
Airport 
surface 
operations 
The Surface Movement Radar (SMR) 
output deteriorates during heavy rain 
and vanishes due to line of sight. 
ADS-B provides a new source of airport surveillance 
information for safer and more efficient ground 
movement management in airports. Airport ground 
vehicles should also be equipped with ADS-B to 
generate a complete situational awareness display.  
Enhanced 
separation 
Provide low update rate of 4s-12s. The improved accuracy and an update rate of 1-2 
seconds enable reduced separation. Subsequently, 
this will enable redistribution of tasks related to 
sequencing and merging of traffic between the ATC 
and aircraft. It will also enable in-trail procedures in 
non-radar airspace, allowing ADS-B equipped 
aircraft to descend and climb through each others’ 
flight level. This will result in optimised airspace 
capacity utilization. 
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Potential mitigations based on the ADS-B system for the causal factors due to the limitations in the 
current surveillance systems (derived in Section 4.4) are described in Table 4-12. 
 
Table 4-12: Potential mitigations for the limitations of the current surveillance systems 
Derived causal factors for current 
system limitations (Section 4.4) 
Potential mitigation based on ADS-B system 
C1 Lack of situational awareness Flight crew will have complete situational awareness of all ADS-B 
equipped aircraft and geographical structure for a specified range. 
Controllers will also have complete visual representation of air traffic 
in their territory. 
C2 Limited surveillance coverage ADS-B provides surveillance coverage in both radar and non-radar 
airspace. 
C3 Inaccurate positioning 
information 
ADS-B provides accurate positioning information derived from GNSS. 
C4 Low update rate (position data) ADS-B provides an update rate of (1-2) seconds in en-route and less 
than 1 second update rate in the terminal area. 
C5 Loss of communication ADS-B provides continuous broadcast of the aircraft position to ATC 
centers in the ground.  
C6 Unsynchronised surveillance 
information between flight crew 
and ATC 
Flight crew and controllers will have similar level of situational 
awareness. 
C7 Visual deficiencies in extreme 
weather conditions 
Cockpit Display of Traffic Information (CDTI) application supported by 
the ADS-B system will provide complete visual aid to flight crew 
despite of the weather condition. 
 
4.7 Summary 
 
This Chapter has identified and validated that, limitations exist in the current surveillance systems. 
The impacts of these limitations are increasing incidents and inability to support the required 
applications to cater for enhanced flight operations and future air traffic volume. In order to solve 
these issues, the capabilities of ADS-B system are analyzed. Findings in Section 4.6 and analysis in 
Tables 4-11 and 4-12 show that the system has promising capabilities to improve airspace capacity 
by providing accurate aircraft positioning information at high update rates and enhance traffic 
handling capacity by providing separation assistance and situational awareness to flight crew. In 
addition, high system performance (i.e. accuracy, reliability, integrity, availability) in comparison to 
the current surveillance systems should lead to improved system safety. However, the safety level of 
the ADS-B system has to be assessed and validated in various operational environments prior to 
consideration for global implementation by all stakeholders. It is important to have a systematic 
approach to assess the safety level of a safety critical system. The next Chapter presents a 
comprehensive, reliable and robust safety assessment framework for ADS-B system to ensure that 
the system is acceptable safety to operate in any operational environment. 
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Chapter 5  
Safety Assessment Framework for ADS-B 
 
 
This Chapter develops a comprehensive safety assessment framework for the ADS-B system, taking 
into account the limitations of the current systems and the capabilities of ADS-B identified in the 
previous chapters.  
 
The first part of this Chapter, defines safety assessment, performance assessment and safety case. 
The second reviews the existing safety assessment approaches and safety cases for ADS-B system. 
Finally, the Chapter describes in detail the proposed ‘Safety Assessment Framework for the ADS-B 
System’ together with the relevant performance and safety level requirements. 
 
5.1 Background 
 
The ADS-B system is envisioned to support many new application concepts being developed for the 
future ATM operations e.g. reduced separation minima, complete situational awareness for flight 
crew and controllers, free flight and self separation. This is in line with the new concept of operation, 
based on 4D trajectory management. Each application concept can have its own safety assessment 
program. For example, a trial study on the safety and effectiveness of the In-Trail Procedure (ITP) 
application to enable aircraft surveillance in oceanic and remote areas, was conducted by 
EUROCONTROL in collaboration with Airbus (EUROCONTROL, 2009a). However, the safety and 
reliability of the source (ADS-B system) for the applications was neither assessed nor validated prior 
to the trial.  
 
ICAO defines safety as “the state in which the possibility of harm to persons or of property damage is 
reduced to, and maintained at or below, an acceptable level through a continuing process of hazard 
identification and safety risk management” (ICAO, 2009c). This definition is not suitable for this 
thesis because it provides a general definition for operations. As this thesis focuses on the ADS-B 
system, and its operations within a specified operational environment, safety is defined as the state 
in which, the system operates within the required performance level in a nominal operational 
environment, and is able to notify users (within a specified time period) on its failure to function 
based on the requirements to avoid the possibility of harm to persons or property. 
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Hollnagel (2014) defines Safety-I as “a condition where the number of adverse outcomes was as low 
as possible”. Safety-I is measured by counting the number of failures, responding to what goes 
wrong and identifying the risk of the failures. This definition is in line with ICAO’s definition.  
Hollnagel also looked at safety from a different angle whereby focusing on what goes right rather 
than what goes wrong (Safety-II). Safety-II is measured by counting the number of cases where 
things go right (Hollnagel, 2014). Safety-I is a traditional risk assessment approach and hence, more 
established than the Safety-II approach. 
 
The safety definition proposed in this thesis combines both approaches, Safety-I and Safety-II. 
However, the assessment conducted in this thesis only focuses on what may go wrong in the ADS-B 
system rather than what goes right. Safety-II requires the system to be operational for a duration 
that enables the safety analyst to analyze/study how the system functions succeed to provide the 
daily required performance level. It is a proactive rather than reactive approach, providing potentials 
for early intervention. ADS-B is still in its early implementation or trial in most part of the globe apart 
from Australia. Future work will improve the ADS-B safety assessment framework proposed in this 
thesis by reaping and integrating the Safety-II approach advantages into the framework. 
 
The ADS-B system is very complex, being highly dependent on the navigation and communication 
elements. Hence, it is prone to more failure modes in comparison to the radar system. Therefore, it 
requires a rigorous, clear and comprehensive safety assessment method to ensure that the system is 
acceptably safe to operate in any particular context. Before developing a safety assessment method, 
it is important to understand and differentiate between safety assessment, performance assessment 
and safety case. 
 
5.2 Safety Assessment, Safety Case and Performance Assessment 
 
EUROCONTROL (2010d) envisages that the distinctions between safety assessment and safety case 
must be understood before they are established. EUROCONTROL states that safety assessment looks 
at hazards, and their effects and mitigations, and makes reasonable assumptions about the behavior 
of the system elements (such as their reliability and accuracy levels or failure rates) so as to be able 
to assess quantitatively the likelihood of hazards resulting in incidents or accidents. On the other 
hand a safety case collects data to verify that the assumptions are valid in a real life situation. The 
worthiness of a safety case depends on the suitability of the outcome to verify the parameters set in 
the safety assessment phase.  
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Performance assessment captures system behavior. Its objective is to ensure that the system will 
perform its intended function, while a safety assessment indicates that the system will not induce 
dangerous situations. Therefore, performance covers the nominal (non-adjusted) modes of 
operation whereas safety focuses on non nominal modes (ICAO, 2006b). Performance requirements 
such as accuracy, integrity and availability are integral to safety assurance of the ATC surveillance 
system (ICAO, 2006b). In order to ensure that ADS-B implementation is safe, both safety and 
performance assessments must be undertaken, whereby hazards are identified and barriers are 
introduced to reduce the risk that may be caused by these hazards. 
 
5.2.1 Safety Assessment 
 
Safety assessment is a structured and systematic process for the identification of hazards and 
assessment of the risk associated with each hazard. A safety assessment based on these concepts is 
essentially a process for finding answers to three fundamental questions (ICAO, 2005): 
 What could go wrong? 
 What would be the consequences? and 
 How often is it likely to occur? 
In relation to the equipment to be used, a safety assessment should consider the following sources 
of faults: 
 Hardware faults; 
 Software malfunctions; 
 Environmental conditions; 
 Dependencies on external services; and 
 Operating and maintenance procedures. 
5.2.1.1  Safety significant factors 
 
According to ICAO, safety assessment shall consider all relevant factors determined to be safety-
significant, including (ICAO, 2005): 
a) types of aircraft and their performance characteristics, including aircraft navigation 
capabilities and navigation performance; 
b) traffic density and distribution; 
c) airspace complexity, ATS route structure and classification of the airspace; 
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d) aerodrome layout, including runway configurations, runway lengths and taxiways 
configuration; 
e) type of air-ground communications and time parameters for communication dialogues, 
including controller intervention capability; 
f) type and capabilities of surveillance system, and the availability of systems providing 
controller support and alert functions; and 
g) any significant local or regional weather phenomena. 
In this thesis, the proposed safety assessment framework focuses on the ADS-B system itself 
including the role of the human, operational environment and operational procedures. 
 
5.2.1.2 The need for safety assessment 
 
ICAO has clearly defined the need for safety assessment and when it is conducted. A safety 
assessment is required for significant airspace reorganizations, significant changes in the provision of 
ATS procedures applicable to an airspace or an aerodrome, and the introduction of new equipment, 
systems or facilities, such as (ICAO, 2005): 
a) a reduced separation minimum to be applied within an airspace or at an aerodrome; 
b) a new operating procedure, including departure and arrival procedures, to be applied within 
an airspace or at an aerodrome; 
c) a reorganization of the ATS route structure; 
d) a resectorization of an airspace; 
e) physical changes to the layout of runways and/or taxiways at an aerodrome; and 
f) implementation of new communications, surveillance or other safety significant systems and 
equipment, including those providing new functionality or capabilities. 
 
Proposals are implemented only when the assessment has shown that an acceptable level of safety 
is achieved. The ICAO adds that, if the result of an assessment is that the system under review does 
not satisfy the safety assessment criteria, it is necessary to find some means of modifying the system 
in order to reduce the risk. This process is called risk mitigation. Therefore, the development of 
mitigation measures is an integral part of the assessment process, since the adequacy of the 
proposed mitigation measures must be tested by re-evaluating what the risk would be with the 
mitigation measures in place. 
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Therefore, the safety assessment framework in this thesis is developed to assess performance and 
validate safety of the ADS-B system as a surveillance source to the controller and the flight crew. The 
framework also aims to identify the risks related to the system implementation and to propose 
mitigations to reduce the identified risks based on the assessment. 
 
5.2.1.3  Acceptable Level of Safety 
 
The ultimate goal of any safety assessment method is to satisfy ‘an acceptable level of safety’. Also 
referred to as the target level of safety (TLS), the way this term is defined is very subjective. The 
ICAO (2001a) specifies safety requirements in terms of TLS, which represents the risk of a fatal 
accident during the entire operation of an aircraft from the point it leaves the gate until it arrives at 
the destination gate (Schuster and Ochieng, 2011). The ICAO states that the TLS of the ATM system 
as a whole must be better than one fatal event per million operations (or approximately one fatal 
accident per 1.0E-07 flight hour) (Andrew and Thompson, 2007). Logically, the list of safety 
significant factors explained in section 5.2.1.1 should contribute to the above safety level figure 
stated by the ICAO. However, no absolute fraction of each factor is derived to date. A study by 
MITRE Corporation (Jones, 2005) recommended that the failure rate assigned to surveillance 
position measurement error of 2.0E-12 per surveillance report, which is an extremely demanding 
requirement.  
 
In this thesis, the failure rate of a surveillance position derived by the ADS-B system is measured and 
the contributing factors are identified in Chapter 6. It is important to identify the sources that 
contribute to failures to enable mitigations or barriers to be implemented. As explained in Chapter 2, 
the Required Surveillance Performance (RSP) is derived based on the radar parameters. Hence, the 
issue with the RSP is the ability of new surveillance systems to achieve the required safety standards. 
The RSP should be derived independent of the surveillance technology giving flexibility to Air 
Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) to deploy any type of technology suitable to their operational 
environment and budget having met the required safety standards. According to the M.I.T Lincoln 
Laboratory (Andrew and Thompson, 2007), a standard called the Required Total System 
Performance (RTSP) is developed as part of the NextGen concept. RTSP will involve a set of 
performance requirements covering communication, navigation and surveillance. The idea of RTSP 
fits the performance requirements of ADS-B system being highly dependent on the navigation and 
communication functions. The only generic requirements available to date for surveillance systems 
implementation independent of technology, is the Surveillance Performance and Interoperability 
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Implementing Rule (SPI-IR) (EUROCONTROL, 2011d), explained in Chapter 3. The ICAO has also 
provided a guide for Baseline ADS-B service parameters (ICAO, 2007d). The baseline parameters 
given cater for operational scenarios that complement the current operating environments, for 
example, radar or procedural control environment.  
 
Another approach to define ‘acceptable level of safety’ is to use a comparative approach, in which, 
the risk of the new system is not greater than the reference system. This approach is adopted in this 
thesis as discussed in detail in section 5.3.2. 
 
The next section reviews the existing system safety assessment approaches.  
 
5.3 Existing safety assessment approaches 
 
A number of approaches exist to assess the safety level of a system. These include ‘Evaluation of 
system risk against a threshold value (Absolute Method)’(ICAO, 1998c); ‘Comparison with a 
reference system (Relative Method)’(ICAO, 1998c) and (Butcher, 2002); and ‘Safety assessment 
based on Fluid Stochastic Petri Nets’ (Vismari, 2008). However, none of these methods are 
applicable fully to assess the ADS-B system due to its complex nature. In addition to the methods 
stated above, Hammer (2007) and Zeitlin (2001) proposed safety assessment methods for ADS-B 
based applications, with the current focus being on implementation. In this thesis, the aim is to 
develop a comprehensive safety assessment approach for ADS-B to ensure that the system is 
acceptably safe to support any airborne or ground based applications for ATC and aircraft navigation 
operations. It is crucial to verify that the data sources are reliable, before being used in any 
application to support operations. The development of a safety assessment approach for a complex 
and safety critical system, requires a detailed understanding of the system architecture including 
functionality and physical architecture.  
 
5.3.1 Evaluation of risk against threshold value (Absolute Method) 
 
This approach is proposed by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). It is also known as 
the target-level-of-safety approach. It applies the Reich Model (Reich, 1964) as the modeling and 
analyses method, involves a number of tasks including:  
 defining the proposed system by identifying its functional elements and their parameters;  
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 setting evaluation criteria by defining the safety metrics values or safety integrity level (SIL); 
identifying the potential hazards that may lead to collision;  
 estimating the frequency of each hazard based on historical events, specialists judgements 
or indirectly from system parameters;  
 modeling the consequences of each hazard and identifying their severity degree; and 
 finally estimating the risk by applying the formula, Risk(Hazard i) = Frequency 
*Consequences. 
 
If the risk value is less than the SIL value, then the proposed system is considered to be safe. Figure 
5-1 depicts this approach. The safety level of the new system is calculated directly from models and 
data. However, this approach may not produce an accurate output due to the use of historical 
hazard data. In addition the pre-established value of the SIL is based on a different system e.g. radar 
system, which may have different parameters from the proposed system. Furthermore, this 
approach is based on a mathematical model with limitations, including inability to model controller’s 
feedback and the flight crew’s intervention when an aircraft is on a collision route. 
Setting evaluation criteria
Frequency Estimation Consequence modelling
Risk Estimation
Identification of Hazards
Proposed System definition
 
Figure 5-1: Evaluation of Risk against threshold value (Absolute Method) (ICAO, 1998c) 
 
5.3.2 Comparison with a reference system (relative method) 
 
This approach is also proposed by the ICAO. The safety evaluation based on this approach is made by 
comparing the performance parameters of the new system to a reference system. The reference 
system should be a system already in use and accepted as providing adequate safety. The approach 
is also conditioned upon the fact that both systems must be similar based on a set of minimum 
requirements. This approach is conducted in three steps:  
 describing the differences and similarities between the two systems;  
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 verifying each analysed parameter if the differences can affect the risks, this analysis is done 
using a mathematical technique or operational judgement; and  
 finally comparing the level of safety for each parameter.  
 
However, the relative method cannot be applied when the new system is significantly different from 
the reference system. This approach has the advantage that it does not require complete modelling 
of all the factors that impact safety (Andrew and Thompson, 2007). Butcher (2002) applied the 
relative method by using the radar system as the reference system to validate ADS-B system safety. 
The work concluded that the ADS-B system is as safe as the radar system. The main reason why this 
is not acceptable is that the performance of ADS-B must be significantly higher than radar, to 
support the surveillance requirements for ever increasing air traffic. Moreover, the radar system is 
substantially different than the ADS-B system. 
 
 
 
5.3.3 Safety assessment method based on Fluid Stochastic Petri Nets (FSPN) 
 
This approach combines the two approaches proposed by the ICAO in section 5.3.1 and 5.3.2. It is 
based on modeling, simulation and comparison with the radar system. It applies Fluid Stochastic 
Petri Nets (FSPN) as the modeling and analyses method. Figure 5-2 illustrates each step in the 
approach. However, it does not produce an accurate output due to the historical data used as input 
to the risk evaluation model. Furthermore, it is not suitable for a system which does not have a 
reference system.  
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Figure 5-2: Safety assessment method based on Fluid Stochastic Petri Nets (FSPN)(Vismari, 2008) 
 
5.3.4 Issues with the existing system safety assessment approaches 
   
Based on the analysis of the safety assessment approaches in the previous sections, the limitations 
of the existing approaches are summarized in Table 5-1.  
 
Table 5-1: Issues with existing system safety assessment approaches 
Safety Assessment Method Issues 
Evaluation of system risk against a threshold value 
(Absolute Method) 
 Does not provide an accurate output due to 
historical hazard data  
 The pre-established Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 
value is based on the radar system, which has a 
different set of parameters to ADS-B. 
 Based on a mathematical model (Reich Model, 
1964) which is unable to take into account 
human factors within the ATC loop. 
Comparison with Reference System (Relative 
Method) 
 Cannot be applied when the new system is 
significantly different from the reference system. 
Safety assessment based on Fluid Stochastic Petri 
Nets 
 Does not produce an accurate output due to the 
imprecise input values to the risk evaluation 
model. 
 Not suitable for systems without a reference 
system. 
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5.4 Safety Case 
 
The aim of a safety case is to enable system implementers to assure themselves and their regulators 
that the system under consideration for implementation will deliver an acceptable level of safety 
throughout its lifetime. This is publicized through documented logical arguments and the provision 
of supporting evidence. The development of a safety case is not an alternative to carrying out a 
safety assessment; instead it is a mean of structuring and documenting a summary of the results of a 
safety assessment to provide the evidence that the new system (service) can be considered safe 
(EUROCONTROL, 2006b). 
 
5.4.1 Generic Safety Case development manual 
 
EUROCONTROL has developed a generic safety case development manual (EUROCONTROL, 2006b). 
Figure 5-3 depicts the generic safety case development concept suggested by EUROCONTROL. 
Because of its generic nature, the safety case development manual is not sufficient for 
implementation of specific safety cases. Other documents such as the Safety Assessment Manual 
(EUROCONTROL, 2010d) could be required to complement it. However, the overall concept is logical 
and acceptable if precise methods for each step in the safety case development concept in Figure 5-
3 are provided.  
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Figure 5-3: Safety Cases and the Project Safety Lifecycle (EUROCONTROL, 2006b) 
 
5.4.2 Existing Safety Cases for ADS-B 
 
In this section, various safety cases developed for the ADS-B system by EUROCONTROL, NATS, FAA 
and Airservices Australia, are discussed.  
5.4.2.1  EUROCONTROL 
 
EUROCONTROL has implemented preliminary safety cases for the ADS-B system in radar and non-
radar airspace under the CASCADE programme. The CASCADE programme coordinates the 
deployment of initial ADS-B applications and Wide Area Multilateration (WAM) in Europe. The 
programme covers both ground surveillance (i.e. “ADS-B OUT” and WAM) as well as airborne 
surveillance applications (i.e. “ADS-B IN” / Air Traffic Situational Awareness (ATSAW)). The key 
deliverables of the CASCADE programme are: standardization, certification and integration support 
for the applications as well as airborne and ground based system components; safety case activities; 
validation of ADS-B applications and systems; functional performance analysis and, as necessary, 
support to the rectification of system anomalies. In the context of the CASCADE program, a 
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Preliminary Safety Case (PSC) does not include implementation, transition and in-service related 
issues; it includes design stages of the intended system, related requirements considering typical 
operating environment characteristics such as traffic density and the separation minima to be 
applied. The various PSCs developed are: 
 PSC for ADS-B in Non Radar Area (NRA) (EUROCONTROL, 2008c) 
 PSC for ADS-B in Radar Area (RAD) (EUROCONTROL, 2010c) 
 Review of PSC for ADS-B in Radar Area (RAD) (Eurocontrol Safety Regulation Commission 
2011) 
 PSC for ADS-B in Airport Surface Surveillance (APT) (EUROCONTROL, 2011b) 
 PSC for ADS-B in Visual Separation on Approach (VSA) (EUROCONTROL, 2011c) 
 
In this thesis, the relevant concepts of PSC for ADS-B in NRA and PSC for ADS-B in RAD are discussed. 
 
5.4.2.1.1 Preliminary Safety Case for Enhanced Air Traffic Services in Non-Radar Area 
using ADS-B Surveillance (PSC ADS-B NRA)  
 
The purpose of this PSC is to document the results of the assessment of ADS-B to support and 
enhance Air Traffic Services (ATS) in both en-route and Terminal Area (TMA) airspace without radar 
surveillance. The safety assessment method applied is comparison with radar-based ATS operations 
using single Mode A/C SSR radar as a sole surveillance means in the nominal mode of operation and  
target level of safety method (EUROCONTROL, 2008c) (compliant with ESARR4 (EUROCONTROL, 
2001) safety target values) in non-nominal mode of operation. The safety standard applied in this 
PSC ADS-B NRA is the “Safety Performance and Interoperability Requirements Document for ADS-B 
NRA application”(RTCA, 2006b). The PSC concludes that, ADS-B surveillance in non-radar areas for 
ATS is acceptably safe on the basis that the quality of service of ADS-B surveillance is similar to SSR 
radar and that appropriate (VHF) air-ground communication coverage is available. 
5.4.2.1.2 Preliminary Safety Case for Air Traffic Control Services in Radar Area using 
ADS-B Surveillance (PSC ADS-B RAD)  
 
The purpose of this PSC is to demonstrate the use of ADS-B to provide surveillance information 
together with radar to support Air Traffic Control Service (ATC) in radar airspace. The safety 
assessment method applied for this safety case is the reference method approach using only 
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multiple radars as the reference system for the combination of ADS-B and other radar. The PSC 
considers three different operating scenarios: 
 
Scenario 1: ATC services in a TMA area with medium traffic density (i.e. an average of 6 flight hours 
controlled per sector hour and a maximum of 15 instantaneous aircraft count in a sector), applying 3 
NM as separation minima. The surveillance systems considered here for supporting the ATC services 
are based on: 
 ADS-B-RAD system: ADS-B and PSR surveillance means. 
 Reference system: SSR and PSR surveillance means. 
 
Scenario 2: ATC services in En-route airspace with high traffic density (i.e. an average of 6 flight 
hours controlled per sector hour and a maximum of 20 instantaneous count aircraft in a sector), 
applying 5 NM as separation minima. Two sub-cases are used for the surveillance systems 
supporting the ATC services based on: 
Case 2.1 
 ADS-B-RAD system: ADS-B and SSR as surveillance means 
 Reference system: two SSR as surveillance means 
Case 2.2 
 ADS-B-RAD system: ADS-B and Mode S (elementary surveillance) as surveillance means 
 Reference system: two Mode S as surveillance means 
 
Scenario 3: ATC services in TMA airspace with high traffic density (i.e. an average of 6 flight hours 
controlled per sector hour and a maximum of 15 instantaneous count aircraft in a sector), applying: 
 3 NM as separation minima in the wide area 
 2.5 NM separation minima for succeeding aircraft on the same final, and 
 2 NM separation minima for succeeding aircraft on adjacent ILS/MLS 
The surveillance systems considered in this scenario for supporting the ATC services are based on: 
 ADS-B-RAD system: ADS-B and PSR and SSR as surveillance means 
 Reference system: two SSR and PSR as surveillance means 
 
This PSC concludes that the use of ADS-B to provide surveillance information together with radar to 
support ATC service shows similar performance level to the reference system in the stated operating 
conditions. 
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5.4.2.1.3 CRISTAL UK – ADS-B in South East England 
 
EUROCONTROL funded another case study called CRISTAL UK – ADS-B in South East England (NATS, 
2007), led by NATS and Helios to assess the implementation of ADS-B in South East England due to 
Terminal Manoeuring Area (TMA) resectorisation in 2004. The assessment focused on the capability 
of ADS-B to supplement the radar coverage. The case study concluded that, ADS-B could supplement 
low level radar surveillance coverage with two ADS-B ground stations located at the current NATS 
infrastructure sites. However, the study also concluded that, the use of ADS-B alone may not be 
sufficient to provide 3NM separation service. Nonetheless, there was no credible methodology used 
to support this case study. 
5.4.2.1.4 CRISTAL RAD HD 
 
NATS, the main Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) in the UK has planned to either supplement 
or replace existing en-route radar coverage with WAM and the ADS-B system from 2019 (NATS, 
2011a). The decision on the technology option to replace the current en-route Mode-S radars is to 
be taken by 2015. In achieving this objective, it was deemed necessary to deploy a pre-operational 
standard WAM/ADS-B system for validation and trials in high density and complex environment in 
the UK airspace under the CRISTAL RAD HD project. This was in line with the CASCADE Pre-
operational validation exercise for the ADS-B RAD project. The project used the infrastructure 
installed under the CRISTAL RAD HD project to complete the safety case for its operation and 
validation of the ADS-B RAD preliminary safety case (EUROCONTROL, 2010c). The CRISTAL RAD HD 
has further expanded its scope to develop a detailed description of how a multi-sensor tracked 
environment could operate in the London TMA. This was verified by a discussion with Craig Foster, 
Project Manager of the Crystal Project at NATS. The ATC operations in the UK aim to merge old and 
new surveillance technologies using multi-sensor  tracker called ARTAS (EUROCONTROL, 2001-
2013a). 
5.4.2.2  Airservices Australia 
 
Airservices Australia has conducted an operational trial of ADS-B for Air Traffic Control (ATC) 
surveillance in the Burnett Basin of Queensland. The safety case design and implementation was 
developed based on a comparison of ADS-B to radar performance (ICAO, 2006b). The findings from 
the comparison study for ADS-B and SSR conducted by Airservices Australia showed that ADS-B 
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tracks are solid and without any significant multipath problems or gaps. The study also highlighted 
that ADS-B coverage is very close to that of radar. The minor differences identified are due to the 
antenna heights. In addition, the study also found that one particular aircraft used ADS-B in excess of 
360NM. A statement by Airservices Australia states that, it has been agreed that if ADS-B can be 
demonstrated to be as good as radar in the relevant system performance measures, then it can be 
used to deliver the services that radar currently supports. Apart from Airservices Australia, many 
other ANSPs and regulators worldwide such as EUROCONTROL, FAA, and others perform ADS-B 
system assessment using radar system as the baseline. The ICAO has designed a generic safety case 
based on a safety case conducted by Airservices Australia on the operational use of ADS-B in non-
radar airspace (ICAO, 2003d). The safety case is based on the reference system approach by the 
ICAO (refer to section 5.3.2). 
5.4.2.3  The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has conducted a number of trials in non-radar areas such 
as Capstone in Alaska. The Capstone project was designed to determine the safety and efficiency 
levels of ADS-B technology in Alaska and to demonstrate its capabilities for use nationally. Alaska 
was chosen as the test-bed due to its reliance on air transport more than other states, whereby only 
10% of the state is accessible by road. In addition, Alaska contributes 35% of the nation’s air 
transport accidents due to the state’s mountainous terrain and extreme winter climate. A study by 
MITRE and the University of Alaska found that from year 2000 to 2004, the rate of accidents for ADS-
B equipped aircraft was reduced by 47% (Federal Aviation Administration, 2011a). Therefore the 
Capstone project demonstrated that ADS-B would improve aviation safety in Alaska.  
 
The other trials for ADS-B demonstration were conducted in Philadelphia and the Gulf of Mexico, 
where the traffic has grown at twice the rate in domestic airspace over the last decade (Esler, 2007). 
Radar coverage is not possible over the Gulf of Mexico due to its geographical structure. However, 
air traffic in the Gulf is as busy as the traffic in the East Coast Corridor, with 5000 to 9000 helicopters 
offshore platform operations daily including commercial flights between US, Mexico, and South 
America. Low altitude aircraft are isolated and high altitude commercial aircraft are separated by 
100 miles to ensure safety due to unavailability of radar surveillance, and lack of communication and 
weather information. These lead to restricted capacity and efficiency (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2011a). Initial ADS-B surveillance in the Gulf began in December 2009. This enabled 
controllers to separate high-altitude ADS-B equipped aircraft over the Gulf, reducing the 100 miles 
separation to 5NM in trail. This also enabled low altitude helicopters to receive air traffic services 
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and weather information. The trial demonstrated a significant improvement in the aviation 
operation in the Gulf. However, in August 2010, an 11 hours ADS-B outage due to failure of the 
ground station network without any backup affected air traffic control over the Gulf. The outage also 
the affected FAA’s Surveillance Broadcast Services (SBS) which was intended to monitor the ground 
station performance (Office of Inspector General, 2011). The FAA in collaboration with UPS 
Corporation also conducted an ADS-B terminal area proof of concept at the freight carrier’s hub in 
Louisville. This trial was intended to increase airport capacity and address runway incursions at the 
busy cargo hub (Esler, 2007). The numerical outcomes of the trial are not publicly available. 
However, as a result of the successful trial, currently the controllers in Louisville are operating using 
ADS-B. Four ADS-B ground stations give the controllers coverage more than 60NM in all directions 
up to 10000 feet (Federal Aviation Administration-SBS ESA, 2013).  
 
Based on the various safety cases designed and implemented by EUROCONTROL, Airservices 
Australia and FAA, it is obvious that there is no defensible evidence on the safety assessment of the 
ADS-B system. The safety argument used by the safety cases designed and conducted by 
EUROCONTROL and Airservices Australia is that, if the new system is able to perform at the level of 
the radar system, then it is considered safe. The FAA trials do not encompass any safety assessment. 
The safety argument for the trials conducted is based on the improvements on the number of 
incidents after the implementation of the ADS-B system. In this thesis, a comprehensive and 
defensible safety assessment framework is developed for the ADS-B system. The framework is 
developed based on the assumption that the ADS-B system is the sole surveillance source for the 
ATC in dense airspace. The next section describes the proposed framework in detail. 
 
5.5 Proposed Safety Assessment Framework for ADS-B 
 
In order to address the limitations identified in section 5.3 and 5.4, this thesis proposes a novel 
safety assessment framework for the ADS-B system. The proposed framework combines Fault Based 
Safety Assessment (FBSA) and Performance Based Safety Assessment (PBSA) methods. The FBSA is 
based on a Failure Modes Identification approach and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), while the PBSA 
measures the system performance parameters (accuracy, integrity, availability, continuity, latency). 
The parameters are then validated using onboard Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) as the 
reference system to validate ADS-B system performance. The findings from the PBSA are fed into the 
FBSA. Finally, the overall safety assessment output is used to develop a safety case for the ADS-B 
system. The safety case aims at two different scenarios: 
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 ADS-B operating as the sole surveillance system in a particular airspace 
 Surveillance data fusion between ADS-B and existing surveillance system (ADS-B/WAM, ADS-
B/SSR, ADS-B/WAM/SSR) operating in a particular airspace 
 
The data fusion is to be developed using the Kalman Filtering based optimisation. Then the complete 
PBSA and FBSA are conducted for each scenario. Finally the safety case is validated by the required 
performance requirements as stipulated in Chapter 3. 
 
The framework (Figure 5-4) proposed in this thesis is comprehensive in the sense that it assesses the 
system design, implementation and operational performance. It is defensible in the sense that it 
provides a valid safety argument using concrete safety validation approach and safety evidence by 
means of the system performance quantification. The next sections describe the specific methods 
and the processes integrated in the framework. 
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Figure 5-4:  Proposed Safety Assessment Framework for ADS-B system 
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5.5.1 Performance Based Safety Assessment (PBSA) 
 
Performance Based Safety Assessment (PBSA) is conducted by measuring actual system performance 
parameters and validating the parameters using a safety validation approach. In the proposed 
framework, the reference system method is used for the performance validation. The PBSA consists 
of the following processes: 
a) Defining the system performance parameters and requirements. ADS-B performance is specified 
in terms of the following parameters: 
 Accuracy  
 Integrity 
 Continuity  
 Availability 
 Latency 
b)   Data collection 
 ADS-B data from ground stations; and 
 Onboard navigation data (reference) for each aircraft over a given time interval. 
c) Justification of the suitability of the ‘reference system’. 
d) Data decoding into useable format. 
e) Deriving reference data for ADS-B 
f) Data correlation between ADS-B data and onboard navigation data 
 
The processes and formulas derived to measure each parameter are discussed in detail in Chapter 6.  
 
In the PBSA, the onboard Global Positioning System (GPS) is used as the reference system to validate 
ADS-B positioning performance. GPS-based positioning and navigation enables four dimensional (4D) 
position determination for all phases of flight from departure, en-route, and arrival to airport surface 
navigation. It supports concepts such as Area Navigation (RNAV), which allow aircraft to fly optimal 
routes without depending on ground infrastructure. (National Coordination Office for Space-Based 
PNT, 2006). In addition, GNSS is also a key enabler of operations using Reduced Vertical Separation 
Minima (RVSM) proposed by the ICAO for aircraft flying between FL290 (29000 ft) to FL410 (41000 
ft). Moreover, GNSS is constantly being improved and modernized to support safety critical 
applications. Therefore, this will make GPS even more robust navigation service for various aviation 
applications. Above all, GNSS is the key driver for the 4D trajectory-based operations proposed by 
NextGen in the United States and SESAR in the Europe. ICAO has established stringent standards 
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(ICAO, 2004b) to use GNSS for aviation applications. The requirements include integrity, a measure 
of safety, and defined as a measure of the degree of trust in the correctness of navigation 
information (Bhatti, 2007). For safety critical applications such as ADS-B, real time integrity 
information is required (ICAO, 2004b). This is achieved at the GPS receiver level through receiver 
autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) (TSO-C129a and RTCA-DO208) and externally with Ground 
Based Augmentation Systems (GBAS) and Satellite Based Augmentation Systems (SBAS). The 
technical standard order (TSO-C129) provides detailed minimum performance standards that 
airborne supplemental RNAV equipment using GPS must meet. TSO-C129 also states that, the 
requirements in RTCA-DO208 “Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Airborne 
Supplemental Navigation Equipment Using Global Positioning System (GPS) have to be met. 
Required Navigation Performance (RNP) and Performance Based Navigation (PBN) requirements are 
also applicable. Table 5-2 shows the GPS receiver models used by the aircraft navigation system 
included in this thesis to evaluate ADS-B system performance. The receivers comply with the real 
time integrity monitoring requirements. 
 
Table 5-2: GPS Receiver model and specifications 
GPS receiver model RAIM augmentation GBAS SBAS 
Thales TLS755    
Honeywell GNSSU   
Honeywell Mercury Card equipped EGPWC MkV   
Rockwell Collins GLU920   
 
It is important to note that GPS position accuracy and integrity performance is dependent on GPS 
Signal-In-Space (SIS) availability. An analysis conducted by Imperial College London (2011) for CAA 
Safety Regulation Group (SRG) to monitor GPS performance and to determine if GPS performs as 
specified the International Civil Aviation Organisation’s (ICAO) Standards and Recommended 
Practices (SARPS) Annex 10 (ICAO, 2004b), is reviewed for this purpose. The analysis report describes 
the performance of GPS for Enroute to Non-Precision Approach (NPA) for the period of 1 January 
2010 to 31 December 2010. The performance is analyzed and measured using data recorded at one 
site in the East Midlands region of the UK (augmented with data from the Hailsham and Zimmerwald 
International GNSS Service (IGS) stations). The East Midlands station covers a significant portion of 
the UK airspace and thus provides a credible measure of GPS performance within the airspace 
(Imperial College London, 2011). The performance analysis covers the following parameters 
quantification and compliance to the determined standard: 
a) Horizontal Accuracy 95% 
b) Horizontal Alert Limit 
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c) Integrity 
d) Time to Alert 
e) Continuity 
f) Availability 
Table 5-3 summarizes the GPS performance analysis results. 
 
Table 5-3: Summary of GPS performance analysis results (Imperial College London, 2011) 
 Performance parameter Results ICAO SARPS GPS performance 
standard 
1. Horizontal Accuracy 95% 
 
<10m 220m 
2. Horizontal Alert Limit 
 
No horizontal position 
errors were above or 
close to 556m 
556m 
3. Integrity 
 
100% level (measured in 
terms of number of 
samples below the alert 
limit and expressed as a 
percentage) for each 
day over the period 
analysed 
1-1x10-7/hour 
4. Time to Alert 
 
No samples exceeded 
the alert time and no 
cases of RAIM 
unavailability. Therefore 
the continuity risk was 
zero. 
10 seconds 
5. Continuity 
 
100% for each day over 
the period analysed 
1-1x10-4/hour to 1-1x10-8/hour 
6. Availability 
 
100% 0.99 to 0.9999 
 
The literature review, findings and analysis in this section indicates that GPS is acceptably safe for 
aviation applications based on its performance to the stipulated requirements. 
5.5.1.1  Reference system and ADS-B system 
 
Similarity between GPS and ADS-B lies in the aircraft data output by both systems. In the scope of 
this thesis, aircraft state data broadcast by the ADS-B system from the onboard GPS. Therefore the 
output data types are of similar a nature. This is a strong point to indicate that the GPS is a good 
‘reference system’ for ADS-B position performance validation. It is appropriate to compare two 
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entities of a similar nature as they will have similar characteristics. For example, for GPS and ADS-B, 
accuracy and integrity might vary between aircraft and in time depending on the equipment and 
method of position determination (ICAO, 2006b). Unlike radar, the accuracy and integrity 
information in GPS and ADS-B are provided as variables.  
 
The ADS-B system performance is partly determined by the performance of the GPS and partly due 
to the performance of the data processing and data link from ADS-B avionics to ADS-B ground 
stations. Therefore, it can be forecast that the performance can either be similar to that of the GPS 
or worse, but definitely not better than the GPS.  
 
The PBSA is carried out in Chapter 6. The failure modes identified throughout the PBSA process from 
the ADS-B data and the corresponding onboard navigation system (GPS) data analysis are input to 
the next process; Fault Based Safety Assessment (FBSA). 
 
5.5.1.2 Relationship between the performance parameters and ADS-B system 
safety 
 
Based on the definition of safety in section 5.1, it is related to system failure. The integrity 
performance parameter is directly related to safety. It provides alerts on the detection of system 
malfunction/failure, to the system users within the required time-to-alert. In terms of aircraft 
positioning, the alert limit defines the largest position error, which results in a safe operation 
(Ochieng and Sauer, 2003). The integrity parameter determines the level of trust on the positioning 
information based on the position error (i.e. accuracy of the position). The system continuity is 
determined based on its capability to provide the system output (positioning information) with 
specified level of accuracy and integrity throughout the intended period of operation without non-
scheduled interruptions. Finally, the system is considered to be available, if the system output 
satisfies accuracy, integrity and continuity requirements. Therefore, it is clear that all the 
performance parameters are related to each other. This is illustrated in Figure 5-5. The position 
performance quality indicators (explained in Chapter 3) included in the ADS-B message serves as 
alert to the ATC on the state of the ADS-B surveillance report. In other words, these values act as 
safety indicators for the ADS-B system. However, the reliability of these quality indicators is arguable 
and is addressed in Chapter 6. 
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Figure 5-5: ADS-B performance parameters and safety 
 
5.5.1.3  Data 
 
Two types of data are used in the PBSA for the ADS-B system for aircraft manoeuvering in the 
London Terminal Manoeuvering Area (LTMA): 
 ADS-B surveillance data recorded from the ADS-B ground stations (ASTERIX CAT021) 
 Navigation data from aircraft navigation system (GPS) 
 
The surveillance data for the work in this thesis are obtained from the CRISTAL UK Project by NATS 
UK as discussed in Section 5.4.2. Data from the reference system, GPS positioning data from aircraft, 
are obtained from British Airways, recorded within the same time interval as the surveillance data 
from ADS-B ground stations. A descriptive statistical analysis is conducted to identify the percentage 
of fields present in the ASTERIX Category 021 message used for ADS-B performance analysis in this 
thesis. This is shown in Figure 5-6.  
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Figure 5-6: Analysis of fields present in ADS-B report (ASTERIX Category 021) 
 
Based on Figure 5-6, the time of detection, target position, aircraft address and Figure of Merit 
(FOM; target integrity level) are always present in the ASTERIX message contrary to for example, the 
air speed or trajectory intent. The fields present and Flight Level are important in the scope of the 
research analysis in this thesis. As can be seen, the geometric vertical rate is present more often 
than geometric altitude. The data fields present in the ADS-B message depends on the ADS-B 
avionics make model and also on the performance currently required for the system. The data used 
in this thesis comply with the requirements in RTCA DO-260 (RTCA, 2003). However, the latest 
standard available is RTCA DO-260B (RTCA, 2011). Table 5-4 indicates the data field descriptions 
present in the ADS-B message. A detailed description of each data field is available in the 
EUROCONTROL Standard Document for Surveillance Data Exchange - Cat 021 ADS-B Messages 
(EUROCONTROL, 2003). 
Table 5-4: ADS-B data field description 
Data Description 
System Area Code (SAC) An area identifier code, unique to a specific area, usually a whole country, 
displayed in decimal however usually displayed in hexadecimal, the UK is 
allocated 34 and 35 (Hex).  
System Identification Code 
(SIC) 
A unique identifier code allocated to each Radar / Surveillance System, the 
Cristal ADS-B system is counted as one consolidated surveillance source and 
hence is allocated one SIC code. 
Target Report Descriptor 
(TRD) 
Each of these items reports on the type and quality of the data received from 
the aircraft, for example, ARC refers to the altitude reporting capability of the 
aircraft, when aircraft report their altitude in the 1090 MHz Extended Squitter, 
it is quantized into either 100ft or 25 ft bands, the ARC reports which of these 
bands are being used.  
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Data Description 
Time of Day (TOD) Time of day in seconds after midnight  
Latitude (LAT) Longitude 
(LONG) 
Latitude and Longitude in WGS-84 format displayed in decimal degrees. 
 
ADD The aircrafts unique ICAO 24 bit address in Hexadecimal, most registered 
aircraft in the world and all registered aircraft in the UK has a unique address 
that is hard coded into the Mode-S transponder. 
GALT Geometric Height in feet from a plane tangent to the earth’s ellipsoid.  
Flight Level (FL) The flight level of the aircraft, which is the altitude of the aircraft expressed at a 
standard pressure setting of 1013 Mb and rounded to the nearest 100ft. This is 
used by en-route aircraft flying IFR to ensure all aircraft fly at the same relative 
altitudes and thus retain vertical separation. This is as opposed to flying on local 
QNH pressure settings generally used during VFR flight. 
GV-GS Ground Vector – Ground Speed  
GV-TA  Ground Vector – Track Angle, direction the aircraft is heading 
Target Identification (TID) This is the callsign or registration of the aircraft. 
 
Position reference data (obtained from the aircraft navigation system, GPS) from British Airways 
contains less data fields from the ADS-B message. The GPS message includes the following data 
fields: 
 Time 
 Latitude –WGS84 
 Longitude-WGS84 
 Altitude (Flight Level based on standard pressure setting of 1013 Mb) 
 Radio Height 
 Compute Air Speed 
 Ground Speed 
The scope of the ADS-B data and the corresponding onboard GPS data are based on the aircraft 
manoeuvring in the LTMA airspace. Two different sets of data are collected at different time interval 
as specified in Table 5-5. 
 
Table 5-5: ADS-B and onboard GPS data recording details 
Date Time Interval 
10 January 2011 00:00:00 – 23:48:29 
23 May 2011 9:13:14 - 11:42:14 
 
5.5.1.3.1 Air Traffic Environment in NATS London Terminal Control  
 
The main responsibility of ATC at NATS London Terminal Control (TC) is to manage the streams of 
aircraft arriving and departing from airfields within LTMA and to provide service to aircraft transiting 
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the same airspace. The airspace is divided into 5 sectors (refer to Figure 5-7 and Table 5-6). The 
sectors are designed to manage traffic arriving and departing from London Heathrow, Gatwick, 
Luton, Stansted, City as well as Birmingham, East Midlands and smaller airfields in the region. All 
sectors are low-level, from the base of controlled airspace to FL195–215. London TC handles flights 
operating at or below FL210, regardless of whether another unit is online or not. Figure 5-7 shows 
the London TC airspace structure. Table 5-6 provides the details of each sector. 
 
Figure 5-7: London Terminal Airspace Structure (IVAO, 2012) 
 
Table 5-6: London Terminal Control Sectors description (IVAO, 2012) 
ID Name IVAC IDENT RT Frequency 
SE DEPS South East Departures EGTL_SE_CTR 120.525 
NW DEPS North West Departures EGTL_NW_CTR 119.775 
NE DEPS North East Departures EGTL_NE_CTR 118.825 
SW DEPS South West Departures EGTL_SW_CTR 134.125 
REDFA Redfa EGTL_E_CTR 121.225 
 
In 2011, the London TC handled an average of 3419 movements daily. The traffic analysis indicates a 
decrease from 2008 to 2010, and a 3% growth from 2010 to 2011 (refer Figure 5-8). The majority of 
the traffic is either climbing or descending, indicating that the airspace is highly complex (NATS, 
2007). Due to a high rate of vertical traffic movements, controllers need tactical freedom to enable 
aircraft to reach their required levels safely and expeditiously. This requires the application of radar 
vectors and manipulation of the aircraft’s required routes (NATS, 2007). A high volume traffic 
indicates that a large number of control instructions need to be conveyed; resulting in both RT 
frequencies (refer to Table 5-6) and the airspace being often congested. Air Traffic Services (ATS) are 
provided based on radar control with separation standard of 3NM or 5NM laterally and 1000ft 
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vertically. Reduced radar separation (2.5NM) may be used on approach under criteria and larger 
separation is used for wake vortex considerations as necessary (NATS, 2007). 
 
Figure 5-8: Average daily traffic in London TC from 2008-2011 (EUROCONTROL, 2012) 
 
Current operational surveillance infrastructures in the United Kingdom consist of 22 radars (NATS, 
2011b) including secondary radars and co-mounted primary radars; and multilateration system for 
airport ground surveillance. These systems support NATS ATS with surveillance information in the 
NATS controlled airspace with the required operational and safety performance. Figure 5-9 and 
Table 5-7 show the radar locations and descriptions of the LTMA coverage respectively.  
 
Figure 5-9: Radar locations and coverage for LTMA 
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Table 5-7: Radar description for London Terminal Manoeuvring Area (LTMA) coverage 
Radar Name Latitude (WGS84) Longitude 
 (WGS84) 
Height (WGS 
ellipsoid - to 
ground) 
Rotation 
(rpm) 
Debden 51 59 24.923785 0 15 49.94932 E 162.965 9.7 
Cromer 52 54 37.734515 01 20 58.820655 E 65.459 12 
Heathrow  51 27 37.58 000 26 22.448 W 60.572 15 
Pease Pottage 51 05 00.30993 00 12 51.750605 W 187.816 9.71 
 
As discussed in Section 5.4.2, the ADS-B positioning data for this research are obtained from the 
CRISTAL RAD HD project led by NATS and carried out in collaboration with industry partners; 
QinetiQ, Raytheon and SITA. The surveillance infrastructures under the project include the ADS-B 
system and Wide Area Multilateration System (WAM) network for surveillance coverage in the 
LTMA. It involves installation of ADS-B and WAM ground receiver sensors and also equipage of ADS-
B emitters onboard aircraft involved in the project. More than 500 aircraft have received their EASA 
airworthiness certification (EUROCONTROL, 2011a) based on AMC-20-24 avionics requirements for 
ADS-B in non-radar airspace. To date, no certification rules for aircraft avionics to operate in radar 
airspace have been published. Six ADS-B ground stations (receiver sensors) are installed at the 
existing NATS radio transmitter communication sites at Ventnor, Winstone, Chedburgh, Warlingham, 
Greenford and Reigate. The central processors, central monitoring servers and remote control and 
monitoring systems are located within the Test and Development equipment room at NATS CTC 
(NATS, 2011a). Figure 5-10 and 5-11 illustrates the ground receiver sensor installation sites and the 
corresponding coverage. Each sensor is providing a coverage of 256NM (NATS, 2011a). 
 
 
Figure 5-10: ADS-B ground stations for LTMA coverage (NATS, 2011a) 
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Figure 5-11: ADS-B Coverage (NATS, 2011a) 
 
5.5.2 Fault Based Safety Assessment (FBSA) 
 
In this thesis, the concept of ‘Fault Based Safety Assessment (FBSA)’ is introduced and defined as the 
‘measure of Safety Integrity Level (SIL) of a system based on the probability of the system not 
functioning due to system component failures’. The term SIL is a measure of the confidence with 
which the system can be expected to perform its safety function (Dutuit et al., 2008). The SIL 
concept was introduced in the IEC 61508 standard (Bell, 2005). The standard defined SIL for system 
functions with high demand rate or functions that operate continuously, such as accident rate is the 
probability of failure per hour. The definition is not clearly defined in the standard. However, it is 
applicable to the ADS-B system as the system is safety critical, required to operate continuously. In 
this thesis, the SIL is derived from the unavailability ‘Q’ of the system. Unavailability of the system 
may vary with the parameters of the various reliability models applied to the system components 
which are of a different nature. The ADS-B system is composed of various system components that 
are of a different nature. 
 
FBSA is a comprehensive step-by-step approach comprising of methods to identify failure modes in a 
system and quantify the failure modes using the fault tree analysis method (FTA). Apart from these 
two methods, other methods such as Petri Nets or Markov Graphs can be used to assess complex 
systems.  However, the design of the models in these methods are complex and error prone (Dutuit 
et al., 2008). In the proposed framework, the failure mode identification approach is developed to 
identify ADS-B failure modes, analyze the failure mode consequences on the system functionalities 
and subsequent ATC and aircraft navigation operations. The impact of the failure is also analyzed if it 
affects one or all aircraft within a specific airspace. The nature of the failure is further analyzed to 
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determine if the failure is detectable or undetectable by the ADS-B system users. The final output of 
the approach is a failure mode register for the ADS-B system. A failure mode register tracks the 
potential failure that may occur in a system. The information captured in a failure mode register 
includes the failure mode description, components that contribute to the failure and the failure 
effects. The failure mode identification approach proposed in the FBSA adopts some of the steps in 
the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) method. The FMEA is not applied in the proposed 
framework, because it requires historical failure data, not available for ADS-B to date apart from the 
AsA database (called ASID) used within Airservices Australia for reporting all problems in their ATC 
systems. However, the AsA data were not available to this thesis. In addition, the amount of data 
available in the database to date may not be sufficient to conduct a rigorous quantitative FMEA for 
ADS-B. Hence, failure quantification is conducted using the FTA approach. 
 
In the proposed framework, the information gathered to perform the failure mode identification 
process is obtained from: 
 extensive literature review on each ADS-B specific component and the integrated navigation 
and communication system components; 
 review of safety reports on ADS-B trials from various Air Navigation Service Providers 
(ANSPs) worldwide including FAA (2000), Air Services Australia (ICAO, 2006b) and NATS 
(2007, 2002, 2011a); 
 analysis of ADS-B reports gathered from ADS-B ground stations and corresponding 
positioning data from onboard navigation system (GPS) for 37 aircraft through collaboration 
with NATS’ CRISTAL Project and British Airways; and 
 input from Subject Matter Experts  (SME) (with more than five years of experience on ADS-B 
system design and trial implementation) from EUROCONTROL, QinetiQ, Airbus and NATS via 
structured interviews.  
 
Figure 5-12 shows ADS-B specific components and external system components integrated with the 
ADS-B system included in the failure mode identification approach. Initially, the process is conducted 
with the assumption that the ADS-B system is operating as the primary surveillance system in 
support of ATC operations. The process comprises the following tasks:  
 identification of  the failure modes of the ADS-B system; 
 identification of failure mode effects on the ADS-B system; 
 determination of the consequences of the failure effect on the overall ATC surveillance  
operations; 
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 determination of the failure hazards to ATC operations and aircraft navigation; 
 categorisation of failure modes into failure models;  
 development of a mitigation approach for each failure mode; 
 determination of the extent of failure impacts (e.g. single or multiple aircraft); and 
 determination of the failure detectability. 
 
 
Figure 5-12:  ADS-B specific and external systems 
 
The failure mode identification process begins by developing a comprehensive ADS-B system 
architecture diagram based on inputs from the literature and Subject Matter Experts (SME). Then, 
the failure mode identification is conducted for ADS-B specific components and interfacing 
components between the external systems (navigation, communication, human and operational 
environment) as illustrated in the architecture diagram. The inputs for this task are obtained from 
the literature, safety reports and from the PBSA output. Based on the output, a fault tree is 
developed for the ADS-B system. Next, the availability of existing research on onboard navigation 
system performance, that feeds the aircraft position to the ADS-B system, is determined. If available, 
the system performance quantifications are validated against the Required Navigation Performance 
(RNP) / Performance Based Navigation (PBN) requirements and fed into the ADS-B fault tree. If no 
relevant research is identified, then, a separate failure mode identification process is developed for 
the onboard navigation system with the literature, navigation data analysis from aircraft and safety 
reports as inputs. Then a fault tree is developed for the navigation system to quantify the system 
performance. The quantification values are then validated against RNP / PBN requirements and fed 
into the ADS-B fault tree. The same process is repeated for the data link system used by the ADS-B 
system to broadcast ADS-B message to ATC in the ground and other aircraft within a specified range. 
The data link performance quantifications are then validated against the Required Communication 
Performance (RCP) for ADS-B and fed into the ADS-B fault tree. 
 
Failure 
mode 
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A fault tree is a model that graphically and logically represents combinations of possible events in a 
system that lead to a top (undesired) event. Three types of failure events are identified as causes 
(Barlow et al., 1974) : 
 Primary failures – due to internal characteristics of the system element under consideration;  
 Secondary failures – due to excessive environmental or operational stress placed on system 
elements; 
 Command fault – inadvertent operation or non-operation of a system element due to failure of 
initiating element. 
Primary failures of the ADS-B system may include the failure of the onboard navigation system that 
feeds the aircraft position to the system or failure of the data link that enables the ADS-B message to 
be broadcast to users. The secondary failures of the ADS-B system are due to the deteriorization of 
airborne (e.g. ADS-B antenna mounted on aircraft) or ground equipment due to environmental 
effects. Command faults may be initiated by human error for example, a pilot forgetting to switch on 
the ADS-B transponder or selecting a wrong operational mode on the transponder. 
 
The probability of top event occurrence is important from a safety point of view. On the other hand, 
from a reliability point of view the probability of non-occurrence of the top event is of interest. The 
main aim of the FTA is to calculate the probability of occurrence of the top event. Based on the FTA, 
the performance measure of the ADS-B system is the unavailability (Q) or probability of the system 
not functioning as required to enable surveillance service provision and assist aircraft to navigate 
safely. Based on the failure mode identification, potential hazards for the ADS-B system are 
identified and defined as tabulated in Table 5-8.  
 
Table 5-8: Potential hazards for ADS-B system 
Hazard Definition 
Loss of Data Unavailability of ADS-B surveillance data (including position data) 
to the controllers or other ADS-B equipped aircraft. 
Corruption of Data Incorrect ADS-B surveillance data transmitted to controller or 
other aircraft. 
Corruption of Altitude Data Incorrect altitude data transmitted (in the ADS-B message) to 
controllers or other ADS-B equipped aircraft. 
Corruption of Position Data Incorrect position data transmitted (in the ADS-B message) to 
controller and other ADS-B equipped aircraft. 
Loss of Altitude Data Unavailability of altitude data in the ADS-B message transmitted 
to controllers and other ADS-B equipped aircraft. 
Corruption of Position Quality Indicator Incorrect position quality indicator transmitted (in the ADS-B 
message) to controllers and other ADS-B equipped aircraft. 
Human Error Incorrect system input and mishandling/ misinterpretation of the 
system functionalities due to inadequate knowledge or human 
sensory limitations. 
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Based on the hazards identified, the FTA for the ADS-B system is conducted for the following top 
events: 
 Corruption of data for all aircraft 
 Corruption of data for one aircraft 
 Corruption of position data for one aircraft 
 Loss of data for all aircraft 
 Loss of data for one aircraft 
 
A major disadvantage in FTA and other safety analysis methods is the possibility that important 
failure modes are overlooked in the analysis (Barlow et al., 1974). A key problem for ADS-B is the 
lack of pertinent failure rate data of the system components to perform quantitative fault tree 
evaluation. Additionally, the human element within the system is difficult to quantify.  
 
5.6 Summary 
 
This Chapter has proposed a comprehensive safety assessment framework for the ADS-B system. 
The next Chapter analyses ADS-B system performance based on the PBSA approach explained in this 
Chapter. The detailed methods and results for each performance parameter analysed are provided 
in the next Chapter.  
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Chapter 6  
Performance Based Safety Assessment (PBSA) 
 
 
In Chapter 5, a novel and comprehensive safety assessment framework for ADS-B was developed. 
The framework comprises two parts: Performance Based Safety Assessment (PBSA) and Failure 
Based Safety Assessment (FBSA). This Chapter describes the PBSA method, identifies the errors in 
the ADS-B data collected from the ADS-B ground stations and in the corresponding GPS data 
collected from the onboard navigation system, and presents the ADS-B performance analysis results 
in terms of accuracy, integrity, availability, update rate and latency. Next, correlation analysis is 
conducted to identify the potential factors that may influence the ADS-B horizontal position 
accuracy. Finally, due to the unexpected update rate performance obtained from the results, 
structured statistical analysis is conducted to identify the potential factors that may have 
contributed to the performance. A model is derived to represent the ADS-B message update rate 
distribution based on various correlation analyses and a generalized linear modeling approach.  
 
6.1 Background 
 
ADS-B has been deployed on a large scale in Australia, with the safety justification for its 
implementation based on the finding that ADS-B is as good as the radar system (ICAO, 2006b). 
However, ADS-B implementation in Australia is in low traffic density airspace. From an operational 
perspective, the requirements for surveillance in low traffic density and high-traffic density airspace 
are completely different (Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) standards for radar 
(RTCA, 2009) and non-radar (RTCA, 2007) airspace). This Chapter assesses the performance of ADS-B 
in one of the most high-traffic density airspaces in the world; the London Terminal Manoeuvring 
Area (TMA).  
 
Figure 6-1 shows the components that may influence ADS-B system performance. These include: 
 positioning system on-board; 
 ADS-B avionics on-board; 
 data link;  
 ADS-B ground station; and 
 ADS-B data and quality indicators 
  147 
 
Figure 6-1: Components influencing ADS-B system performance 
 
Numerous methods have been used by various parties to assess ADS-B system performance. 
Airservices Australia used a comparison method with Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) (ICAO, 
2006b) while EUROCONTROL (EUROCONTROL, 2010c, EUROCONTROL, 2008c) generated a reference 
from multi-radar fusion using the ARTAS system (EUROCONTROL, 2001-2013a). However, none of 
these methods proposed a framework or detailed processes for ADS-B data evaluation in order to 
assess system performance. In addition, the anomalies or difficulties identified throughout the 
assessment process were not made available to the public. It is worth noting that the reference to 
be used to assess the ADS-B system should be of a very high performance, in order to support the 
implementation of various safety critical ground and airborne applications envisioned in the future 
by having ADS-B data as the source. For example, the reference should have an accuracy level higher 
than the most stringent requirement for reduced separation between aircraft. Therefore, even 
multi-radar fusion as the reference is insufficient for this purpose. 
  
In the method proposed in this thesis, specifically for ADS-B position accuracy, latency and integrity 
performance assessment, navigation data from the onboard navigation system is used as the 
reference. Justification for this is provided in Chapter 5. All the aircraft included in this thesis use 
GNSS based navigation system (with augmentations) as the onboard navigation system. A detailed 
description of the data available in the ADS-B and onboard GPS messages are provided in Chapter 5. 
In addition to the available data, additional data required for the performance analyses are 
  148 
generated based on the available data, including ground stations that detected the aircraft at each 
epoch and aircraft range from the detected ground station. The next section proposes a novel ADS-B 
data evaluation framework. 
  
6.2 Data Evaluation Framework 
 
The framework is intended to assess the performance of the ADS-B system in terms of accuracy, 
integrity, availability, update rate and latency. In order to achieve this, ideally the framework should 
include the following characteristics: 
 data collection method; 
 conversion of the data into useable form; 
 derivation of a reference position for the assessment particularly for accuracy, integrity and 
latency; 
 data correlation method; and 
 robustness to handle different data characteristics, for example, unsynchronized datasets. 
 
The framework is shown in Figure 6-2. In this framework, the GPS data obtained from the aircraft is 
used to derive the reference position against which the ADS-B horizontal position data are 
compared. The GPS derived position from the aircraft satisfies the requirement for the navigation 
system (Department of Defense, 2008, ICAO, 2004b). In addition, the GPS receiver onboard all the 
aircraft included in this thesis is enabled with Satellite Based Augmentation System (SBAS) or Ground 
Based Augmentation System (GBAS) and Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM), which 
indicates the GPS positioning integrity. In this Chapter therefore, the framework is developed based 
on the assumption that the GPS positions are error free. The measured error encompasses 
cumulated errors beyond the onboard GPS receiver which includes errors in the FMS, ADS-B specific 
components (e.g. interfacing and transponder), communication system and ADS-B ground station. 
 
In the first part of the process (Figure 6-2), ADS-B data collected from ground stations were decoded 
from the ASTERIX 021 to ASCII format. It was found that the two datasets are generally 
asynchronous. Prior to correlation, the time stamp accuracy of both datasets was checked. A 
correlation algorithm was developed and applied to correlate the datasets. The algorithm uses time 
stamp and horizontal position differences as well as the 24 bit aircraft address. The correlated 
dataset is then stored in a Surveillance database and the GPS position extrapolated to derive a 
reference position (the TRUTH). Next, various statistical analyses are conducted to clean up the 
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dataset. Finally, performance analysis is conducted to measure data latency, accuracy, integrity, 
availability and update rate was conducted. The methods for each analysis are described in detail in 
the following sub-sections. 
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Figure 6-2: ADS-B Data Evaluation Framework 
 
6.2.1 Data Correlation 
 
Correlation of ADS-B data recorded from the ground stations and the corresponding GPS data from 
aircraft is challenging due to vast differences identified in the data characteristics: 
 Different update rates between datasets whereby GPS data shows a consistent update rate 
at one second, while ADS-B data do not have a deterministic pattern in the update rate; 
 Inconsistent update rates of ADS-B data;  
 Lack of ADS-B data due to a lack of coverage of the ADS-B ground station especially for lower 
altitude operations and lower update rate level; 
 Differences in the decimal precision of the horizontal position data from each source; and 
 Time differences due to the delay in the ADS-B ‘time’ data with respect to GPS data. 
  150 
Due to the discrepancies identified above in the nature of the datasets, neither the ‘time stamp’ nor 
the ‘horizontal position’ data could be used to correlate the datasets directly. A systematic data 
synchronization method is thus a crucial prerequisite.  
 
The method initially identifies the GPS datasets corresponding to a given ADS-B time stamp on the 
basis of the relative timing for the identified GPS subset. Geometrical differences with respect to the 
ADS-B position data (latitude and longitude) are assessed and the final GPS candidate is chosen on 
the basis of minimal difference. This process is repeated for each ADS-B data point. The flow chart in 
Figure 6-3 illustrates the flow of the processes. The method starts by identifying the first time stamp 
in the ADS-B dataset as ‘T_ADS-B’. It then identifies the dataset with a time stamp ‘T_GPS’ from the 
GPS dataset which are less than the ‘T_ADS-B’. For the identified subset, the difference between the 
ADS-B (latitude and longitude) at ‘T_ADS-B’ and all the GPS data (latitude and longitude) at ‘T_GPS’ 
when (T_GPS<T_ADS-B) are calculated. Based on the differences, the GPS (latitude and longitude) 
with the minimal difference is stored in the new database and the rest from the subset are discarded 
from the GPS dataset. The process is repeated for T_ADS-B (n+1) of the ADS-B dataset until the last 
data. All aircraft included in this thesis are based on the ADS-B avionics certified under RTCA D0-260 
(2003) which performs extrapolation (by 200 ms) on the horizontal position received from the 
onboard GPS receiver due to the anticipated delay in the ADS-B transmitting subsystem.  
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Figure 6-3: Flow chart for data correlation algorithm 
 
6.2.2 Reference Horizontal Position Derivation Using Extrapolation Method 
 
In this thesis, the reference method is used to assess the performance of the ADS-B horizontal 
position (latitude, longitude) recorded from ADS-B ground stations. GPS horizontal positions 
recorded from the aircraft FMS, are extrapolated to the exact time at which the ADS-B data is 
received at the ADS-B ground station. The extrapolated GPS horizontal position is used as the 
‘Reference’ (or TRUTH).  
 
The Reference (φREF, λREF) is derived as: 
φREF = φGPS  + Δφ   (Eq. 1) 
λREF  = λGPS  + Δλ   (Eq. 2) 
where,  
φGPS is  GPS latitude,  
λGPS  is GPS longitude,  
Δφ , Δλ  is the function of distance and azimuth based on latency and speed. 
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6.3 Results of Evaluation 
 
The aircraft assessed are equipped with a number of different types of GPS Receivers, ADS-B 
Emitters and FMSs, (described in Chapter 5) thereby enabling the assessment of the impact of 
variable avionics systems on ADS-B performance. All the aircraft use the Mode S 1090 MHz Extended 
Squitter (1090ES) as the data link to transmit ADS-B data from the aircraft to the ground stations. 
Two datasets were collected based on opportunity traffic and used in the various analyses. The first 
dataset comprises 29 aircraft with 15 minutes of flight duration while the second consists of 31 
aircraft with 60 minutes of flight duration. Fortunately, four aircraft were found in both datasets. 
This gave the opportunity to analyze the ADS-B system performance consistency for those aircraft 
for the various parameters assessed. The first dataset was used for the accuracy, integrity and 
latency analysis. Before conducting the analysis, the data quality and suitability to be included in the 
performance (accuracy, integrity and latency) analysis were assessed. Among 29 aircraft in the 
dataset, twelve were found to be suitable for the analysis. The following problems were identified: 
 Duplicate ADS-B messages, as recorded at ground stations. This is due to more than one 
ground station detecting the same aircraft at the same time and the central processing unit 
not removing the duplication; 
 GPS Clock errors as recorded onboard the aircraft. This error could be due to the settings in 
the receiver; 
 GPS position fluctuations recorded onboard the aircraft. This refers to jumps in position of 
about 0.1 degree every 100-200 seconds in latitude and more frequently in the longitude 
every 50 seconds. This is still under investigation with the British Airways ; 
 Lack of a consistent GPS position format output by the aircraft. For example, at time t1, only 
the latitude information is given and at time t2, only the longitude information is provided. 
This may be the results of the setting in the Flight Management System (FMS); 
 Uncorrelated time intervals between GPS data (at aircraft level) and ADS-B data (at ground 
level). This may be due to clock error in either the aircraft or the ground station. 
 
Details of the problems in each aircraft data (ADS-B and GPS data) are provided in Chapter 7 and 
Appendix A. 
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6.3.1 ADS-B Latency 
 
The RTCA (2009) defines total latency as the amount of time taken to broadcast a position relative to 
the time of applicability of the position measurement. Based on the notation in Figure 6-4, the total 
latency is represented as TL = TD – TOAB1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-4: Onboard ADS-B functional architecture and timing diagram (modified from RTCA 2009) 
 
The interfaces in Figure 6-4 are defined as: 
 A1: Input to the position measuring equipment 
 B1: Output of the position measuring equipment 
 C: Input to the ADS-B transmitting equipment 
 D: Output of the ADS-B transmitting equipment (i.e. the transmission) 
While 
 TX :is the time that the data crosses interface X 
 TOAX: is the true time of applicability of the data that crosses interface X  
The total latency is recommended to be less than 1.5 seconds. The total latency function is broken 
down into three components: 
 TD –TOAB1 = (TD –TC) + (TC –TB1) + (TB1 –TOAB1) 
Where 
 TB1 –TOAB1: Industry standards ensure that this does not exceed 200 milliseconds. 
 TC –TB1: The amount of time taken to deliver data from the position source to the data 
interface. This delay is recommended to be less than 200 milliseconds and a direct 
connection from the position source to ADS-B system is preferred. 
Measuring 
Equipment 
(GNSS engine, 
integrated 
GPS/INS 
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Data Transfer and Processing (e.g., Data 
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A1 
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 TD –TC: The amount of delay within the ADS-B transmitting subsystem (position update and 
the preparation of data for transmission) is limited to 100 milliseconds. 
The total amount of onboard extrapolation (ΔTC→D) performed by the ADS-B transmitting subsystem 
on the horizontal position is 200 milliseconds using the velocity data provided for the position fix. 
ΔTB1→C is assumed to be zero and TOAC = TOAB1. 
 
The RTCA (2009) defines Uncompensated Latency (UL) as the amount of total latency that is not or 
cannot be compensated by the receiver. It is the difference between the time of applicability 
perceived by the ADS-B receiving subsystem and the true time of applicability of the transmitted 
data: 
 UL = TTOA – (TOAB1 + ΔTB1→D) 
Where 
 TTOA : the transmit time of applicability is the time that is expected to be decoded by 
the ADS-B receiving subsystem as being the time to which the position contained in the 
ADS-B message is accurate. 
 TOAB1 + ΔTB1→D : is the time compensated for onboard latency. 
 
The definitions proposed by the RTCA (2009), do not include various onboard delays which include 
delay in the GNSS receiver, interfacing between the receiver and data transfer and processing block 
(e.g. FMS), interfacing between the receiver and the ADS-B transmitting subsystem and the delay 
within the ADS-B transmitting subsystem. In addition the total latency definition does not include 
the propagation delay, which is the delay accumulated from TD until the message is received by the 
ADS–B receiving subsystem at the ground station. This is critical in dense airspace prone to signal 
jamming problems. The uncompensated latency is defined based on the assumption that the TTOA 
is the transmit time (TD) from the ADS-B transmitting subsystem. However, neither the TD nor any 
other time information is broadcast in the ADS-B message by the ADS-B transmitting subsystem. 
 
In this thesis, ADS-B latency is defined as the delay between aircraft position determination by the 
onboard navigation system and position reception by the ground station. Figure 6-5 shows the ADS-
B latency model. This model represents an additive function which incorporates delay in the 
navigation system (Δa), delay within the interfacing between the navigation system and the ADS-B 
emitter (Δb), delay in the ADS-B emitter (Δc), propagation delay (Δd) and delay in the ground station 
(Δe). Various potential sources for the latency are identified, including: 
 Delay in the FMS (due to flight duration) 
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 Interfacing between FMS to transponder (ADS-B emitter) 
 Interfacing between GPS receiver to FMS 
 Interfacing between GPS receiver to transponder (ADS-B emitter) 
 Data link delay (signal in space) 
 ADS-B ground station antenna delay 
 GPS antenna on the ground station (for clock) 
 Time error at the ground station 
 
 
Latency Model = Δa + Δb + Δc + Δd + Δe 
 
Figure 6- 5: ADS-B Latency Model 
 
Δb varies due to ADS-B avionics configuration based on either D0-260/D0-260A or D0-260B. The 
configuration based on D0-260/D0-260A requires connection from the GPS receiver to the FMS, in 
which case the positioning information will be transmitted to the ADS-B emitter from the FMS while 
for the configuration based on D0-260B, the position information from the GPS receiver will be 
directly transmitted to the ADS-B emitter, bypassing the FMS. The first configuration will increase Δb 
not only due to the additional transmission stage, but also the size of the FMS database will 
contribute to the delay by increasing the data transmission processing time with increasing database 
size. The size of the FMS database is influenced by the flight duration as more information is 
gathered throughout the flight. The latter type of configuration is expected to significantly improve 
Δb. Based on the requirements stipulated in RTCA 2009, ADS-B latency budgeting is derived using 
the latency model developed in Figure 6-5: 
 
Δa + Δb + Δc + Δd + Δe < 1500 milliseconds 
where 
Δa  ≤ 200 milliseconds 
Δb  < 200 milliseconds 
Aircraft 
GNSS 
SIS 
GPS  
Receiver 
ADS - B 
Emitter SIS (1090 MHz) 
ADS - B  
Station /other  
Aircraft 
Interface 
Δ b Δ c Δ d 
Δ a 
Δ e 
GNSS 
Receiver 
  156 
Δc  ≤ 100 milliseconds 
 
Therefore 
 Δd + Δe < 1500 – (Δa + Δb + Δc)  
Δd + Δe < 1500 – (200 + 199 +100) 
Δd + Δe < 1001  
The latency budget derived above indicates that the propagation delay plus the delay encountered 
at the ground station before the time stamp is generated upon the receipt of the ADS-B message by 
the ADS-B receiving subsystem at the ground station should not exceed 1001 milliseconds. 
 
Latency performance for the eight aircraft are analyzed and tabulated in Table 6-1. The mean latency 
is measured according to Eq.3.  
μ Latency =        (Eq.3) 
where, 
  is the position reception time stamp at the ground station, 
  is the position determination time by aircraft navigation system, 
  is the number of reports received at the ground station. 
 
From Table 6-1, aircraft 40608F, 400246 and 40087B exceed the 1.5 seconds latency requirement 
stipulated by the RTCA 2009. Since the avionics make-model (Thales TLS755 MMR GPS receiver and 
Honeywell TRA-67A ADS-B transponder) is the same for all the aircraft in Table 6-1, no particular 
conclusion is made to justify the variation identified in the latency performance. 
 
Table 6-1: Latency analysis results 
Aircraft ID Aircraft Type Mean Latency (second) Std. Dev (second) 
40608F A318 1.7227 0.4851 
405A48 A320 0.6289 0.2430 
400A26 A320 1.9050 0.6485 
400877 A319 0.6927 0.1615 
400878 A319 0.5597 0.2627 
40087B A319 1.7414 0.7008 
4008F2 A319 0.6235 0.2584 
400935 A319 0.7094 0.2158 
 
Aircraft 40087B shows the highest and aircraft 400877 lowest variation (standard deviation) in the 
latency for each ADS-B message transmitted to the ground stations. However, the overall analysis 
results show small standard deviation values, indicating that the latency values for each epoch are 
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close to the mean latency. Hence, no significant variation is found in the latency analysis. Aircraft 
400A26 shows the highest mean latency 1.9050 seconds with a standard deviation of 0.6485 
seconds while aircraft 400878 shows the lowest latency 0.5597 seconds with a standard deviation of 
0.2627 seconds. Figures 6-6 to 6-9 show the latency distribution for the worst and best performing 
aircraft 400A26 and 400878, respectively. 
 
  
Figure 6- 6: Latency distribution for aircraft 
400A26 
Figure 6- 7: Deviation from normal 
distribution for aircraft 400A26 
  
Figure 6-8: Latency distribution for aircraft 
400878 
Figure 6-9: Deviation from normal distribution 
for aircraft 400878 
 
Both aircraft show that the ADS-B message latencies are normally distributed despite the difference 
in the performance.  
 
ADS-B latency performance consistency is evaluated using the data collected for the four aircraft in 
both the first and second dataset, which differ in terms of the flight duration. Consistent values are 
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anticipated in Δa and Δc for the individual aircraft. The value in Δb may vary due to the size of the 
FMS database, as a result of the flight duration. The propagation delay, Δd, may depend on the 
range between the aircraft and the ground station and also on the traffic density of the airspace, 
whereby Δd may increase due to the signal jamming in a more dense airspace. Higher Δd is 
anticipated in lower altitude in TMA which is more prone to signal jamming where aircraft is closer 
to each other, higher duplex transmission between aircraft and radar, and also TCAS activities on the 
same frequency. Delay at the ground station Δe, may be incurred due to clock error or message 
queue at the ADS-B receiving subsystem before the time stamp is generated for the particular 
message received at the ground station. Table 6-2 shows the latency performance consistency for 
the four aircraft.  
 
Table 6-2: Latency performance consistency 
Aircraft Aircraft Type μ Latency (seconds) Std. Dev  
  Dataset 1 Dataset 2 Dataset 1 Dataset 2 
406250 A320 15.6877 5.6801 6.5012 2.0189 
4008B4 A319 0.5895 1.1527 0.2760 0.2209 
4009C7 A320 0.6837 0.4355 0.1493 0.3207 
400942 A319 0.6787 47.9933 0.1666 8.0583 
 
Based on the analysis, no consistency is identified in the latency performance between the two 
flights for each aircraft. Aircraft 406250 shows a very high mean latency during both flights with 
15.6877 seconds and 5.6801 seconds respectively. However, the large standard deviation values 
6.5012 and 2.0189 indicate that the latency values in both datasets are farther away from the mean 
on average. Aircraft 400942 shows drastic degradation from 0.6787 seconds to 47.9933 seconds 
with standard deviation 0.1666 and 8.0583 respectively. Aircraft 4008B4 shows a higher mean 
latency in dataset two, 1.1527 seconds in comparison to dataset one, 0.5895 seconds. Aircraft 
4009C7 shows fairly good performance in both flights 0.6837 seconds and 0.4355 seconds 
respectively with small standard deviation values. Aircraft 406250 and 400942 are analyzed further 
due to the peculiarities found in the aircraft latency performances. Further analysis investigates the 
latency distribution and the impact of altitude on the latency.  
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Figure 6-10 and 6-11: Latency distribution for dataset 1 and dataset 2 for aircraft 406250 
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Figure 6-12 and Figure 6-13: Latency vs altitude for dataset 1 and dataset 2 for aircraft 406250 
 
The latency distribution for aircraft 406250 in dataset one (Figure 6-10) varies between 0.1 to 20 
seconds with the highest distribution between 18 to 20 seconds. While the latency distribution for 
the same aircraft is consistent between 5 to 6.5 seconds in dataset two. Latency performance across 
the flight altitude for aircraft 406250 in dataset one (Figure 6-12) indicates that the latency increases 
as the altitude decreases. This complies with the hypothesis proposed earlier whereby lower altitude 
in the TMA is more dense hence the signal jamming would be worst than in higher altitude. 
However, the same aircraft does not comply with the hypothesis in dataset two (Figure 6-13), 
instead showing consistent performance across the altitudes. 
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Figure 6-14 and 6-15 : Latency distribution for dataset 1 and dataset 2 for aircraft 400942 
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Figure 6-16 and 6-17: Latency vs altitude for dataset 1 and dataset 2 for aircraft 400942 
 
The latency distribution for aircraft 400942 in dataset one is consistent between 0.4 to 0.9 seconds 
(Figure 6-14) complying with the requirements while the performance in dataset two is extremely 
bad with the highest distribution between 45 to 50 seconds (Figure 6.15). The latency performance 
across the altitudes for aircraft 400942 in dataset one is scattered between 0.4 to 0.9 seconds 
(Figure 6-16) while in dataset one the performance is consistent at 45 to 50 seconds after 10000 feet 
(Figure 6-17). The latency performances for aircraft 406250 and 400952 do not comply with the 
requirements and do not show consistency in the performance. The plausible reasons for the 
inconsistency were not identified. However, the consistency analysis in Appendix B concludes that 
the latency performance is not correlated to the change in the flight altitude. 
 
In addition, an interesting finding from, Figures 6-16 and 6-17 (highlighted in yellow) is that the 
latency performance varies significantly when the aircraft is level at a specific altitude. In order to 
verify this finding, all the aircraft in Table 6-1 were analyzed to assess latency performance across 
  161 
the flight level (Appendix B).  Based on the analysis, all the aircraft also show that the latency 
performances vary significantly when the aircraft is cruising at specific level, at both low and high 
altitude. These findings indicate that, the latency performance is not influenced by the aircraft 
altitude. 
 
The latency performance impacts the situational awareness by Air Traffic Control (ATC). Assuming 
for example, that an aircraft travels at 400 knots, the highest mean latency as identified in the 
analysis of 1.9050 seconds (Table 6-1) translates into an error in the 3D geometrical distance of 392 
meters. This is not sufficient for ATC to provide 3NM separation based on the requirements in ED-
142 (EUROCAE, 2010). Therefore, latency is one of the factors that contribute to the ADS-B 
positioning accuracy, in addition to the onboard navigation system accuracy that feeds to the ADS-B 
system. 
 
6.3.2 ADS-B Horizontal Position Accuracy 
 
In this thesis, ADS-B horizontal position accuracy is evaluated by comparing the received position 
from the ADS-B ground station with the reference position (derived from Eq. 1 and Eq. 2). The 
Horizontal Position Error (HPE) is measured for each ADS-B position by applying Eq. 4 and Eq. 5. In 
Eq. 4, the WGS84 ellipsoidal co-ordinates (latitude (λ), longitude (φ), altitude (h)) for both the ADS-B 
position and the reference position are transformed into the Earth-Centred Earth-Fixed (ECEF) 
Cartesian co-ordinate (x, y, z). Eq.5 measures the HPE. 
   (Eq.4) 
where, 
 e is the first eccentricity of ellipsoid, denoted as e = 0.08181919, 
 N is the distance along the normal from the position (λ, φ, h) to the meridian ellipse, denoted 
by: 
, a=6378137 (Equatorial Radius) 
 
   (Eq. 5) 
where, 
R =  
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Table 6-3 tabulates the Root Mean Square (RMS) horizontal position error (HPE) computed for the 
eight aircraft. 
Table 6-3: RMS horizontal position error (HPE) 
Aircraft ID Aircraft Type HPE (meter) 
40608F A318 476.2826 
405A48 A320 66.2622 
400A26 A320 552.8482 
400877 A319 109.4822 
400878 A319 113.1374 
40087B A319 14287 
4008F2 A319 48.8772 
400935 A319 145.4744 
 
As shown in Table 6-3, aircraft 40087B exhibits an unacceptable position error of 14287 metres. 
Further investigation is in progress with British Airways on the performance of this particular 
aircraft. Aircraft 4008F2 shows a good position error of 49 meters. Five of the aircraft are compliant 
with the requirement of 3NM separation i.e. <150 meters RMS error (EUROCAE, 2010). Figures 6-18 
to 6-21 show the largest and least position error over time and the position error distribution for 
aircraft 40087B and 4008F2, respectively.  
 
For aircraft certified with DO-260B, the ADS-B report includes a data item called Navigational 
Accuracy Category (NAC), an indicator of receiver positioning accuracy (RTCA, 2011). NAC is derived 
based on GPS accuracy (Horizontal Figure of Merit-HFOM). HFOM does not reflect unannounced 
faults in a GPS satellite (ICAO, 2007b). The NAC is not suitable for making integrity decisions where 
safety of life is concerned. The resultant NAC is presented as a numerical value, from 0 to 9, whereby 
higher the NAC value, more accurate the position magnitude value.  
 
Figure 6-18: Position error over time for aircraft 40087B 
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Figure 6-19: Position error distribution for aircraft 40087B 
 
Figure 6-20: Position error over time for aircraft 4008F2. 
 
Figure 6-21: Position error distribution for aircraft 4008F2 
The HPE performance consistency is evaluated using the data from the four aircraft recorded during 
two different flights. Table 6-4 shows the performance consistency. 
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Table 6-4: HPE performance consistency 
Aircraft Aircraft Type HPE (meters) Std. Dev  
  Dataset 1 Dataset 2 Dataset 1 Dataset 2 
406250 A320 11093 1134 1096 305 
4008B4 A319 26 279 17 66 
4009C7 A320 169 130 36 39 
400942 A319 11026 7713 1378 2677 
 
Based on the analysis in Table 6-4, none of the aircraft is showing consistency in the horizontal 
position accuracy between the two flights. Aircraft 406250 and 400942 show extremely bad HPE in 
both flights and hence the positioning information cannot be used to perform separation. It is also 
found that there are jumps in the GPS position in latitude and longitude in dataset one for aircraft 
400942. These anomalies are investigated and discussed further in Chapter 7. However, the HPE 
measured in Table 6-4 is after removing the outliers due to position jumps. While aircraft 4008B4 
shows good HPE with 26 meters in dataset one and the performance degraded to 279 meters in 
dataset two. Aircraft 4009C7 shows almost similar HPE in both flights 169 meters and 130 meters 
respectively. Figure 6-22 to 6-29 shows the HPE distributions for the four aircraft.  
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Figure 6-22 and 6-23: HPE distribution for dataset 1 and dataset 2 for aircraft 406250 
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Figure 6-24 and 6-25: HPE distribution for dataset 1 and dataset 2 for aircraft 4008B4 
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Figure 6-26 and 6-27: HPE distribution for dataset 1 and dataset 2 for aircraft 4009C7 
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Figure 6-28 and 6-29: HPE distribution for dataset 1 and dataset 2 for aircraft 400942 
Among the four aircraft only HPE for aircraft 4009C7 are normally distributed in both flights. Next, 
the correlation between the HPE and latency is investigated for the four aircraft in both flights in 
Figures 6-30 to 6-37.  
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Figure 6-30 and 6-31: HPE vs Latency for dataset 1 and dataset 2 for aircraft 406250 
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Figure 6-32 and 6-33: HPE vs Latency for dataset 1 and dataset 2 for aircraft 4008B4 
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Figure 6-34 and 6-35: HPE vs Latency for dataset 1 and dataset 2 for aircraft 4009C7 
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Figure 6-36 and 6-37: HPE vs Latency for dataset 1 and dataset 2 for aircraft 400942 
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Based on the analysis in Figures 6-30 to 6-37, no correlation was identified between HPE 
performance and latency for all the aircraft in both flights. However, the HPE performance for 
aircraft 406250 and 400942 may be influenced by the errors in the data correlation process between 
the GPS position and ADS-B position due to the position jumps identified in both aircraft datasets. 
The results of the correlation between the HPE performance and change in altitude are investigated, 
and shown in Figures 6-38 to 6-45.  
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Figure 6-38 and 6-39: HPE vs Altitude for dataset 1 and dataset 2 for aircraft 406250 
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Figure 6-40 and 6-41: HPE vs Altitude for dataset 1 and dataset 2 for aircraft 4008B4 
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Figure 6-42 and 6-43: HPE vs Altitude for dataset 1 and dataset 2 for aircraft 4009C7 
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Figure 6-44 and 6-45: HPE vs Altitude for dataset 1 and dataset 2 for aircraft 400942 
 
The results in Figures 6-38 to 6-45 indicate that there is a significant correlation between HPE 
performance and the change in altitude, whereby as the altitude increases the HPE also increases. 
This can be clearly seen for example, in Figure 6-40 (dataset 1) and Figure 6-41 (dataset 2), whereby 
in dataset 1, aircraft 4008B4 is manoeuvring at a very low altitude between 52 to 64 feet, resulting in 
a mean HPE of 26 meters while in dataset 2, the aircraft is manoeuvring between 1000 to 40000 
feet, resulting in a mean HPE of 278 meters. In order to verify this finding, a statistical correlation 
test is conducted. Both the HPE and altitude data are not normally distributed; therefore a non-
parametric correlation test, Spearman’s Rho is used. The test results are presented in Table 6-5.  
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Table 6-5: Correlation between HPE and flight altitude 
 Altitude HPE 
Spearman's 
rho test 
Altitude Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .321** 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
N 9496 9496 
HPE Correlation Coefficient .321** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
N 9496 9496 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
The correlation test in Table 6-5 verifies that there is significant correlation between HPE and flight 
altitude with a correlation coefficient of 0.321 significant at (p<0.05). The correlation itself is 
positive: therefore, it can be concluded that as the altitude increases, there is a corresponding 
increase in the HPE. 
 
6.3.3 ADS-B Horizontal Position Integrity 
 
In order to determine whether ADS-B data may be used to provide ATC separation service, a position 
integrity quality indicator is required (ICAO, 2007b). The ADS-B data available for this thesis includes 
a position integrity quality indicator called Figure of Merit (FOM). The FOM represents the 
Navigational Uncertainty Category (NUC), which encodes the integrity bound, on the basis of 
Horizontal Protection Limit (HPL) provided by the GPS receiver (for avionics based on DO-260), as a 
numerical value, from 0 to 9. The higher the value, the higher the position integrity. For aircraft 
certified with DO-260B, the indicator is known as Navigation Integrity Code (NIC). In addition, 
another indicator called Surveillance Integrity Level (SIL) is also included in the report. The SIL 
defines the level of integrity by providing the probability of being outside the NIC radius without 
equipment at the transmitting aircraft detecting that might be the case: 10-3, 10-5, or 10-7 per flight 
hour (RTCA, 2002).  Based on the data analysis in Table 6-6, the mean position integrity of the 
sample is 5.43, i.e. above the threshold specified in Table 6-9 for radar and non radar airspace 
separation. FOM=0 cases are associated with position jumps. Such position jumps can result from 
avionics faults, and sometimes at the edge of coverage (ICAO, 2009a). When the ADS-B ground 
stations detect such a jump, the FOM value transmitted to ATC is zero (to prevent the position from 
being used by the ATC system). 
 
Table 6-6: Descriptive analysis of Figure of Merit (FOM) for position integrity quality indicator 
 N Min Max Mean Std. Dev 
FOM 95676 0 8 5.43 2.620 
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The ADS-B position accuracy is presented in the previous section as the Horizontal Position Error 
(HPE). The integrity risk of the ADS-B position is the probability that an error larger than the Alert 
Limit (AL) is undetected. The AL based on the NUC/FOM for aircraft certified under DO-260 is given 
in Table 6-7. 
Table 6-7: Alert Limit (AL) based on NUC/FOM 
NUC  in DO-260 HPL in DO-260 (Alert Limit) 
0 ≥ 20NM 
1 < 20NM 
2 < 10NM 
3 < 2.0NM 
4 < 1.0NM 
5 < 0.5NM 
6 < 0.2NM 
7 < 0.1NM 
8 < 25meters 
9 < 7.5meters 
 
The FOM/NUC or NIC value is transmitted to the ADS-B ground station for ATC use is the only 
indication of the aircraft position integrity. But how reliable is the quality indicator value? It is critical 
to verify this value at the ground station, before the aircraft position information is used for the 
various ATC applications.  Therefore, in this thesis, a set of algorithms is developed for this purpose 
as follows: 
 Correct detection event occurs when the FOM value presented to the controllers is less than 
the alert limit and the actual HPE is also less than the alert limit; (HPE<FOM<AL). 
 Missed detection event occurs when the FOM value presented to the controllers is less than 
the alert limit while the actual HPE is greater than the alert limit; (FOM<AL<HPE). 
 False alert event occurs when the FOM value presented to the controllers is less than the 
alert limit while the actual HPE is greater than the FOM but less than the alert limit; 
(FOM<HPE<AL). 
 
The set of algorithm is used to validate the integrity quality indicator (FOM/NUC or NIC) and to 
identify the actual ADS-B system performance for all the aircraft included in this thesis. The integrity 
performance (correct/missed/false detection) is evaluated for each ADS-B sample from each aircraft. 
Then the percentage of the categories and the integrity risk of each aircraft are measured. The 
results are shown in Table 6-8. It is found that three aircraft indicate 100% missed detection. Aircraft 
400878 shows 99.8% correct detection and 0.2% missed detection. Aircraft 400935 shows 91.2% 
correct detection and 8.8% missed detection. No false detection events are identified. Missed 
detections are most critical as ATC relies on the integrity quality indicator provided by the ADS-B 
system to ensure aircraft separation. The integrity risk of aircraft 40608F, 400A26 and 40087B are 
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measured as 1. While aircraft 400878 has integrity risk of 1.6 x 10-03 and aircraft 400935 has integrity 
risk of 8.8 x 10-02.  
Table 6-8: ADS-B Integrity quality indicator validation 
Aircraft ID Integrity Performance Category Integrity  
Risk 
Correction Detection 
(%) 
Missed Detection 
(%) 
False Detection 
(%) 
40608F 0 100 0 1 
405A48 100 0 0 0 
400A26 0 100 0 1 
400877 100 0 0 0 
400878 99.8 0.2 0 1.6 x 10
-03
 
40087B 0 100 0 1 
4008B4 100 0 0 0 
4008F2 100 0 0 0 
400935 91.2 8.8 0 8.8 x 10-02 
 
The error identified in the FOM may be due to the decoding process in the ADS-B transmission 
subsystem. Hence, it is crucial to have a validation mechanism at the ADS-B ground station to avoid 
such errors impacting the ATC system. This mechanism will also aid the ANSP to inform the airline on 
the problems detected in the avionics. 
 
6.3.4 ADS-B Availability 
 
ADS-B availability is impacted at three levels: availability of position integrity indicator from the GPS 
receiver, and the performance of ADS-B data transmission and ADS-B data reception at ground 
stations. The ATC system only displays ADS-B data to controllers when the FOM value is above the 
required threshold (Table 6-9). If the FOM does not reach this threshold, the ADS-B service is 
disrupted to that aircraft. The percentage of suitable FOM during the sample period effectively 
represents the availability of the GPS position data to the ADS-B transmitter. Acceptable FOM/NUC 
requirements were developed by the FAA-EUROCONTROL Requirements Focus Group (RFG) for Non 
Radar Airspace (NRA) and the Radar Airspace (RAD) ADS-B applications. These are summarised in 
Table 6-9. 
 
Table 6-9: Separation requirement based on NUC as quality indicator 
RTCA standard for Non Radar Airspace (NRA) : 
DO303 (RTCA, 2007) 
RTCA standard for Radar Airspace (RAD) : 
DO318 (RTCA, 2009) 
5 NM en-route separation : NUC = 4 
3 NM separation:  
NUC = 5 
5 NM en-route separation: NUC = 4 
3 NM separation:  
NUC = 5 
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The percentage of reports (with NUC > threshold) during the sampling period effectively represents 
the availability of the GPS position data to the ADS-B transmitter during the sample period. Failures 
of the ADS-B transmitter and of the ADS-B ground station receiver will also impact ADS-B availability. 
Based on the data analysis in Figure 6-46 and Table 6-9, the percentage of received ADS-B reports is 
81.80% and the availability is 81.78%. This shows an unavailability of 0.02%. 
 
Figure 6-46: Availability of the ADS-B positional data based on Integrity Quality Indicator 
 
6.3.5 ADS-B Continuity 
 
ADS-B continuity is defined in detail in Chapter 3. The variable that denotes continuity parameter 
performance is the ‘ADS-B message update rate’; measured as the rate (seconds) at which periodic 
ADS-B messages were received at the ground stations.  
 
Initially the update rate analysis was conducted using the first dataset comprising ADS-B messages 
recorded for 15 minutes flight duration for 34 aircraft based on opportunity traffic in the LTMA. 
However, the scatterplot analysis clearly showed that there was no deterministic pattern on the 
message update rate. The cause for this finding was verified when the same analysis was conducted 
using the second dataset comprising ADS-B messages for 45-60 minutes flight duration for 31 
aircraft recorded in the same airspace based on opportunity traffic. The analysis conducted with the 
second dataset clearly showed a pattern in the message update rate. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that, to conduct ADS-B continuity analysis, the data has to be recorded for at least 45 minutes.  
Coincidently, four aircraft were identified in both datasets. Figure 6-47 shows the update rate vs. 
flight duration for one of the aircraft.  
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Figure 6-47: Update rate vs. Flight time for the same aircraft in different time intervals 
 
Therefore, the first dataset was not used to conduct the ADS-B update rate analysis. 
 
General aircraft avionics information and descriptive statistic of ADS-B message update rate for each 
aircraft included in this analysis are given in Appendix C. The general aircraft information includes 
24-bit aircraft address, onboard GPS receiver model, ADS-B transponder model and aircraft type. 
The descriptive statistics information includes mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum 
update rate value in seconds. 
 
Due to the unanticipated update rate pattern which does not completely meet the required 
performance (0 to 2 seconds) based on the findings in Appendix C and Appendix D (scatterplot 
update rate vs. flight time), further effort is placed to investigate the factors that may have affected 
the performance were investigated. A number of possible factors affecting ADS-B message update 
rate were identified based on the review of ADS-B system operations: 
 Aircraft model (categorical variable) 
 Phases of flight (categorical variable) 
 Ground station (categorical variable) 
 GPS receiver model (categorical variable) 
 Transponder model (categorical variable) 
 Range (continuous variable) 
 Flight level (continuous variable) 
 
The analysis is structured in a way to finally derive an update rate model to introduce the factors 
that contribute to the update rate performance. In the first part of the analysis, scatterplot of the 
update rate against flight duration is produced for all the 31 aircraft (Appendix D). The scatterplot 
analysis clearly shows that there is a pattern on the ADS-B message update rate. It is also found that 
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obvious outliers and duplicate messages exist in the data. The findings are provided in Appendix C 
for each aircraft. The reason for the duplicate messages is due to ADS-B message transmission to 
more than one ground station within the aircraft range at the same time and the central processing 
unit for the ground stations did not discard the duplicate messages. 
 
It is important to determine if the update rate distribution is normal or non-normal to choose the 
correct correlation test for the correlation analysis. Therefore the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-
Wilk normality tests are used to check the data distribution. These tests compare the set of data in 
the sample to a normally distributed set of data with the same mean and standard deviation. If the 
test is non-significant (p>0.05), the sample distribution is not significantly different from a normal 
distribution (i.e. normal). If, however, the test is significant (p<0.05), then the sample distribution is 
different from a normal distribution (i.e. non-normal). Based on the tests results, the update rate 
data are not normally distributed. Therefore, the correlation or association between the variables 
(potential factors) and ADS-B message update rate are tested using non-parametric tests; Friedman 
test, Wilcoxon Signed-rank test or Spearman’s rho tests depending on the variable type; categorical 
or continuous .  
 
The Friedman test is used to test for differences between two or more groups when the dependent 
variable being measured is ordinal or continuous data (that deviates from normality) and the 
independent variable being categorical data. This test is chosen to identify if the following variables 
(categorical) contribute to the ADS-B update rate (continuous) performance in Appendix D. If the 
result of the Friedman Test is significant (i.e. there is a significant difference between the tested 
groups), then it can be concluded that the variables contribute to the ADS-B message update rate 
performance. However, the Friedman test does not pinpoint which group in particular differs from 
each other. Therefore, further analysis on the data is performed to identify the differences between 
the groups using the Wilcoxon Signed-rank test. The Wilcoxon test is run separately on the different 
combinations of the related groups. The test uses Z-statistics to measure the differences between 
the groups combination. If there are more than two group samples, Bonferroni adjustment is used 
to derive the adjusted significance level p, by dividing the initial significance level (in this case, 0.05) 
by the number of group samples. 
 
The Spearman’s Rho test is used to measure the strength and direction of association between the 
following variables (continuous) and update rate performance. The test produces two statistics 
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values; correlation coefficient, r and significance level, p. The correlation coefficient, r, measures the 
averaged sum of combined difference for two variables with different units (refer to Equation 6).  
 
r =   (Eq.6) 
 
where      
 
 
The corresponding value of ‘r’ should be between -1 and +1. If it is out of this range, then something 
must be wrong with the calculation. Interpretations of the ‘r’ values are as follows 
 +1 → indicates that the two variables are perfectly positively correlated, when one variable 
increases, the other increases by a proportionate amount. 
 -1 → indicates a perfect negative relationship. 
 0 → indicates no linear relationship at all between the two variables. When one variable 
changes, the other stays the same. 
 
The correlation between the potential factors identified and ADS-B message update rate are 
analysed based on the availability of the required data and information from the ANSP and airline 
operator; in this case, NATS and British Airways.  
6.3.5.1  Aircraft model 
 
The Friedman test in Table 6-10 indicates that, there is an overall statistically significant difference in 
the mean rank of ADS-B message update rate for aircraft model A319, A320, A321, B744 and B777-
200 with χ2(4) = 504.325, p < 0.01. This suggests that the aircraft model contributes to the ADS-B 
message update rate performance.  
 
Table 6-10: Friedman test for Aircraft model vs. Update rate 
Aircraft model Rank Friedman Test Statistics 
N Chi-Square df Asymp. Sig. 
A319 2.62 4403 504.325 4 .000 
A320 3.31 
A321 3.17 
B744 3.01 
B777-200 2.88 
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In order to identify the differences among the aircraft models, further analysis is conducted by 
calculating the percentage of update rates within 2 seconds as shown in Figure 6-48. The results 
show that the ADS-B message update rate performance varies based on the aircraft model. A319 
shows the best performance with 87.35% of the message update rates within 2 seconds, followed by 
A321 with 82.32% and B777-200 with 80.55%. While B744 shows the worst performance with 
72.24% followed by A320 with 74.49%. The potential reason for this variation maybe due to the 
differences in the avionics models used by the aircraft. Therefore, the next sections investigate the 
update rate performance based on the GPS receiver and ADS-B transponder models. 
 
Figure 6-48: Percentage update rate ≤ 2 seconds based on aircraft model 
 
6.3.5.2  GPS receiver model 
 
The Friedman test in Table 6-11 indicates that there is an overall statistically significant difference in 
the ADS-B message update rate based on GPS receiver onboard; Honeywell GNSSU , Rockwell Collins 
GLU920 MMR and Thales TLS755 MMR with χ2(4) = 327.904, p < 0.01. This suggests that the GPS 
receiver type is associated with the ADS-B message update rate performance.  
 
Table 6-11: Friedman test for GPS receiver model vs. Update rate 
GPS receiver model Rank Friedman Test Statistics 
N Chi-Square df Asymp. Sig. 
Honeywell GNSSU 2.22 3628 327.904 2 .000 
Rockwell Collins GLU920 MMR 1.99 
Thales TLS755 MMR 1.79 
  177 
However, by looking at the performance based on the percentage of update rate within 2 seconds 
(Figure 6-49), no significant difference is identified between the GPS receivers based on the aircraft 
make model. However, if the data were more diverse; with each aircraft model using different types 
of GPS receivers, the findings would have been more concrete. Based on Figure 6-49, only B777-200 
uses two different GPS receivers; Honeywell GNSSU and Rockwell Collins GLU920 MMR which shows 
80% and 86% of update rate within 2 seconds respectively. These conclude that the GPS receiver 
model affects the update rate performance. 
 
Figure 6-49: Percentage update rate ≤ 2 seconds vs. GPS receiver model based on aircraft model 
 
It is important to recall at this point as explained in Chapter 3, that the GPS position received 
onboard is fed to the ADS-B system. The GPS data analysis shows that the GPS position update rate 
by all the onboard GPS receivers included in this analysis is consistent at 1 second. Therefore, no 
anomalies are identified on the GPS position update rate by the receivers that might have affected 
the performance of the ADS-B message update rate. 
 
6.3.5.3  Transponder model 
 
The Friedman test in Table 6-12 indicate that, there is an overall statistically significant difference in 
the mean rank of ADS-B message update rate based on the transponder; ACSS XS-950 and 
Honeywell TRA-67A with χ2(4) = 364.88, p < 0.01. This suggests that the transponder type 
contributes to the ADS-B message update rate performance.  
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Table 6-12: Friedman test for Transponder model vs. Update rate 
Transponder  model 
 
Rank Friedman Test Statistics 
N Chi-Square df Asymp. Sig. 
ACSS XS-950 1.59 12092 364.888 1 .000 
Honeywell TRA-67A 1.41 
 
However, further analysis in Figure 6-50 measuring the percentage of ADS-B message transmitted 
within 2 seconds, does not show any significant differences between the transponder models. This is 
due to lack of diversity in the data. Comparison can only be made between the transponder models 
if the same aircraft model has different transponders. 
 
 
Figure 6-50: Percentage update rate ≤ 2 seconds vs. transponder model based on aircraft model 
 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the transponder model affects the ADS-B update rate 
performance. However, diverse data are required to obtain a more concrete result.  
6.3.5.4  Flight level 
 
The correlation between aircraft flight level and ADS-B message update rate is tested using 
Spearman’s rho test. The test results are tabulated in Appendix E. The results show that 30 aircraft 
have significant correlation between flight level and update rate with positive correlation coefficient, 
r, significant at 0.01 level, indicating that when the flight level increases, the update rate also 
increases. However, the correlation was not significant for one aircraft with a correlation coefficient, 
r=0.038 and significance, p = 0.077. This is assumed to be an outlier in the sample. Further analysis is 
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conducted by grouping the flight level and identifying the update rate performance between each 
group. 
 
The Friedman test in Table 6-13 shows that, there is an overall statistically significant difference in 
the ADS-B message update rate between flight level grouped as 0 – 10000 (FL1), 10001 – 20000 
(FL2), 20001 – 30000 (FL3), 30001 – 40000 (FL4) and 40001 – 50000 (FL5) with χ2(4) = 323.446, p = 
0.000. This suggests that the flight level groups contribute to the ADS-B message update rate 
performance. In order to analyze the differences between the flight level groups, a post-hoc analysis 
with the Wilcoxon signed-rank test (Table 6-14 and Table 6-15) was conducted with a Bonferroni 
correction applied, resulting in a significance level set at p<0.01. Median (Table 6-14) update rate for 
ADS-B message at FL1, FL2, FL3, FL4 and FL5 were 1.03 (0.95 to 1.14), 1.01 (0.93 to 1.11), 1.02 (0.93 
to 1.32), 1.38 (0.97 to 2.09) and 1.43 (0.98 to 2.29) respectively. There was a statistically significant 
decrease in update rate in FL2 vs. FL1 (Z = -5.035, p= 0.000). However, there was no significant 
difference between the FL2 and FL1 update rate range. There was a statistically significant increase 
in the update rate in FL3 vs. FL1 (Z = -18.877, p= 0.000), FL4 vs. FL1 (Z = -39.211, p= 0.000), FL5 vs. 
FL1 (Z = -13.251, p= 0.000), FL3 vs. FL2 (Z = -11.821, p= 0.000), FL4 vs. FL2 (Z = -30.744, p= 0.000), FL5 
vs. FL2 (Z = -16.349, p= 0.000), FL4 vs. FL3 (Z = -19.676, p= 0.000) and FL5 vs. FL3 (Z = -14.196, p= 
0.000). However, there was no significant difference between FL4 and FL5 despite and overall 
increase in FL5 vs. FL4 (Z= -0.960, p = 0.337).  
 
Table 6-13: Friedman test for Update rate vs. Flight level group 
Flight level  
group 
Rank Friedman Test Statistics 
N Chi-Square df Asymp. Sig. 
0 - 10000 2.82 1197 323.446 4 .000 
10001 - 20000 2.58 
20001 - 30000 2.73 
30001 - 40000 3.39 
40001 - 50000 3.48 
 
Table 6-14: Median update rate based on flight level groups 
 
N 
Percentiles 
25th 50th (Median) 75th 
FL1 1197 .9500 1.0300 1.1350 
FL2 1197 .9300 1.0100 1.1100 
FL3 1197 .9300 1.0200 1.3200 
FL4 1197 .9700 1.3800 2.0900 
FL5 1197 .9800 1.4300 2.2900 
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Table 6-15: Wilcoxon signed-rank test statistics 
 
 
FL2 - 
FL1 
FL3 - 
FL1 
FL4 - 
FL1 
FL5 - 
FL1 
FL3 - 
FL2 
FL4 - 
FL2 
FL5 - 
FL2 
FL4 - 
FL3 
FL5 - 
FL3 
FL5 - 
FL4 
Z -5.035
a
 -18.877
a
 -39.211
a
 -13.251
a
 -11.821
a
 -30.744
a
 -16.349
a
 -19.676
a
 -14.196
a
 -.960
a
 
Asymp. Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .337 
a. Based on negative ranks. 
 
The analysis concludes that the ADS-B update rate is performance is influenced by the aircraft flight 
level whereby the update rate increases as the flight level increases. 
6.3.5.5  Phases of flight 
 
The phase of flight variable is derived based on the aircraft flight level pattern throughout the flight 
duration as; climbing, cruising and descent.  
 
The Friedman test in Table 6-16 shows that there is an overall statistically significant difference in 
the ADS-B message update rate for aircraft models A319, A320, A321, B744 and B777-200 based on 
the phases of flight with χ2(2) = 116.818, p = 0.000; χ2(2) = 194.577, p = 0.000; χ2(2) = 11.875, p = 
0.003; χ2(2) = 151.405, p = 0.000 and χ2(2) = 222.213, p = 0.000 respectively. This suggests that the 
phases of flight (climbing, cruising, and descent) contributes to the ADS-B message update rate 
performance. Further analysis is undertaken to identify the specific differences between the phases 
of flight (Figure 6-51) and phases of flight based on aircraft model (Figure 6-52). 
 
Table 6-16: Friedman test for Update rate vs. Phases of flight based on aircraft model 
 Rank Friedman Test Statistics 
Aircraft model Phases of flight  N Chi-Square df Asymp. Sig. 
Climbing Cruising Descent 
A319 2.15 1.87 1.98 3003 116.818 2 .000 
A320 2.13 2.13 1.74 1879 194.577 2 .000 
A321 2.20 1.86 1.94 190 11.875 2 .003 
B744 1.99 2.17 1.84 2599 151.405 2 .000 
B777-200 1.89 2.19 1.93 4202 222.213 2 .000 
 
Figure 6-51 indicates that the ADS-B message update rate performance is worst when the aircraft is 
in the cruising phase while no significant difference is found between the climbing and descent 
phases. However, further investigation is conducted to identify if all aircraft models included in this 
study comply with these findings. Figure 6-52 shows that aircraft models A320, B744, and B777-200 
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comply with the findings. However, aircraft models A319 and A321 show fairly high performance in 
descent and cruising phases despite lower performance in the climbing phase.  
 
Figure 6-51: Percentage Update rate vs. Phases of flight 
 
 
Figure 6-52: Percentage Update rate vs. Phases of flight based on aircraft model 
 
Further investigation is conducted to see if there is any association between the update rate and 
flight level for each phases of flight (Figure 6-53 to 6-55).  
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Figure 6-53: Update rate vs. Flight level for Climbing phase 
 
Figure 6-54: Update rate vs. Flight level for Cruising phase 
 
Figure 6-55: Update rate vs. Flight level for Descent phase 
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Figures 6-53 to 6-55 indicate that there are more data points deviating from the normal towards 
higher flight levels (specifically 30000 to 40000 feet). This is more obvious in the cruising phase.  
 
In summary, the analysis concludes that the update rate performance is influenced by the phases of 
flight. It also concludes that the performance is worst during the cruising phase specifically at higher 
flight levels between 30000 to 40000 feet. The reason for this finding is may be due to the ADS-B Out 
antenna mounting angle on the aircraft and the range relative to the ground stations. 
 
6.3.5.6  Ground station 
 
The Friedman test in Table 6-17 show that, there is an overall statistically significant difference in the  
ADS-B message update rate for ADS-B ground stations; Chedburgh, Greenford, Reigate, Ventnor, 
Winstone and Warlingham with χ2(5) = 181.404, p = 0.000. This suggests that the ground station 
contributes to the ADS-B message update rate performance.  
 
Table 6-17: Friedman test for Update rate vs. Ground station 
Ground Station Rank Friedman Test Statistics 
N Chi-Square df Asymp. Sig. 
Chedburgh 3.72 1980 181.404 5 .000 
Greenford 3.11 
Reigate 3.29 
Ventnor 3.76 
Winstone 3.53 
Warlingham 3.60 
 
Further analysis is conducted to identify the differences in station performance by calculating the 
percentage of ADS-B message update rate within 2 seconds in Figure 6-56. Reigate station shows the 
best performance while Winstone shows the worst performance, 97.02% and 81.44% of ADS-B 
message update rate in ≤ 2 seconds respectively.  
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Figure 6-56: Percentage Update rate vs. ADS-B ground stations 
 
An analysis was undertaken to see if there is any relationship between station performance and the 
phase of flight of the aircraft while transmitting the message to the particular station. In order to 
statistically prove if the relationship exists, Crosstabulation and the Chi-square test are conducted. 
The crosstabulation method analyses the relationship between two categorical variables (in this case 
Station and Phases of flight). The data are tabulated and then the chi-square test is carried out to 
see if the variables are associated. The chi-square test detects whether there is a significant 
association between the two categorical variables. However, it does not give any indication on the 
strength of the association. Table 6-18 shows the crosstabulation between the two variables. Taking 
a random case and based on Figure 6-56, Reigate station has the best performance. Hence the 
hypothesis based on the findings in section 6.3.5.5 (whereby the lowest % update rate ≤ 2 seconds is 
while cruising) should be true if the Reigate station has the lowest count of messages while in the 
cruising phase. Table 6-18 shows that this is true whereby, 906 messages were sent while climbing, 
368 while cruising and 706 while descending. Hence, the lowest count is in the cruising phase.  
 
Table 6-18: Phase of flight * Station Crosstabulation 
 
 
Station 
Total Chedburgh Greenford Reigate Ventnor Warlingham Winstone 
Phase Climbing 1455 890 906 1552 8655 2178 15636 
Cruising 616 2236 368 2615 5612 6919 18366 
Descent 528 7011 706 1146 12629 3309 25329 
Total 2599 10137 1980 5313 26896 12406 59331 
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Table 6-19: Chi-Square Tests 
 Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 10797.321
a
 10 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 10621.710 10 .000 
N of Valid Cases 59331   
 
To statistically prove this, the chi-square test in Table 6-19 indicates that the station performance (in 
terms of ADS-B message update rate) and the phases of flight are associated with χ2(5) = 
10797.321, p = 0.000. This finding has led to another assumption, that there might be an association 
between the update rate and aircraft track angle based on phases of flight with reference to the 
station. In the first step, scatterplots (Figure 6-57 to 6-62) are produced for update rate against 
aircraft track angle grouped by phases of flight for each station. There seem to be a general trend in 
the data for all stations whereby, the data are clustered in the lower region of the update rate scale 
in all phases of flight in spite of the aircraft track angle. There are obvious outliers in the cruising 
phase for Ventnor, Warlingham and Winstone stations and in the climbing phase for Reigate station 
in spite of the aircraft track angle. However, Chedburgh and Greenford stations do not show any 
obvious trend. In general the scatterplots do not show any obvious association between the aircraft 
track angle and ADS-B message update rate.  
 
 
Figure 6-57: Winstone 
 
Figure 6-58: Chedburgh 
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Figure 6-59: Greenford 
 
Figure 6-60: Ventnor 
 
Figure 6-61: Reigate 
 
Figure 6-62: Warlingham 
 
In order to statistically verify this observation, correlation analysis using Spearman’s Rho test is 
conducted to see how the aircraft track angle with respect to the stations affects the update rate 
performance. Table 6-20 presents the results.  
 
Table 6-20: Correlation test between aircraft track angle and update rate based on stations 
Station Correlation Coefficient, r Asymp. Sig. Findings 
Chedburgh 0.235 .000 Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 
Greenford 0.051 .000 Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 
Reigate -0.002 .916 Correlation is not significant 
Ventnor -0.064 .000 Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 
Warlingham 0.013 .040 Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 
Winstone -0.046 .000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
 
The Spearman’s test results in Table 6-20 indicate there is a correlation between update rate and 
aircraft track angel for all station in spite of the extremely small correlation coefficient, r value, 
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except for Reigate station. The sign of the correlation coefficient indicates that the correlation 
direction depends on the station location as the aircraft track angles are measured from the north.  
 
Based on the scatterplots (Figure 6-57 to 6-62) and the Spearman’s test result (Table 6-20), no 
concrete conclusions can be made on the association between update rate and aircraft track angle 
based on phases of flight with reference to each station.  
 
6.3.5.7  Range 
 
Aircraft range between aircraft position (latitude, longitude, altitude) and the position of the station 
(latitude, longitude, altitude) receiving the ADS-B message, is computed using ellipsoid distance 
formula. The correlation between aircraft range and ADS-B message update rate is analyzed using 
Spearman’s rho test. The test is conducted for the 31 aircraft manoeuvering in the LTMA airspace, 
broadcasting ADS-B message to six ground stations within its coverage. The test results are tabulated 
in Appendix F. The results indicate 30 aircraft show significant correlation between flight level and 
update rate with positive correlation coefficient, r, significant at 0.01 level, indicating that when the 
flight level increases, the update rate also increases. However, the correlation was not significant for 
one aircraft with correlation coefficient, r = 0.056 and significance, p = 0.009. This is the same 
aircraft identified as an outlier in the Flight level analysis in Section 6.3.5.4. 
 
6.3.5.8  ADS-B Update rate model 
 
The correlation analysis between the potential factors identified and the ADS-B message update rate 
in sections 6.3.5.1 to 6.3.5.7 indicate that aircraft model, GPS receiver model, transponder model, 
flight level, phases of flight, ground station, aircraft track angle and aircraft range from the station 
are associated with the ADS-B message update rate performance. However, the correlation tests 
neither indicate how these variables are related to the update rate nor the strength of the 
associations. Therefore, a mathematical model is derived for the ADS-B message update rate to 
identify the contributing factors to its performance. In the first step, the update rate distribution 
pattern is analysed. The histogram for update rate in Figure 6-63 shows that the update rate 
distribution is not normal and projects an exponential form. In addition, the update rate values are 
greater than zero.  
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Figure 6-63: Update rate distribution 
 
Due to these characteristics identified, it can be concluded that the update rate function is non-
linear. Hence, the gamma probability distribution function is used to derive the model. The choice of 
the distribution-link function is guided by either a priori theoretical considerations or the 
combination that best fits based on the visual distribution observation of the dependent variable. 
The Gamma distribution is chosen because it is appropriate for variables with positive scale values 
that are skewed toward larger positive values. If a data value is less than or equal to 0 or is missing, 
then the corresponding case is not used in the analysis. The link function is a transformation of the 
dependent variable that allows estimation of the model. The Log link function: f(x) =log(x), is chosen 
for the model. This link can be used with any distribution. 
  
The derived model’s general information is provided in Table 6-21. The gamma probability 
distribution models the log of the Update Rate (dependent variable /outcome) as a function of the 
predictor variables (independent variables) which include the phases of flight, aircraft model, ground 
station, flight level, range between the aircraft and ground station, and aircraft track angle. The GPS 
receiver and transponder models are not included in the Model to avoid data redundancy. For 
example, all A319 aircraft are equipped with the Thales TLS755 GPS receiver and Honeywell TRA-67A 
transponder. Hence, the performance of the A319 also corresponds to the performance of Thales 
TLS755 GPS receiver and Honeywell TRA-67A transponder. By including aircraft, GPS receiver and 
transponder models will cause multicollinearity, which occurs when two or more independent 
Exponential form 
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variables are highly correlated with each other. This leads to problems in understanding which 
independent variable contributes to the variance explained in the dependent variable as well as 
technical issues in calculating the Model. 
 
Table 6-21: Model Information 
Dependent Variable Update Rate 
Probability Distribution Gamma 
Link Function Log 
 
The Omnibus Test in Table 6-22 gives the overall test for the model. The Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square 
value of 9635.939 with significance value (P-value) less than 0.0005 indicates that the model as a 
whole fits significantly better than the intercept-only model (i.e. model with no predictor). The 
probability distribution of the test statistics is approximated by the Chi-Square distribution with 
(df14) degrees of freedom. Overall, the result in the table indicates that the independent variables 
reliably predict the dependent variable (Update Rate) with D (14) = 9635.939, p < .0005 (i.e., the 
model is a good fit of the data).  
 
Table 6-22: Omnibus Test 
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square df Sig. 
9635.939 14 .000 
 
The Wald statistic in Table 6-23 is used to ascertain whether a variable is a significant predictor of 
the outcome (i.e. Update Rate). Each predictor in the model is tested for whether it has any effect. 
Predictors with significance values less than 0.05 have some discernible effect. The results in Table 6-
23 show that all the predictor variables contribute significantly to the prediction of the Update Rate. 
The effect of each predictor is provided in the Parameter Estimates in Table 6-24. 
 
Table 6-23: Tests of Model Effects 
Source Type I 
Wald Chi-Square df Sig. 
(Intercept) 38.275 1 .000 
Phase 685.406 2 .000 
Aircraft 2071.290 4 .000 
Station 251.069 5 .000 
FL 1967.487 1 .000 
Range 625.758 1 .000 
Track Angle 311.034 1 .000 
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The parameter estimates in Table 6-24 summarize the effect of each predictor. While interpretation 
of the coefficients (B) in this model is difficult because of the nature of the link function, the signs of 
the coefficients for covariates (categorical variables) and relative values of the coefficients for factor 
levels (continuous variables) give important insights into the effects of the predictors in the model. 
 
The significance of each predictor is measured using a Wald statistics, giving 95% Confidence Interval 
(CI) for the odds ratio (Exp (B)). If the significance value p < 0.05, then the coefficients (B) are 
statistically significantly different from zero. Notice that the Phase has three different values; 
Climbing, Cruising and Descent. These are interpreted as three independent variables. Each enters 
the Model with its own coefficient and p-value. The Aircraft have five different values; A319, A320, 
A321, B744 and B777-200. The Station has six different values; Chedburgh, Greenford, Reigate, 
Ventnor, Warlingham and Winstone. 
 
The Climbing phase (p = 0.431) does not appear to be an important predictor of the Model while 
there is a significant predictive power for all other predictors with p > 0.05. The Model shows that 
compared to Descent, Cruising has 1.143 times higher odds ratio (95% CI = 1.130 to 1.155) to predict 
the Update Rate. Compared to the B777-200, A319 has 0.827 times higher odds ratio (95% CI = 0.808 
to 0.837), A320 1.071 times higher odds ratio (95% CI = 1.004 to 1.040) and B744 1.051 times higher 
odds ratio (95% CI = 1.038 to 1.065) to predict the Update Rate. 
 
Compared to the Winstone, Chedburgh has 1.034 times higher odds ratio (95% CI = 1.012 to 1.058), 
Greenford 1.052 times higher odds ratio (95% CI = 1.034 to 1.070), Reigate 0.908 times higher odds 
ratio (95% CI = 0.886 to 0.932), Ventnor 0.922 times higher odds ratio (95% CI = 0.906 to 0.939) and 
Warlingham 1.017 times higher odds ratio (95% CI = 1.000 to 1.034) to predict the Update Rate. For 
each 100 feet increase in FL, there is an increase in Update Rate of 1.209E-5 seconds. While for each 
one meter increase in Range, there is an increase in Update Rate of 7.629E-8 seconds. Interestingly, 
although the p-value for the Track Angle is small, notice that the odds ratio is 1.000 and the 
coefficient is 0.000. This seemingly contradicting information suggests that the values for the Track 
Angle are hiding the actual odds ratio in this Model, and hence, assumed irrelevant to the Model. 
 
As a conclusion, the Model in Table 6-24 shows that the aircraft model with its corresponding 
avionics (GPS and transponder models) significantly impact the ADS-B update rate performance with 
A320 showing the highest impact, followed by B744, A321 and A319. The differences in the impact 
may be due to the performance of the aircraft avionics including FMS. The Model also indicates that, 
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only when the aircraft is in the cruising Phase, the ADS-B update rate performance is affected. The 
possible reason for this may be the due to the ADS-B Out antenna mounting on the aircraft relative 
to the ground station location. The ground stations significantly impact the ADS-B update rate 
performance in the following order with the highest impact from Greenford, followed by Chedburgh, 
Warlingham, Ventnor and Reigate. The reason for the differences in the impact between the stations 
may be due to message congestions at the stations.  
 
6.3.5.8.1 Model diagnostics 
 
In order to validate the appropriateness of the Generalized Linear Model developed in section 
6.3.5.8, residuals are defined and the residual plots and distributions are examined in this section. 
The difference between the observed value of the dependent variable ( ) and the estimated value 
( ) is called the residual ( ). Each data point has one residual, whereby   =  - . The sum and the 
mean of the residual are expected to be equal to zero due to the laws of random errors. That is, 
Σ  = 0 and 
 = 0 
A residual plot is a graph that shows the residual on the vertical axis and the independent variable 
on the horizontal axis. If the points in the residual plot are randomly dispersed around the horizontal 
axis and centered on zero, than the Model is appropriate for the data. Figure 6-64 plots residuals vs. 
Flight Level and Figure 6-65 plots residual vs. Track Angle. Both plots show fairly random patterns, 
indicating that the Model provides a decent fit to the data. 
 
The appropriateness of the Model is also determined based on the residual distribution. If the 
residuals are normally distributed, then the Model is a good fit for the data. The residual distribution 
is checked using: 
 Normal probability plot of the residuals; and 
 Histogram of residuals. 
Figure 6-66 shows the normal probability plot of the residuals in a scatter plot diagram with Update 
Rate (dependant variable) on the y axis and the residuals on the x axis. The figure indicates that the 
relationship between the Update Rate and the residuals is approximately linear. This indicates that 
the residuals are normally distributed. The histogram of the residuals in Figure 6-67 also shows that 
the residuals are normally distributed, further verifying  that the Model is a good fit for the data. 
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Table 6- 24: Parameter Estimates 
 
Parameter B Std. Error 95% Wald Confidence 
Interval 
Hypothesis Test Exp(B) 95% Wald Confidence Interval 
for Exp(B) 
Lower Upper Wald Chi-
Square 
df Sig. Lower Upper 
(Intercept) -.071 .0114 -.093 -.048 38.275 1 .000 .932 .911 .953 
[Phase=Climbing] .004 .0055 -.006 .015 .620 1 .431 1.004 .994 1.015 
[Phase=Cruising  ] .133 .0056 .122 .144 574.514 1 .000 1.143 1.130 1.155 
[Phase=Descent ] 0a . . . . . . 1 . . 
[Aircraft=A319 ] -.190 .0058 -.201 -.179 1079.446 1 .000 .827 .818 .837 
[Aircraft=A320] .068 .0073 .054 .083 87.400 1 .000 1.071 1.056 1.086 
[Aircraft=A321] .022 .0089 .004 .039 5.857 1 .016 1.022 1.004 1.040 
[Aircraft=B744 ] .050 .0066 .037 .063 56.811 1 .000 1.051 1.038 1.065 
[Aircraft=B777-200] 0a . . . . . . 1 . . 
[Station=Chedburgh] .034 .0113 .012 .056 8.951 1 .003 1.034 1.012 1.058 
[Station=Greenford] .051 .0088 .034 .068 33.580 1 .000 1.052 1.034 1.070 
[Station=Reigate  ] -.096 .0130 -.122 -.071 54.762 1 .000 .908 .886 .932 
[Station=Ventnor] -.081 .0093 -.099 -.063 76.085 1 .000 .922 .906 .939 
[Station=Warlingham] .017 .0085 -2.741E-5 .033 3.829 1 .050 1.017 1.000 1.034 
[Station=Winstone] 0a . . . . . . 1 . . 
FL 1.209E-5 2.7260E-7 1.156E-5 1.263E-5 1967.487 1 .000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Range 7.629E-8 3.0497E-9 7.031E-8 8.227E-8 625.758 1 .000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Track Angle .000 2.4979E-5 .000 .000 311.034 1 .000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(Scale) .247b .0014 .245 .250       
 
Dependent Variable: Update Rate 
Model: (Intercept), Phase, Aircraft, Station, FL, Range, Track Angle 
a. Set to zero because this parameter is redundant. 
b. Maximum likelihood estimate. 
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Figure 6-64: Residual vs. Flight Level Figure 6-65: Residual vs. Track Angle 
  
Figure 6-66: Normal Probability Plot Figure 6-67: Histogram of Residuals 
 
6.4 Summary 
 
The ADS-B data and onboard GPS data (reference) are asynchronous. This has made it more 
complicated to correlate the datasets to perform data evaluation.  The data evaluation framework 
developed in this Chapter is robust enough to handle this difficulty. The onboard GPS has been used 
as the reference for the ADS-B system, due to its superior performance. The radar system is not 
appropriate for this purpose. 
 
The latency budget derived in this Chapter indicates that the propagation delay including the delay 
encountered in the ground station should not exceed 1001 milliseconds. The latency analysis shows 
that five aircraft have latency more than 1.5 seconds. In addition, there is no consistency in the 
latency performance between flights of the same aircraft. An investigation of the impact of altitude 
change on latency shows that as the altitude decreases, the latency increases. This could be due to 
the signal jamming anticipated in the lower altitude of dense TMA airspace. 
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The ADS-B horizontal position accuracy analysis shows that five aircraft are compliant with the 3NM 
separation requirement (RMS HPE < 150 meters). Two aircraft have RMS HPE > 10000 meters. 
Further investigation is in progress with British Airways on the performance of these aircraft. In 
addition, there is no consistency in the RMS HPE between flights. Correlation analysis between HPE 
and latency indicates that there is no association between the horizontal position accuracy 
performance and latency. However, there is a significant correlation between horizontal position 
accuracy performance and the altitude, whereby as the altitude increases, the HPE also increases. 
 
The mean ADS-B horizontal position integrity (NUC) measured for the sample included in this thesis 
is 5.43, sufficient for the radar and non-radar airspace separation. However, 100% missed detections 
were identified for three aircraft. Missed detections are critical as the ATC relies on the NUC value to 
ensure aircraft separation. The identified error is assumed to be due to the decoding process in the 
ADS-B transmitting subsystem. Therefore, the integrity indicator included in the ADS-B message 
must be validated at the ground station before it is transmitted to ATC for operational use. 
 
The ADS-B availability analysis indicates 81.78% availability. 
 
The findings from the continuity analysis indicate that, to conduct a continuity analysis, the data 
have to be recorded for at least 45 minutes to enable the presence of a deterministic pattern to be 
identified in the data distribution. The analysis shows that there is no consistency in the update rate 
of ADS-B messages to the ground station. The required update rate between 0.5 to 2 seconds is not 
met by the aircraft. Therefore, further analysis to identify the factors that contribute to the update 
rate performance based on various correlation tests and Generalized Linear Model (GLM) show that 
the aircraft model, GPS model, transponder model, flight level, range from the ground station, 
ground station and phases of flight, significantly impact the update rate performance.  
 
In summary, this Chapter has presented a comprehensive framework for ADS-B data performance 
evaluation using a comparison method (with extrapolated GPS horizontal position as the reference). 
The evaluation was made by analysing recorded data, observing tracks, and measuring accuracy, 
integrity, latency, availability and update rate. The Chapter also identified various errors in the 
datasets which limit the performance evaluation. The causes of these errors should be investigated 
and mitigated before the ADS-B system can be implemented for ATC surveillance and to support 
enhanced airborne and ground ATC applications. The Chapter provides a method to validate the 
integrity quality indicator included in the ADS-B message. Finally, the Chapter identifies the factors 
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that contribute to the measured performance and also derives an Update Rate Model. The aircraft 
used in this analysis are certified to the DO-260 standards. However, the framework proposed in this 
Chapter is applicable also to the aircraft to be certified in future to the DO-260B standards.  
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Chapter 7  
Fault Based Safety Analysis (FBSA) 
 
 
In Chapter 6, the performance of ADS-B in terms of accuracy, integrity, availability, latency and 
continuity was assessed using the Performance Based Safety Assessment Approach (PBSA) proposed 
in the chapter. The anomalies identified throughout the PBSA process, in the ADS-B and onboard 
navigation data are used in this Chapter to analyze ADS-B safety. 
 
To quantify system safety, a good understanding of its potential failure modes is vital. ADS-B system 
failure modes include those from the communication and navigation systems and human and 
environmental factors, as well as ADS-B specific components. In this Chapter, potential failure modes 
of the ADS-B system are identified using a systematic approach developed in this Chapter. The 
approach is customized for the ADS-B system due to its complexity and operational context which 
includes human and environmental elements. However, the approach is transferable to other ATC 
surveillance systems. The failures are classified and a mathematical model specified for each class, 
before analyzing the impact on ATC operations and finally proposing potential mitigations. It is 
important to note that the work carried out in this Chapter is based on the assumption that the ADS-
B operates as the sole surveillance source for the ATC. Finally the Chapter analyses the risks of the 
failure modes by quantifying the failures using Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). Where relevant, the 
assumptions and limitations are highlighted. 
 
This Chapter accomplishes the fourth research objective; ‘to identity failure modes for ADS-B, 
develop a failure mode register and failure model and to analyze the risks of the failure modes’.  
 
7.1 Background 
 
Integrity is a crucial parameter to measure system safety. It is defined as the “level of trust that 
errors will be correctly detected while integrity risk is the probability that an error larger than a given 
threshold goes undetected for longer than a specified time to alert” (ICAO, 2006b). More specifically, 
ADS-B position integrity can be defined as the level of trust in the navigation source and the 
communication system to provide the required input to the ADS-B reported information. The ADS-B 
positioning data integrity level is represented by the NUC/NIC indicator, derived from the navigation 
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system, included in the ADS-B message. Therefore, the safety of ADS-B depends on the navigation 
and communication systems. 
 
According to Bhatti and Ochieng (2007), failures can occur from the system components, operational 
environment and human factors. It is important to note that, for ADS-B, the analysis of failure modes 
should include failures of the system specific components and also of the integrated architecture 
that defines the whole system. Prior research has characterised failure modes for ADS-B based 
applications (Hammer et al., 2007, Walala, 2008), without considering the ADS-B system as a whole. 
Hammer et al. (2007) provide a method for the analysis of ADS-B based on operational hazard 
identification and assessment. This method identifies potential hazards and allocates safety 
requirements to ADS-B ground and airborne functions. However, it is at a relatively high level of 
detail dealing with systems and applications, and does not address the failure modes of the ADS-B at 
the component level. Walala (2008) assesses the implementation of ADS-B for ground operations at 
non-towered airports to prevent runway incursions. The author identifies functional and general 
component failures that may potentially lead to runway incursions. Walala’s (2008) approach 
focuses on the ADS-B failures that lead to a particular type of incident i.e. runway incursion. Both 
studies do not address ADS-B failure modes that impact the system performance (particularly 
integrity and hence safety) for both ground and airborne applications. The various safety cases 
developed by EUROCONTROL, NATS, FAA and Airservices Australia for the ADS-B system discussed in 
detail in Chapter 6, are used this Chapter to identify ADS-B failure modes. 
 
This Chapter conducts an exhaustive search for potential failure modes that can affect ADS-B 
performance using a systematic approach developed in this thesis (described in section 7.2). The 
approach incorporates the analysis of the impact of the failure modes on ATC operations and aircraft 
navigation based on the assumption that ADS-B operates as the sole surveillance source. Finally the 
identified failure modes are classified and a mathematical model specified for each. The Chapter 
then identifies potential risks/hazards as a result of the failures followed by quantification of the 
risks using Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). 
 
7.2 ADS-B Failure Mode Identification Approach 
 
A failure mode is a description of a state that disables the performance of a required function due to 
certain event (Rausand and Høyland, 2004). Due to the complexity and safety critical nature of the 
ADS-B system, a systematic approach is developed in this thesis to identify its failure modes. The 
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approach focuses on identifying possible failures in the system specific components and its 
interaction and integration with external systems (e.g. navigation and communication) and external 
elements such as human (controllers and pilots) and environmental factors. The human element is 
identified as one of the failure modes, as failures induced by a pilot’s action (or inactions) may result 
in the loss of ADS-B service to controllers. Such failures are analyzed based on the impact of the 
human actions on the overall system performance. The existence of elements with unpredictable 
nature such as the human increases the complexity of the system in addition to its highly integrated 
nature. 
 
The failure identification process is illustrated in Figure 7-1, and consists of the following tasks: 
 identify all failure modes of the ADS-B system; 
 identify failure mode effects on the ADS-B system; 
 determine consequences of the failure effect on the overall ATC surveillance  operations; 
 determine failure hazards to ATC operations and aircraft navigation; 
 categorize failure modes; and 
 propose a mitigation approach for each failure mode. 
 
 The input to the processes is obtained from: 
 an extensive literature review on each ADS-B specific components and the integrated  
navigation and communication system components; 
 a review of safety reports on ADS-B trials from various Air Navigation Service Providers  
(ANSPs) worldwide including EUROCONTROL, FAA and Air Services Australia;  
 analysis of ADS-B reports gathered from ADS-B ground stations and corresponding  
positioning data from onboard navigation system (GPS) for 57 aircraft through collaboration  
with NATS CRISTAL Project and British Airways;  
 Subject Matter Experts (with more than five years of experience on ADS-B  
system design and trial implementation) from EUROCONTROL, QinetiQ, Airbus and NATS via  
structured interviews; and 
 an understanding of the overall system architecture and functionalities. 
 
The sub-next section describes in detail the processes, inputs used and outputs. 
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7.2.1.  ADS-B Failure Mode Identification Process  
 
In the first step, various technical documents of the ADS-B system requirements and system 
descriptions are reviewed to gain a comprehensive understanding of the system architecture, 
functions and operations. 
In the second step, a high level system architecture diagram (Figure 7-2), the ADS-B OUT functional 
block diagram (Figure 7-3) and ADS-B IN functional block diagram (Figure 7-4) are developed based 
on inputs from the literature and experts from Airbus, NATS and British Airways. The system 
architecture in Figure 7-2 is divided into five levels: Level-0 is the GNSS subsystem; Level-1 is the 
ADS-B avionics, known as the on-board ADS-B OUT subsystem; Level-2 is the ADS-B IN specific 
subsystem; Level-3 is the ADS-OUT ground station subsystem and Level-4 the controller working 
positions on the ground. Figure 7-3 illustrates the detailed components of the ADS-B OUT functional 
block composed of the Message Generation Function which obtains its input from external systems: 
onboard navigation system, barometric altimeter, pilot interface and Flight Management System 
(FMS), and then encodes and assembles the message; and the Transmit Message Exchange Function 
which broadcasts the ADS-B message to the users (other ADS-B equipped aircraft and to ATC on the 
ground). Figure 7-4 illustrates the detailed components of the ADS-B IN functional block composed 
of the Receive Message Exchange Function, which receives the encoded message from the Transmit 
Message Exchange Function (Figure 3); and the Report Assembly Function which decodes and feeds 
the ADS-B message to client applications: FMS, Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS), Airborne 
Separation Assistance System (ASAS) and Cockpit Display of Traffic Information (CDTI) for aircraft 
navigation aid.  
 
In the third step, ADS-B failure modes are identified from safety reports generated by ANSPs 
following ADS-B trial implementations, literature review of the system components and ADS-B data 
performance analysis (Chapter 6). The failures identified from the ADS-B data and the corresponding 
onboard navigation system data are discussed and provided in the next sub-section. The scope of 
the analysis in this thesis is from Level-0 to Level-3 as shown in Figure 2. Most of the failure modes in 
Level-0 (GNSS) included in this thesis  are adopted from existing research (Bhatti and Ochieng, 2007, 
Ochieng and Sauer, 2003, The Royal Academy of Engineering, 2011). Failures also result from 
interfaces between the components, human errors and environmental effects. The failure modes 
identified are provided in Tables 7-1 to 7-5.  
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In the fourth step, the effects of each failure mode on the ADS-B system performance are analyzed 
based on safety reports and understanding of the system component interactions and 
functionalities. In the fifth step, the consequence of the failure mode effects on ATC surveillance 
operations and aircraft navigation are analyzed by referring to the Required Surveillance 
Performance (RSP) and understanding the required surveillance function and level of performance 
for ATC operations. In the sixth step, specific hazards to ATC operations are determined based on 
the findings in step five. 
 
In the seventh step, the characteristics of each failure mode are described and categorized based on 
the failure model: step error, ramp error, random noise, oscillation, or bias error by understanding 
the nature of the failure modes. In the eighth step, a mitigation for each failure mode identified is 
derived / proposed based on the understanding of the ADS-B system design and ATC surveillance 
system requirements. 
 
In the last step, the list of identified failure modes is reviewed in an iterative manner to revise and 
update the failure mode register. The failure mode register is a living document that can be updated 
as more failures are discovered in the future. 
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Figure 7-1: ADS-B failure mode identification process
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Figure 7-2: ADS-B High Level System Architecture
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Figure 7-3: ADS-B OUT Functional Block Diagram 
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Figure 7-4: ADS-B IN Functional Block Diagram 
* Shaded boxes indicate software modules 
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7.2.2 Anomalies identified from ADS-B and corresponding onboard navigation system 
(GPS) data analysis 
 
ADS-B data from the ground station and the corresponding onboard navigation system (GPS) data 
were collected from opportunity traffic in LTMA for 57 ADS-B equipped aircraft. Various errors were 
identified in the datasets, some of which were found to be common to the same aircraft type. The 
common errors identified are summarized according to the aircraft type as follows: 
 
a) GPS Clock Error 
 For A319, A320 and A321 aircraft, after the 59th second, the minute did not increase by one, 
e.g. the epoch after 10:48:59 was 10:48:00, instead of 10:49:00.   
 The GPS position update rate was consistent at one second. However, for aircraft B777-200 
and B744, duplicate and missing time information without any deterministic pattern were 
found in the GPS time data. 
b) GPS Data Error 
 For B744 aircraft, GPS latitude and longitude were provided every four seconds. 
 For B767-300, GPS latitude and longitude values were given individually every two seconds. 
c) GPS Position Jumps 
Latitude and longitude position jumps were found in the GPS data for all B777-200 aircraft. The 
height of the spikes was approximately 0.1 degrees for both latitude and longitude for all the 
aircraft. However, the latitude jump was consistent at every 50, 100 or 200 seconds while that 
for the longitude was random. All of the aircraft used the Honeywell GNSSU GPS receiver. 
Further investigations on the corresponding ADS-B data show that the position jumps found in 
the GPS data were discarded by either the ADS-B emitter onboard aircraft or ADS-B ground 
station. Figures 7-5 to 7-12 illustrate the GPS latitude and longitude position jump and the 
corresponding ADS-B horizontal position data for four B777-200 aircraft. According to Airservices 
Australia (2009), for Australian ADS-B ground stations, if the ground station detects 
unreasonable position jumps in the ADS-B position data, the FOM/NUC value (position integrity 
quality indicator) for the corresponding position transmitted to ATC is forced to zero (so that the 
position is not used by the ATC system). However, this was not the case identified in this thesis 
for the NATS’s ADS-B ground stations in the LTMA, in which the whole string of the data was 
found to be missing from the ADS-B message. The cause for this anomaly is still being 
investigated with the help of British Airways for the particular aircraft. The position jumps can  
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result from avionics faults and sometimes for unknown reasons at the edge of coverage (NATS, 
2002).   
4005BE 
  
Figure 7-5: GPS latitude indicating position jumps and the corresponding ADS-B latitude 
  
Figure 7-6: GPS longitude indicating position jumps and the corresponding ADS-B longitude 
400610 
  
Figure 7-7: GPS latitude indicating position jumps and the corresponding ADS-B latitude 
  
Figure 7-8: GPS longitude indicating position jumps and the corresponding ADS-B longitude 
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4007F7 
  
Figure 7-9: GPS latitude indicating position jumps and the corresponding ADS-B latitude 
  
Figure 7-10: GPS longitude indicating position jumps and the corresponding ADS-B longitude 
4006C2 
  
Figure 7-11: GPS latitude indicating position jumps and the corresponding ADS-B latitude 
  
Figure 7-12: GPS longitude indicating position jumps and the corresponding ADS-B longitude 
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The general errors identified in the datasets are: 
 
a) Missing flight level information in the ADS-B message 
In the first set of ADS-B data (Appendix A) collected, three aircraft (two A319 and one B777-200) 
had no flight level (barometric altitude) information. Instead, only the geometric altitude 
information was available. However, in the second dataset (Appendix G), none of the 31 aircraft 
had flight level information. Based on this, it could be concluded that the missing flight level 
information in the three aircraft in the first dataset could be a fault in either the barometric 
altimeters or FMS transmission. On the other hand, the unavailability of flight level information 
in the second dataset could be a problem in the data collection process. 
b) Duplicate ADS-B messages 
Duplicate ADS-B messages for random aircraft were found. Further investigation showed that 
the aircraft was detected by more than one ground station within its coverage at the same time. 
However, the central processing unit for the ground station did not remove the duplicate 
messages.  
c) Obvious outliers in the ADS-B message update rate 
An extensive ADS-B update rate analysis was conducted in Chapter 6. The analysis showed that 
on average, approximately 15% of ADS-B messages were updated in more than two seconds. 
The factors that influence the outliers were also identified in Chapter 6. The update rate 
distribution indicating the outliers for 30 aircraft are given in Appendix D. 
d) ADS-B position jumps 
No position jumps were identified in the ADS-B datasets analyzed due to the jumps being 
discarded. An analysis by Airservices Australia (2007, 2012) reported jumps in longitude (ADS-B 
position data) as aircraft cross a transition latitude. The error was justified due to the use of 
early Compact Position Reporting (CPR) encoding algorithm (Sensis Corporation, 2009). The CPR 
is used to encode the ADS-B position (latitude and longitude) to reduce the bits to be broadcast. 
Figure 7-13 illustrates the jump. The FAA also reported on ADS-B position jumps in their early 
implementation experiences and justified the cause as being a position encoding issue (Federal 
Aviation Administration, 2011b). Furthermore, Airservices Australia identified backward jumps 
with some aircraft. The jump was of the order of 0.6 NM in the direction of the aircraft’s track. 
This was attributed to a fault in the extrapolation process of the position between updates from 
the position source. Airservices Australia has implemented a mechanism called “Reasonableness 
Test” to detect sudden jumps in position to deal with this problem (Airservices Australia, 2007). 
However, the mechanism neither identifies the cause nor provides a mitigation. In this thesis, 
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the investigation on the position jumps were conducted one step ahead by analyzing the 
corresponding position source. It was found that, all the position jumps identified in this thesis 
are from the onboard navigation system (GPS) that feeds the position information to the ADS-B 
system. 
 
 
Figure 7- 13: Longitude jump at transition latitude (Airservices Australia, 2007) 
 
e) Position Integrity Indicator Error 
Based on the ADS-B position integrity analysis conducted in Chapter 6, it was found that the 
position integrity indicator, FOM/NUC value, was incorrectly provided for the position of three 
aircraft; A318, A319 and A320, all using Honeywell TRA-67A transponder. However, the cause of 
the error is unknown due to several other aircraft using the same transponder and performing 
well. An analysis by the FAA also identified a similar error without further details on the aircraft 
type or avionics (Federal Aviation Administration, 2011b). In this thesis (in chapter 6) a 
mechanism is proposed to be implemented at the ADS-B ground station to detect and isolate the 
positions with such error. This is crucial for ATC safety.   
 
The detailed error analyses for each of the 57 aircraft are provided in Appendix A and Appendix G. 
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Table 7-1: ADS-B OUT avionics failure modes 
ID Cause Characteristics Impact / Remark Mitigation User 
Detection 
AOA1 Deterioration of 
aircraft equipment 
accuracy 
performance 
Loss of positional accuracy of 
reported position. This failure is 
difficult to detect due to equipment 
aging and may contribute a small 
constant error. 
Possible error in the displayed position 
of the aircraft therefore could lead to a 
breakdown in separation. This will 
affect particular aircraft. 
ADS-B position accuracy quality 
indicator (NAC) will alert the controller 
of the hazard. Routine aircraft avionics 
maintenance and testing is required. 
No 
AOA2 Fault in GPS 
receiver unit 
Corrupted position data sent to 
ADS-B emitter. This failure can 
propagate over a long period due to 
lack of calibration / maintenance. 
Possible error in the displayed position 
of the aircraft could lead to a 
breakdown in separation. This will 
affect particular aircraft. 
Provision of redundant GPS receiver as 
a back-up, in the case of single receiver 
failure. 
No 
AOA3 Failure of GPS Time 
system 
Failure of GPS time input to ADS-B 
track processor will cause loss of 
time synchronisation unexpectedly 
without notification. 
Could lead to incorrect intent data 
without the controller being aware. 
This will affect all aircraft. 
Intent data verification mechanism 
needs to be implemented. 
No 
AOA4 ADS-B OUT 
antenna 
deterioration 
Incorrect data broadcast. This 
failure is difficult to detect due to 
equipment aging and may 
contribute a small constant error. 
Error in the reported data without 
controller awareness could lead to a 
breakdown in separation. This will only 
affect particular aircraft. 
ADS-B data integrity validation 
mechanism required at the ADS-B 
ground station / onboard receiving 
equipment. Flight plan can be utilized to 
conduct the verification in the ground 
and TCAS data for onboard verification. 
No 
AOA5 Incorrect data 
broadcast  due to 
data corruption 
during 
transmission 
Significant random error in the 
displayed aircraft position. 
Could lead to a breakdown in 
separation without controller 
awareness. This will affect all aircraft in 
the region. 
ADS-B data integrity validation 
mechanism required at the ADS-B 
ground station / onboard receiving 
equipment. 
No 
AOA6 Intentional or 
unintentional RF 
interference 
Signal interruption and noise may 
cause data distortion. 
Error in the reported position without 
controller / pilot awareness could lead 
to a breakdown in separation. This 
affects all aircraft in the region. 
ADS-B data integrity validation 
mechanism required at the ADS-B 
ground station / onboard receiving 
equipment. 
No 
AOA7 Fault in ADS-B 
emitter/ 
transponder  
Significant error in the displayed 
position of the aircraft. This failure 
can propagate over a long period 
due to lack of calibration / 
Could lead to a breakdown in 
separation without controller 
awareness. This affects particular 
aircraft. 
ADS-B data integrity validation 
mechanism required at the ADS-B 
ground station / onboard receiving 
equipment. 
No 
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ID Cause Characteristics Impact / Remark Mitigation User 
Detection 
maintenance.  
AOA8 Error in Figure of 
Merit (FOM) 
transmitted by 
ADS-B emitter 
ADS-B data with incorrect integrity 
level will be broadcast to ATC or 
other aircrafts. This failure can last 
for a long period if undetected. 
Could lead to a breakdown in 
separation without controller 
awareness. This affects particular 
aircraft. 
ADS-B data integrity validation 
mechanism required at the ADS-B 
ground station / onboard receiving 
equipment. 
No 
AOA9 Failure of altitude 
sensing 
Corrupted altitude data transmitted 
to ADS-B emitter. This failure can 
propagate over a long period due to 
lack of calibration / maintenance. 
Could lead to a breakdown in 
separation without controller 
awareness. This affects particular 
aircraft. 
Altitude quality indicator will alert the 
controller of the hazard. Routine aircraft 
avionics maintenance required. 
No 
AOA10 Altitude encoder 
malfunction 
Incorrect altitude data transmitted 
to ADS-B emitter. The system 
attitude instability may introduce 
significant random error to the 
altitude data. 
Could lead to a breakdown in 
separation without controller 
awareness. This affects particular 
aircraft. 
Altitude quality indicator will alert the 
controller of the hazard. Routine aircraft 
avionics maintenance and testing is 
required. 
No 
AOA11 Altimetry System 
Error 
-Blocked static port                         -
Damage to port and pitot tube           
-Pressure leaks in pitot/static pipes                                                    
-Air Data computer out of tolerance   
-Poor paint finish static port 
sensitive areas. This failure can 
propagate over a long period due to 
lack of calibration / maintenance. 
Incorrect altitude data transmitted to 
ADS-B emitter. This affects particular 
aircraft.
Altitude quality indicator will alert the 
controller of the hazard. Routine aircraft 
avionics maintenance and testing is 
required. 
No 
AOA12 Stuck bit in altitude 
encoder 
Incorrect altitude data transmitted 
to ADS-B emitter due to stuck bit in 
altitude encoder. This failure leads 
to unexpected error without 
notification. 
Could lead to a breakdown in 
separation without controller 
awareness. This only affects particular 
aircraft. 
Altitude quality indicator will alert the 
controller of the hazard. Routine aircraft 
avionics maintenance and testing is 
required. 
No 
AOA13 Error in the data 
encoding process 
in the ADS-B 
emitter  
Incorrect data broadcast by the 
ADS-B emitter due to data 
corruption. The error is difficult to 
detect. 
Could lead to a breakdown in 
separation without controller 
awareness. This only affects particular 
aircraft. 
ADS-B software module testing and 
debugging to identify and resolve bug 
causing data error. 
No 
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ID Cause Characteristics Impact / Remark Mitigation User 
Detection 
AOA14 Jamming of GPS 
transmission from 
the satellite due to 
deliberate or non-
deliberate actions 
Loss of ADS-B position data to ADS-B 
emitter. Emitter will stop squitting 
ADS-B data. This may impact all 
aircraft within the region. 
The failure is abrupt without 
notification. 
Loss of situational awareness. Increase 
in workload due to requirement to 
transition back to procedural control 
Provision of backup navigation system 
onboard -e.g.  Inertial Navigation 
System (INS) 
Yes 
AOA15 Loss of geometry 
from the satellite 
Possible loss of ADS-B service. The 
failure is abrupt without 
notification. 
Loss of situational awareness. Increase 
in workload due to transitioning back 
to procedural control and 
reassessment of traffic. This will affect 
particular aircraft. 
Provision of backup navigation system 
onboard -e.g.  Inertial Navigation 
System (INS) 
Yes 
AOA16 Satellite Failure - 
Predicted (NANU) 
Possible loss of ADS-B service. The 
failure is abrupt.  
ADS-B tracks will not be displayed on 
the ATC console therefore will cause an 
increase in workload due to the 
requirement to transition back to 
procedural control. This will affect all 
aircraft in the region. 
Provision of backup navigation system 
onboard -e.g.  Inertial Navigation 
System (INS) 
Yes 
AOA17 Satellite Failure - 
Unpredicted-Yes 
Possible loss of ADS-B service. The 
failure is abrupt without 
notification. 
Loss of situational awareness. Increase 
in workload due to transitioning back 
to procedural control and 
reassessment of traffic. This will affect 
all aircraft in the region. 
Provision of backup navigation system 
onboard -e.g.  Inertial Navigation 
System (INS) 
Yes 
AOA18 Satellite Failure - 
Unpredicted-No  
Possible loss of ADS-B service. The 
failure is abrupt. 
Loss of situational awareness. Increase 
in workload due to transitioning back 
to procedural control and 
reassessment of traffic. This will affect 
all aircraft in the region. 
Common Failure mode -no mitigation Yes 
AOA19 Satellite Failure - 
Unpredicted-
Undeclared  
Possible loss of ADS-B service. The 
failure is abrupt without 
notification. 
Loss of situational awareness. Increase 
in workload due to transitioning back 
to procedural control and 
reassessment of traffic. This will affect 
all aircraft.  
Common Failure mode -no mitigation Yes 
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ID Cause Characteristics Impact / Remark Mitigation User 
Detection 
AOA20 GPS receiver 
malfunction 
No position data sent to ADS-B 
emitter. The failure is abrupt 
without notification. 
Loss of situational awareness. Increase 
in workload due to transitioning back 
to procedural control and 
reassessment of traffic. This will affect 
particular aircraft. 
Provision of backup navigation system 
onboard -e.g.  Inertial Navigation 
System (INS) or redundant GNSS 
receiver 
Yes 
AOA21 SBAS inaccuracy Reduced accuracy position sent to 
ADS-B emitter. This failure can 
propagate over a long period due to 
lack of calibration / maintenance. 
Possible error in the displayed position 
of the aircraft could lead to a 
breakdown in separation. This will 
affect all aircraft in the region. 
ADS-B emitter will reject corrupted 
position data based on position 
accuracy indicator (HFOM) from GNSS 
Yes 
AOA22 SBAS failure Reduced accuracy & integrity 
position sent to ADS-B emitter. The 
error is difficult to detect. 
Possible error in the displayed position 
of the aircraft could lead to a 
breakdown in separation. This will 
affect all aircraft in the region. 
GNSS receiver autonomous integrity 
monitoring (RAIM) with fault detection 
and exclusion (FDE) is required for all 
IFR aircraft. 
Yes 
AOA23 Failure to detect 
aircraft in 
manoeuvring  
Sudden delayed aircraft position 
updates without any notification. 
If the position error between updates is 
larger than the separation standard, 
this could lead to a breakdown in 
separation. This will affect particular 
aircraft. 
Need to check and verify GPS antenna 
sensitivity 
Yes 
AOA24 GPS antenna 
failure causing the 
transponder to 
stop squitting 
when data is not 
refreshed every 2 
seconds. 
Loss of ADS-B position data affecting 
the controller. The error slope is 
large enough to be detected. 
Loss of situational awareness. Increase 
in workload due to transitioning back 
to procedural control and 
reassessment of traffic. This will affect 
particular aircraft. 
Provision of backup navigation system 
onboard -e.g.  Inertial Navigation 
System (INS) 
Yes 
AOA25 ADS-B OUT 
antenna 
malfunction 
Loss of ADS-B data affecting 
controller .The error slope is large 
enough to be detected. 
Loss of situational awareness. Increase 
in workload due to transitioning back 
to procedural control and 
reassessment of traffic. This will affect 
particular aircraft. 
Enable antenna sharing with TCAS 
antenna as a backup 
Yes 
AOA26 RF jamming of 
ADS-B 
transmissions due 
to deliberate or 
Sudden loss of ADS-B data to 
controller without notification. 
Loss of situational awareness. Increase 
in workload due to requirement to 
transition back to procedural control. 
This affects all aircraft within the 
This is a security concern that needs to 
be addressed before fully implementing 
the system. 
Yes 
  213 
ID Cause Characteristics Impact / Remark Mitigation User 
Detection 
non-deliberate 
actions 
specific airspace. 
AOA27 Failure of ADS-B 
transponder 
/emitter on the 
aircraft 
Loss of ADS-B data affecting 
controller. The error slope is large 
enough to be detected. 
Loss of situational awareness. Increase 
in controller workload due to 
requirement to revert back to 
procedural control. This affects 
particular aircraft. 
Provision of redundant ADS-B 
transponder or emitter 
Yes 
AOA28 Altimeter 
malfunction 
No altitude data transmitted to ADS-
B emitter. The failure is abrupt 
without notification. 
No altitude transmitted. ATC should fall 
back to procedural control. This affects 
particular aircraft. 
Geometric height from GPS can be used 
as backup information. 
Yes 
AOA29 Failure of 
connection 
between 
navigation source 
and Mode-S ES 
transponder/UAT 
box 
Loss of ADS-B positional data to 
ADS-B emitter. Emitter will stop 
squitting ADS-B data. The failure is 
abrupt without notification. 
Loss of situational awareness. Increase 
in workload due to transitioning back 
to procedural control and 
reassessment of traffic. This only 
affects particular aircraft. 
Routine aircraft avionics maintenance 
and testing is required. 
Yes 
Table 7-2: ADS-B OUT ground station failure modes 
ID Cause Characteristics Impact / Remark Mitigation User 
Detection 
AOG1 Fault in the ADS-B 
receiver at the 
ground station. 
Incorrect data displayed to controller 
due to corruption of data by the 
ground station. The errors last over a 
long period. 
Could lead to a breakdown in 
separation without controller 
awareness. This may affect all aircraft 
tracked by the station. 
Routine ADS-B ground station 
maintenance and testing is required. 
No 
AOG2 Unstable sensitivity 
of the ground 
sensor.  
Tracks dropping in and out of 
coverage in the control area. The 
error portrays the system instability.  
Loss of situational awareness. Increase 
in workload due to transitioning back 
to procedural control and 
reassessment of traffic. This may affect 
all aircraft. 
Routine antenna maintenance and 
calibration are required. 
Yes 
AOG3 Failure of ADS-B 
ground station 
power supply. 
Unexpected loss of ADS-B data 
affecting the controller.  
Loss of situational awareness. Increase 
in workload due to transitioning back 
to procedural control and 
Provision of backup Uninterrupted 
Power Supply (UPS). 
Yes 
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ID Cause Characteristics Impact / Remark Mitigation User 
Detection 
reassessment of traffic 
AOG4 Failure of data 
links between ADS-
B ground stations 
and Controller 
Working Position 
(CWP). 
Sudden loss of ADS-B data affecting 
the controller.   
Loss of situational awareness. Increase 
in workload due to transitioning back 
to procedural control and 
reassessment of traffic. 
Provision of redundant data link of 
different nature, for example fibre 
optic or lease line. 
Yes 
AOG5 Error in the ground 
station data links. 
Incorrect data displayed to controller 
due to corruption of data by the 
instable attitude of ground station 
data links.  
Could lead to a breakdown in 
separation without controller 
awareness. This may affect all aircraft. 
Routine data link testing and 
maintenance required. 
No 
AOG6 Error in the data 
decoding process 
(report assembly 
module) at the 
ground station. 
Position of aircraft may be incorrect 
when the range exceeds a certain 
distance due to the decoding 
process. 
Could lead to a breakdown in 
separation without controller 
awareness. This may affect all aircraft. 
ADS-B software module testing and 
debugging to identify and resolve bug 
causing data error. 
No 
Table 7-3: ADS-B IN failure modes 
ID Cause Characteristics Impact / Remark Mitigation User 
Detection 
AI1 ADS-B IN 
(receiving) antenna 
deterioration. 
Position of aircraft may be in 
incorrect. The error is a small 
constant and difficult to detect. 
False situational awareness and error 
in the navigational aids provided by 
the ADS-B IN application. 
Routine maintenance and calibration is 
required. 
No 
AI2 Error in the ADS-B 
report assembly 
module. 
Position of aircraft may be incorrect 
due to the error in the assembly 
process. The error may last over long 
period. 
False situational awareness and error 
in the navigational aids provided by 
the ADS-B IN application. 
ADS-B software module testing and 
debugging to identify and resolve bug 
causing data error. 
No 
AI3 Connection failure 
between ADS-B 
receiver box and 
the application 
systems (e.g. CDTI, 
ASAS). 
No aircraft track will be displayed to 
the pilot. This will affect particular 
aircraft. The error is abrupt without 
notification. 
Reduced situational awareness 
affecting pilot. 
Routine aircraft avionics maintenance 
and testing is required. 
Yes 
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ID Cause Characteristics Impact / Remark Mitigation User 
Detection 
AI4 CDTI display 
failure. 
System hang due to insufficient 
memory to accommodate incoming 
data. The failure is of sudden nature. 
Reduced situational awareness 
affecting pilot. 
Restart system. Increase system 
memory capacity. 
Yes 
AI5 Inadequate pilot 
knowledge / 
experience about 
the system 
functionalities, 
HMI, new 
procedures (e.g. 
CDTI, ASAS). 
Ineffective use of the ADS-B IN 
application systems. The failure is 
associated with human error. 
Can lead to undesirable events. Provide comprehensive training to 
flight crew. 
Yes 
AI6 ADS-B IN 
(receiving) antenna 
malfunction. 
Sudden loss of ADS-B data to ADS-B 
IN application.  
Reduced situational awareness. Routine aircraft avionics maintenance 
and testing is required. 
Yes 
AI7 Failure of ADS-B 
receiver on the 
aircraft 
Sudden loss of ADS-B data affecting 
ADS-B IN application. 
Reduced situational awareness. Provision of redundant ADS-B receiver 
on-board. 
Yes 
Table 7-4: Human error 
ID Cause Characteristics Impact / Remark Mitigation User 
Detection 
H1 Transponder on 
wrong mode -
Pilot 
No data broadcast from aircraft. The 
failure will remain until the pilot 
notices or informed by the ATC. 
Loss of situational awareness. Increase 
in workload due to transitioning back to 
procedural control and reassessment of 
traffic 
Provision of reminder on aircraft 
navigation document by co-pilot 
No 
H2 Altitude incorrect 
and not checked 
Different altitude displayed in the 
cockpit and on the ATC screen 
whenever the aircraft initially enters 
either ADS-B or radar airspace. The 
failure will remain until the pilot 
notices or informed by the ATC. 
If separate pressure settings are used for 
the ADS-B and SSR transponders, the 
aircraft altitude source depends on type 
of surveillance being used 
Standardise aircraft avionics and 
procedures 
No 
H3 Wrong  pressure 
adjust value given 
by ATC 
Pilot will key in wrong pressure 
adjust on the altimeter before take-
off. The failure will remain until the 
Loss of track of the actual aircraft flight 
level. May lead to collision either in the 
air or on the ground. 
The error can be mitigated if the 
pilot repeats the value to the 
controller and with experience the 
No 
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ID Cause Characteristics Impact / Remark Mitigation User 
Detection 
aircraft enters another transition 
altitude. 
controller may realize the mistake. 
H4 Error in altimeter 
setting by pilot 
Pilot keys in wrong pressure adjust 
on the altimeter before take-off. The 
failure will remain until the pilot 
notices or informed by the ATC. 
Loss of track of the actual aircraft flight 
level. May lead to collision either in the 
air or on the ground. 
Re-checking the altimeter setting 
should be a practise for the cockpit 
crew. 
No 
H5 Mishear the 
pressure adjust 
value from ATC 
during radio-
communication 
Pilot keys in wrong pressure adjust 
on the altimeter before take-off. The 
failure will remain until the aircraft 
enters another transition altitude. 
Loss of track of the actual aircraft flight 
level. May lead to collision either in the 
air or on the ground. 
The error can be mitigated if the 
pilot repeats the value to the 
controller. 
No 
H6 Inadequate 
knowledge about 
the ADS-B system 
functionalities, 
HMI and new 
procedures (Pilot 
and Controllers) 
Introduces a hazard to the 
operations. The same failure may be 
repeated on every flight until the 
knowledge is upgraded via attending 
courses or on job training. Hence the 
nature of the failure will not increase 
or reduce over time.   
Increases the probability of loss of 
separation 
Provision of training on the new 
systems 
Yes 
H7 Incorrect Callsign 
in FMS –input by 
Pilot 
Incorrect coupling with Flight Plan. 
The failure will remain until notified 
by ATC.  
May lead to incorrect data broadcast by 
ADS-B emitter 
Provision of reminder on aircraft 
navigation document / by co-pilot 
Yes 
H8 Incorrect 24 bit in 
Flight Plan-input 
by ATC 
Label will be attached to the wrong 
aircraft. The failure will remain until 
notified by pilot. 
Incorrect coupling will increase the 
controller workload 
Counter check flight plan data by 
controller 
Yes 
H9 Coupling and 
decoupling 
parameters 
Coupling and decoupling occur 
differently from radar and may 
confuse controllers. The failure will 
remain until the knowledge is 
upgraded on the new system 
graphical user interface (GUI). 
There is a difference in coupling 
requirements between ADS-B  and radar 
Training on ADS-B system 
functionality and display features 
Yes 
H10 Mixed operating 
environment-
ADS-B and Radar 
tracks 
The system will introduce an 
additional track (ADS-B) to the 
current environment which will 
introduce a risk that the controller 
Potential for incorrect separation 
standard applied to the Flight Plan track 
ADS-B mandate and training on ADS-
B system functionality and display 
features 
Yes 
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ID Cause Characteristics Impact / Remark Mitigation User 
Detection 
may inadvertently apply radar or 
ADS-B separation standard to the 
Flight Plan track. The failure will 
remain until the knowledge is 
upgraded on the new system 
graphical user interface (GUI). 
H11 Confusion 
affecting 
controller due to 
different altitude 
source display 
(barometric and 
geometric levels) 
Possibility of controllers confusing 
barometric and geometric levels on 
display. The failure will remain until 
the knowledge is upgraded on the 
new system graphical user interface 
(GUI). 
Geometric level is displayed if the 
aircraft is at or below the transition 
altitude AND either barometric level is 
not or the aircraft is not in a QNH 
defined area 
ADS-B mandate and training on ADS-
B system functionality and display 
features 
Yes 
H12 Track couples to 
wrong Flight Plan 
An aircraft's ADS-B track may couple 
to the wrong flight plan. The failure 
will remain until noticed by ATC. 
Could be a result of an aircraft 
substitution that is not followed by 
cancellation and re-issue of flight plan 
Counter check flight plan data by 
controller 
Yes 
Table 7-5: Environmental effects 
ID Cause Characteristics Impact / Remark Mitigation User 
Detection 
E1 Deterioration of 
ground outdoor and 
aircraft external 
equipment 
Corrupted ADS-B data transmitted to 
controllers or other ADS-B equipped 
aircraft. The error may propagate 
over a long period. 
Possible error in the displayed data of 
the aircraft could lead to a loss of 
separation or navigation 
Routine maintenance and 
calibration is required. 
No 
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7.2.3 Failure models 
 
To assess the system integrity performance, the failure modes are modeled mathematically. The first 
step in the modeling process is to analyze the error type based on the failure mode characteristics in 
the third column of Tables 7-1 to 7-5. The second step is to group the failure modes based on the 
error nature; the error groups are then mapped to their corresponding mathematical function. Table 
7-6 summarizes the failure mode classification based on the error type and corresponding failure 
model. The error type classification is adopted from Bhatti and Ochieng (2007) on the classification 
of GPS and INS failure modes. This classification approach is adopted for the work in this thesis, for 
two main reasons: the characteristics of ADS-B system failure modes are found to be similar to the 
GPS failure modes; and the GPS system feeds the ADS-B system with the aircraft positioning 
information; and hence contributes to the ADS-B failures. Based on the failure mode analysis, five 
types of errors were identified: step, ramp, random noise, oscillation and bias. A description of each 
error type including nature of the occurrence and possible causes are given below: 
 
Step Error 
This type of error includes an abrupt change 
without notification, when there is a sudden 
failure associated with an indicator, a sudden 
jump in the signal, unavailability of the data link 
connection and human errors. 
 
Ramp Error 
This type of error is the most difficult to detect 
when the slope is small (Bhatti and Ochieng, 
2007).This category covers aging of equipment, 
motion and low availability of signal. The error 
increases with time. 
 
Random Noise 
This error is a random fluctuation in an electrical 
signal. It may be caused by external interruptions 
such as interference, multipath, signal jamming, 
and system attitude instability. 
 
Oscillation Error 
In navigation equation , oscillatory behaviour 
results from the modelling of the Earth’s 
dynamics, reaction effect of initial conditions and 
calibration errors (Bhatti and Ochieng, 2007). 
The error propagates over a long period of time. 
 
Bias Error 
Bias is a small constant error, less than the 
threshold. Therefore it cannot be detected 
unless simultaneous multiple failures occur. 
Ageing of equipment can contribute to this type 
of failure (Bhatti and Ochieng, 2007). 
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Table 7-6: Failure mode classification, groups and models 
Error Type Related Codes Failure Model 
Step Error AOA14, AOA3, AOA16, AOA17, AOA18, AOA19, 
AOA20,  AOA23, AOA12, AOA26, AOA28, AOA29, 
AOG3, AOG4, AI3, AI4, AI5,AI6, AI7, H1-H12 
f(t)=A μ(t-t0) 
 
where A is the magnitude of the fault, μ(t) is the unit step function and t0 is the onset 
time of the failure. 
 
Ramp Error AOA15, AOA22, AOA24, AOA25, AOA27, AOA13,  f(t)=R(t-t0) μ(t-t0) 
 
where R is the slope of the fault, μ(t) is the unit step function and t0 is the onset time 
of the failure. 
 
Random Noise AOA5, AOA6, AOA10, AOG2, AOG5, AOG6, f(t)=Ak μ(t-t0) 
where 
N(0, Σk)   k<t0 
N(η(k, to), Σk)     k≥ t0 
 
where N(m,V) describes a Gaussian distribution with mean m, η is the mean value of 
the fault, V the variance, μ(t) is the unit step function and t0 is the onset time of the 
failure. 
 
Oscillation AOA2, AOA21, AOA7, AOA8, AOA9, AOA11, 
AOG1,AOG2, AI2 
f(t)=A sin(t-θ) μ(t-t0) 
 
A is the magnitude of the fault, θ is the phase difference, μ(t) is the unit step function 
and t0 is the onset time of the failure. 
 
Bias AOA1, AOA4, AI1, E1 f(t)=B μ(t-t0) 
 
where B is the magnitude of the fault, μ(t) is the unit step function and t0 is the onset 
time of the failure. 
Ak  ~ {    
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7.3 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
 
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a well standardized and documented technique (Henley and Kumamoto, 
1981). A fault tree is a logic diagram that displays the interrelationships between a potential hazard 
(top event) in a system and the reasons for this event. The reasons may be environmental 
conditions, human errors, normal events (events which are expected to occur during the life span of 
the system) and specific component failures. A properly constructed fault tree provides a good 
illustration of the various combinations of failures and other events which can lead to a specified 
hazard.  
 
FTA may be qualitative, quantitative or both, depending on the objectives of the analysis. Possible 
results from the analysis may be: 
 A listing of the possible combinations of environmental factors, human errors, normal 
events and component failures that can result in a critical event in the system (minimal cut 
sets); and 
 The probability that the critical event will occur during a specified time interval (risk 
measure). 
 
In this thesis, both qualitative and quantitative FTA analysis methods are used. In the first part of the 
analysis (qualitative analysis), cut sets for the potential hazards are identified. In the second part, 
quantitative evaluation of fault tree is carried out using reliability data of each basic event that leads 
to the potential hazard. The FTA is conducted with the assumption that the ADS-B system is operates 
as the sole surveillance system to support ATC operations. The FTA conducted in this Chapter aims 
to: 
 identify the combination of basic events (minimal cut sets) that leads to the potential 
hazards of the ADS-B system;  
 measure the risk of the potential hazards of the ADS-B system; and 
 identify the events that contribute the most to the occurrence of the hazards 
(importance/sensitivity analysis).  
It is important to note that, input from Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) of subsystem 
components of ADS-B, on the subsystem component performance (reliability data) is vital in the FTA 
process. This is the most difficult part of the FTA quantification process, as most of the information 
were not easily obtained. Without this reliability data, it is not possible to conduct the risk 
measurement of the potential hazards. As described in Chapter 5, the ADS-B system is composed of 
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navigation, communication and ADS-B specific components. In addition, the system includes human 
and environmental components that contribute to the system performance. Reliability data for the 
components in each of the external system is obtained from the literature and OEM.  
 
7.3.1 Fault Tree Construction 
The fault trees in this thesis are developed using RiskSpectrum PSA version 1.0 (Scandpower, 2008) 
developed by Scandpower. RiskSpectrum PSA is an advanced fault tree and event tree software tool 
used widely to conduct Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) for half of the world's nuclear power 
plants (Scandpower, 2008). 
Based on the output from the Failure Mode Identification approach conducted in section 7.2, six 
potential hazards of the ADS-B system are identified and defined as follows: 
 Corruption of data for all aircraft 
Incorrect ADS-B surveillance data (including position data) broadcast to ATC on the ground 
or to other ADS-B equipped aircraft within a specified range by all ADS-B equipped aircraft in 
the airspace. 
 Corruption of data for one aircraft 
Incorrect ADS-B surveillance data (including position data) broadcast to ATC on the ground 
or to other ADS-B equipped aircraft within a specified range by one ADS-B equipped aircraft 
in the airspace. 
 Corruption of position data for one aircraft 
Incorrect position data transmitted (in the ADS-B message) to ATC on the ground or to other 
ADS-B equipped aircraft by one ADS-B equipped aircraft in the airspace. 
 Loss of data for all aircraft 
Unavailability of ADS-B surveillance data (including position data) broadcast to ATC on the 
ground or to other ADS-B equipped aircraft within a specified range by all ADS-B equipped 
aircraft in the airspace. 
 Loss of data for one aircraft 
Unavailability of ADS-B surveillance data (including position data) broadcast to ATC on the 
ground or to other ADS-B equipped aircraft within a specified range by one ADS-B equipped 
aircraft in the airspace. 
 Failure of ‘ADS-B In’ 
Loss of ADS-B data from other ADS-B equipped aircraft within a specified range which results 
in the failure of airborne applications that use the data. 
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A fault tree for each of the six potential system hazards (top event) is constructed based on the 
connection between the hazard (top event) and the failure modes (basic events) identified in section 
7.2. The basic events can be interpreted as the reason for the occurrence of the top event. The 
connection between the top event and basic events are illustrated using logic gates (Henley and 
Kumamoto, 1981). Tables 7-7 and 7-8 show and describe the basic symbols of the events and gates 
respectively, used in the construction of the fault trees in this thesis. 
 
Table 7-7: Event Symbols 
Event Symbol Description 
  Input / output event of a logic gate 
 Basic inherent failure of a system 
 Failure event that is not developed further 
 
Table 7-8: Symbols for fundamental logic gates 
Logic Gate Description 
 
AND Gate 
Output event will exist if both input events coexist. 
 
OR Gate 
 
Output event will exist if one or more of the input events exist. 
 
Before constructing the fault trees, a detailed understanding of the ADS-B In and ADS-B Out system 
architecture and functionalities was gained from the literature and subject matter experts from 
NATS and British Airways (Section 7.2.1 and Chapter 3). 
 
Figures 7-14 to 7-19 illustrate the fault trees constructed for the potential hazards for the ADS-B 
system. The fault tree in Figure 7-14 for ‘Corruption of ADS-B data for all aircraft’ mainly includes the 
degradation and reduced integrity of ADS-B ground and airborne equipment, while that for 
‘Corruption of ADS-B data for one aircraft’ in Figure 7-15 includes only degradation and reduced 
integrity of airborne equipments of a particular aircraft. The fault tree for ‘Corruption of position 
data for one aircraft’ 7-16 is constructed with the failure modes of degradation and reduced 
Fault event 
Basic event 
Undeveloped event 
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integrity of the onboard navigation system which feeds the aircraft position information to the ADS-
B transponder. The ground equipment are categorized as a common failure mode which impacts all 
aircraft. The fault tree in Figure 7-17 for ‘Loss of ADS-B data from all aircraft’ includes failure of ADS-
B ground equipments, failure of ground datalink between the ground stations and the controller 
working positions (CWP) and failure of airborne ADS-B system due to common failure modes such as 
satellite failure, Mode-S datalink failure and signal jamming within the airspace. Fault tree for ‘Loss 
of ADS-B data from one aircraft’ in Figure 7-18, is constructed based on human errors (by pilot) and 
failure of onboard ADS-B equipments. Finally the fault tree for ‘Failure of ADS-B In’ in Figure 7-19 
includes the failure of ADS-B In applications and failure of ADS-B Out service from other aircraft. The 
next section identifies minimal cut sets for each of the fault trees. 
 
7.3.2 Minimal Cut Sets (MCS) Identification 
 
A cut set in a fault tree is a set of basic events whose simultaneous occurrence causes the 
occurrence of the top event. A cut set is said to be minimal if the set cannot be reduced without 
losing its status as a cut set (Vatn, 2001). The cut set derivation depends on the logic gates applied to 
construct the fault tree; an AND gate increases the size of the cut set while an OR gate increases the 
number of cut sets. For small and simple fault trees, it is easy to identify the minimal cut sets (MCS) 
by inspection without any formal algorithm. However, for large and complex fault trees an efficient 
algorithm is needed. The MOCUS algorithm (Method for obtaining cut sets) is described in standard 
FTA textbooks, and an efficient improvement of the algorithm is described by Vatn (1992). Table 7-9 
provides the minimal cut sets identified for each of the fault tree developed for the potential 
hazards of the ADS-B system in this thesis, using the MOCUS algorithm. 
 
Table 7-9: Minimal Cut Sets (MCS) 
Fault Tree Minimal Cut Sets 
Corruption of data for all aircraft 
(Figure 7-13) 
{CAA-6}, {CAA-7}, {CAA-8}, {CAA-9}, {CAA-10}, {CAA-11}, {CAA-14}, 
{CAA-15}, {CAA-16}, {CAA-17}, {CAA-18}, {CAA-19}  
Corruption of data for one aircraft 
(Figure 7-14) 
{COA-5}, {COA-6}, {COA-7}, {COA-8}, {COA-10}, {COA-11}, {COA-12}, 
{COA-13} 
Corruption of position data for 
one aircraft (Figure 7-15) 
{COAP-5}, {COAP-7}, {COAP-8}, {COAP-9}, {COAP-10, COAP-11, COAP-
12} 
Loss of data from all aircraft 
(Figure 7-16) 
{LAA-2}, {LAA-4}, {LAA-5}, {LAA-7}, {LAA-8}, {LAA-9}, {LAA-10}, {LAA-
11} 
Loss of data from one aircraft 
(Figure 7-17) 
{LOA-4}, {LOA-5}, {LOA-6}, {LOA-7}, {LOA-8, LOA-9}, {LOA-10}, {LOA-
12}, {LOA-13}, {LOA-14}, {LOA-15}, {LOA-16} 
Failure of ‘ADS-B In’ (Figure 7-18) {LOA-0}, {FOAI-2}, {FOAI-4}, {FOAI-5}, {FOAI-6}, {FOAI-8}, {FOAI-9} 
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In reliability and safety analysis, it is crucial to know which failure modes must occur to create a 
hazard. Therefore, the concept of MCS clearly defines these failure modes. The next section 
measures the probability of occurrence (risk) of the potential hazards (top events) of the ADS-B 
system using Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA).  
 
7.3.3 Risk measurement of the potential hazards of ADS-B system 
 
The probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) using FTA uses various reliability models for the basic 
events that lead to the top event. Examples of the basic event reliability models are: 
 
a) Repairable 
This model applies for components in operation. Failure of a component is detected 
immediately and can be repaired. The component is unavailable during repair time. A typical 
failure mode here is spurious stop. 
 Required parameters: Failure rate, Mean time to repair (MTTR) 
 Optional parameters: Fixed probability 
b) Tested 
This is a standard model for components in stand-by. Failure of a component is detected 
only during component test. The component is unavailable during repair time. A typical 
failure mode here is failure to start. 
 Required parameters: Failure rate, Test interval 
 Optional parameters: Fixed probability, MTTR, Time to first test (TF) 
c) Probability 
This is a general model. Failure probability for the component does not depend on the time 
the component is in operation. Typically used for passive components or human errors. 
 Required parameter: Fixed probability 
d) Mission time 
A component must work during a fixed time period and is non-repairable during this time. A 
typical failure mode here is spurious stop. 
 Required parameters: Failure rate, Mission rate 
 Optional parameters: Fixed probability 
e) Frequency 
 This model requires a constant failure rate. It is applied for initiating events. 
 Required parameters: Frequency 
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f) Non-repairable 
This model is used for components which are not repairable during their operation. It is used 
in availability analysis and especially in time-dependent analysis. 
 Required parameters: Failure rate 
 Optional parameters: Fixed probability 
 
In this thesis, the Probability Reliability Model is used for all the basic events included to measure 
the probability of occurrence of the top events. The model is represented as: 
Q0(t) =q 0(t) 
Where Q0(t) is the probability that the top event occurs at time t and q 0(t) is the probability a  basic 
event that leads to the top event. If the state of each component in the fault tree is known at time t, 
then the state of the top event can also be determined regardless of what has happened up to time 
t. Hence Q0(t) is uniquely determined by the qi(t)’s. 
 
The failure probabilities (q) of the basic events included in the FTA in this thesis are adopted from 
EUROCONTROL (EUROCONTROL, 2008b), Capstone Project (Walala, 2008), Federal Aviation 
Administration (2008) and the software related events from (McDermid, 2001). The probability of a 
failure occurring is assumed to be distributed equally over all elements that can cause the failure 
(e.g. the probability of a failure onboard an aircraft is equally likely for all aircraft type in the 
airspace). Table 7-10 provides the (q) values used for the basic events included in all the FTA in this 
thesis. Some of the basic events are used to construct more than one fault tree. Therefore, the 
‘Reference Column’ in Table 7-10 contains more than one reference code for one basic event 
referring its use to the different fault trees. 
 
Table 7-10: Failure probabilities for the basic events 
Reference to Fault tree Basic Event Description Failure 
Probability (q) 
FOAI-2 Failure connection between ADS-B receiver and 
ADS-B In application 
1E-1 
FOAI-4 System hang due to insufficient memory 1E-7 
FOAI-5 Inadequate knowledge/experience on the system 
functionalities (HMI) 
1E-3 
CAA-19/COA-13/FOA-6 Bug in module 1E-7 
FOAI-8 Failure of report assembly module 1E-7 
FOAI-9 Failure of onboard ADS-B receiver 1E-4 
LOA-4 ADS-B Out antenna failure 1E-4 
LOA-6 Pilot forgot to turn on ADS-B transponder 1E-3 
LOA-7 Pilot turned on ADS-B transponder on wrong mode 1E-3 
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Reference to Fault tree Basic Event Description Failure 
Probability (q) 
LOA-10 Failure of connection between GPS receiver and 
ADS-B transponder 
1E-1 
LOA-8 Main transponder failure 1E-4 
LOA-9 Backup transponder failure 1E-4 
COAP-10/LOA-12 Loss of geometry from satellite 1E-8 
LOA-13 Onboard GPS receiver malfunction 1E-4 
COAP-12/LOA-14 GPS antenna failure 1E-4 
CAA-8/LAA-9/LOA-15 Jamming of GPS transmission for satellite 1E-13 
COAP-11/LAA-10/LOA-16 Satellite failure 1E-13 
CAA-6/LAA-2 Failure of ground comm. link between ground 
station and Controller Working Position (CWP) 
1E-4 
LAA-4 Failure of ground station power supply 1E-5 
CAA-17/LAA-5 Data decoding error 1E-13 
LAA-11 Failure of ground processing unit  1E-5 
LAA-6 Failure of ADS-B ground receiver 1E-5 
LAA-7 Failure of ADS-B ground receiving antenna 1E-4 
COA-5 Incorrect 24 bit-code 1E-4 
COAP-8/COA-6/CAA-15 Lack of maintenance 1E-3 
COAP-9/COA-7/CAA-16 Environmental impact 2E-4 
COA-8 Fault in signal 2.6E-6 
COA-10 Fault in ADS-B transponder 1E-4 
COA-11 Data encoding error 1E-13 
COA-12/CAA-18 Data processing error 1E-13 
CAA-7 Error in GPS Time system 1E-4 
CAA-9 Interference 1E-2 
CAA-11 ADS-B ground receiver degradation 1E-3 
CAA-14 Fault in ground ADS-B receiver equipment 1E-5 
COAP-5 WAAS inaccuracy 5E-2 
COAP-7 Signal processing error 1E-13 
 
The results of FTA for all the ADS-B system hazards identified in this thesis are provided in Figures 7-
14 to 7-19. Table 7-11 summarizes the FTA results for the top events.  
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Figure 7-14: Fault tree analysis for ‘Corruption of ADS-B data for all aircraft’
Corruption of ADS-B data  
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CAA-17 
q=1.00E-13 
Data processing error 
CAA-18 
q=1.00E-13 
Bug in module 
CAA-19 
q=1.00E-07 
Fault in ADS-B Receiver  
Equipment 
CAA-14 
q=1.00E-05 
Ground data link error 
CAA-6 
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Figure 7-15: Fault tree analysis for ‘Corruption of ADS-B data for one aircraft’ 
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Figure 7-16: Fault tree analysis for ‘Corruption of ADS-B position data for one aircraft’ 
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  230 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-17: Fault tree analysis for ‘Loss of ADS-B data from all aircraft’ 
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Figure 7-18: Fault tree analysis for ‘Loss of ADS-B data from one aircraft’ 
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Figure 7-19: Fault tree analysis for ‘Failure of ADS-B In’ 
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Failure of ADS-B Out  
(loss of ADS-B data from  
other aircraft) 
LOA-0 
q=1.02E-01 
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Table 7-11: Summary of FTA results for the top events. 
Top event (ADS-B system hazard) Risk Measure (Q) Availability (1-Q) 
Corruption of ADS-B data for all aircraft 1.23E-02 0.9877 
Corruption of ADS-B data for one aircraft 1.40E-03 0.9960 
Corruption of ADS-B position data for one aircraft 5.11E-02 0.9489 
Loss of ADS-B  data from all aircraft 2.30E-04 0.9997 
Loss of ADS-B  data from one aircraft 1.02E-01 0.8980 
Failure of ‘ADS-B In’ 1.93E-01 0.8070 
 
The risk measure or the probability of the hazard/top event occurrence is also known as 
unavailability (EUROCONTROL, 2008b). Therefore, the ADS-B system availability is defined as: 
Availability  = 1 – (probability of the hazard/top event occurrence) 
   = 1 – Q 
 
According to the Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards for ADS-B (RTCA, 2002), if the 
ADS-B system were to be used the a sole means of surveillance, the system availability would be 
calculated using only ADS-B, aircraft sources and applications. In this thesis, the FTA is conducted 
with the assumption that ADS-B operates as the sole means of surveillance. The availability of ADS-B 
as supplemental or as a primary means of surveillance is specified as 95% and 99.9% respectively, for 
all operations (DO-242A). If ADS-B is used as a supplemental means of surveillance during the 
transition period to full ADS-B equipage, then the ADS-B system adds availability within a larger 
surveillance system. While if ADS-B is used as a primary means of surveillance, then a supplemental 
surveillance system (other mean of surveillance) independent of the navigation system is expected 
to be available. To date, there is no quantified requirement for availability of ADS-B as sole means of 
surveillance. However, based on the stipulated availability requirements for other ADS-B operational 
modes discussed above, it can be assumed that the availability of ADS-B as the sole mean of 
surveillance will be smaller than 95% as it will not include availability of any supplemental system 
and it is also bound to the failure of the onboard navigation system.  
 
Table 7-11 presents the FTA results from this thesis. The results show that the availability of ADS-B 
system based on one aircraft is 89.8%. However, the availability of ADS-B system based on all aircraft 
in the airspace is higher at 99.9%. This is because the latter is measured based on common failure 
modes that impacts airborne ADS-B equipment (eg. satellite failure, signal jamming and 
interference)  and also failure modes of ADS-B ground equipment (e.g. ground station failure, 
ground data link failure) which are common to all aircraft within the airspace. While the former (i.e. 
based on one aircraft) is measured based localized failure modes (airborne ADS-B equipments and 
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supporting avionic systems) which directly impact the particular aircraft. It is also important to note 
that ADS-B is a surveillance system that critically relies on the aircraft equipage. The FTA in this 
thesis is conducted based on the assumption that the failure modes are equally distributed despite 
the aircraft avionics make model. However, the analysis in Chapter 6 and section 7.2 of this Chapter, 
showed that ADS-B performance and some of the failure modes do vary based on the aircraft 
avionics make-model. This is particularly relevant to the onboard positioning source, ADS-B 
transponder and ADS-B system configuration onboard.      
 
The FTA (in Table 7-11) indicates that the probability of ‘Corruption of ADS-B position data for one 
aircraft’ is higher than the probability of ‘Corruption of all ADS-B data for one aircraft’ at 5.11E-02 
and 1.4E-03 respectively. The former hazard is mainly due to onboard navigation system integrity 
reduction and equipment degradation. While, the latter hazard is due to ADS-B specific onboard 
equipment degradation and data processing/encoding errors. The probability of ‘corruption of ADS-
B for all aircraft’ is measured as 1.23-02. Finally the availability of ADS-B In service is measured as 
0.807. Unavailability of ADS-B In includes failure of onboard ADS-B receiving equipment, onboard 
ADS-B In applications such as CDTI and ASAS and also unavailability of ADS-B Out service from other 
aircraft. 
 
The next sub-section identifies which basic event contributes the most to the occurrence of the 
hazards (top event) using importance analysis method (Henley and Kumamoto, 1981). 
 
7.3.4 Importance Analysis 
 
A component or cut set’s contribution to the top event occurrence is termed importance. The 
importance analysis is useful for system design, diagnosis and optimization (Henley and Kumamoto, 
1981). Possible variation of the system availability caused by uncertainty in components reliability 
parameters can be estimated through the analysis. As a result, inspection, maintenance and failure 
detection can be carried out based on the order of the importance of the components. Hence, the 
system can be upgraded by improving the components with relatively high importance (Henley and 
Kumamoto, 1981). 
 
Importance measures of the basic events are associated with the risk-significance and safety-
significance of the related components. In particular, they are normally used to rank the system’s 
components with respect to their contribution to the reliability and availability of the overall system. 
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Thus they provide an important indication about the components to be improved in order to 
increase the reliability and the availability of the system (Sergio Contini et al., 2009). The reliability 
importance of a component in a system generally depends on the location of the component in the 
system and the reliability of the component itself (Vatn, 2001). The importance is quantified using 
the following importance measures and its corresponding probabilistic expressions (Henley and 
Kumamoto, 1981): 
 
a) Fussel Vessely factor (FV) 
This measure is used to quantify the contribution of the basic event (i) to the top event with 
the present failure probability of i. The measure is calculated as: 
 
b) Risk Decrease Factor (RDF) 
This measure presents the maximum decrease in the risk for an improvement to the 
reliability (failure probability) of the basic event (i).  indicates the decrease in 
the risk level with basic event (i) optimised or assumed to be perfectly reliable. The measure 
is calculated as:  
 
c) Risk Increase Factor (RIF) 
This measure presents the worth of the basic event (i) in achieving the present level of risk 
and indicates the importance of maintaining the current level of reliability (failure 
probability) for the basic event.  indicates the increase in the risk level without 
basic event (i)  or with basic event (i) assumed to be failed. The measure is calculated as: 
 
 
The importance measures above contain different information and thus have their own use. For 
most applications, the combination of two importance measures is needed while for some other 
applications, one importance measure could be enough. The Fussel Vessely factor (FV) is often used 
as a measure of risk-significance and the Risk Increase Factor (RIF) as a measure of safety-
significance. However, the FV importance alone is sufficient to identify potential components for 
safety improvement based on the ranking of the basic event’s contribution to the occurrence of the 
risk (top event) (M. Van der Borst and H. Schoonakker, 2001).  
 
  236 
The results of the importance analysis conducted for the ADS-B hazards (top events) are provided in 
Table 7-12 to 7-17, which include the three importance measures FV, RDF and RIF. The results show 
the ranks of the basic events that give the greatest contribution to the likelihood of occurrence of 
the top event with the FV measure. In addition, in this thesis the risk significance (with the FV 
measure) and safety significance (with the RIF measure) are regarded as a complementary way to 
identify the role of basic events in the risks of the ADS-B system. 
 
The importance analysis results for ‘Corruption of ADS-B data for all aircraft’ are provided in Table 7-
12. The FV measure results show that the basic event with the highest rank that contribute to the 
risk is basic event CAA-9 referring to signal interference with FV = 8.13E-01. Thus, when the 
probability of the present signal interference (1.00E-02) is improved, the maximum decrease in the 
risk is 5.30E (RDF). The results further show that all the basic events have the same RIF value at 
8.13E+01 indicating equal safety-importance to the system hazard. In other words, any change in the 
probability of the basic events will result in an increase in the risk level. 
 
Table 7-12: Importance analysis for Corruption of ADS-B data for all aircraft (refer Figure 7-14) 
Basic Event Fussel Vessely factor (FV) Risk Decrease Factor (RDF) Risk Increase Factor (RIF) 
CAA-9 8.13E-01 5.30E+00 8.13E+01 
CAA-11 8.13E-02 1.09E+00 8.13E+01 
CAA-15 8.13E-02 1.09E+00 8.13E+01 
CAA-16 1.63E-02 1.02E+00 8.13E+01 
CAA-6 8.13E-03 1.01E+00 8.13E+01 
CAA-7 8.13E-04 1.00E+00 8.13E+01 
CAA-14 8.13E-04 1.00E+00 8.13E+01 
CAA-19 8.13E-06 1.00E+00 8.13E+01 
CAA-17 8.13E-12 1.00E+00 8.13E+01 
CAA-18 8.13E-12 1.00E+00 8.13E+01 
CAA-8 8.13E-12 1.00E+00 8.13E+01 
 
Table 7-13 provides importance analysis results for ‘Corruption of ADS-B data for one aircraft’. Based 
on the FV measure results, basic event COA-6 (referring to ADS-B Out antenna degradation due to 
lack of maintenance - this event is also considered as human error) is identified as the main 
contributing element to the occurrence of the risk. An improvement on it results in a maximum 
decrease of the risk level with RDF = 3.48E. The safety-importance measure (RIF) of the basic events 
shows that all events have the same effect on the risk level measured in Figure 7-14 with RIF = 
7.13E+02.  
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Table 7-13: Importance analysis for Corruption of ADS-B data for one aircraft (refer Figure 7-15) 
Basic Event Fussel Vessely factor (FV) Risk Decrease Factor (RDF) Risk Increase Factor (RIF) 
COA-6 7.13E-01 3.48E+00 7.13E+02 
COA-7 1.43E-01 1.17E+00 7.13E+02 
COA-5 7.13E-02 1.08E+00 7.13E+02 
COA-10 7.13E-02 1.08E+00 7.13E+02 
COA-8 1.85E-03 1.00E+00 7.13E+02 
COA-13 7.13E-05 1.00E+00 7.13E+02 
COA-11 7.13E-11 1.00E+00 7.13E+02 
COA-12 7.13E-11 1.00E+00 7.13E+02 
 
Based on the importance analysis results in Table 7-14, the FV measure indicates basic event COAP-5 
(WAAS inaccuracy) has the highest contribution to ‘Corruption of ADS-B position information for one 
aircraft’ with FV = 9.78E-01. An improvement in the reliability of this basic event results in a 
maximum decrease in the risk with RDF = 4.26E+01. Further analysis based on the RIF indicates that 
basic events: COAP-5, COAP-8, COAP-9 and COAP-7 have higher safety significance with RIF 
=1.96E+01 than basic events: COAP-12, COAP-11 and COAP-10 with RIF= 1.00E+00. 
. 
Table 7-14: Importance analysis for Corruption of ADS-B position information for one aircraft 
(refer Figure 7-16) 
Basic Event FV RDF RIF 
COAP-5 9.78E-01 4.26E+01 1.96E+01 
COAP-8 1.96E-02 1.02E+00 1.96E+01 
COAP-9 3.91E-03 1.00E+00 1.96E+01 
COAP-7 1.96E-12 1.00E+00 1.96E+01 
COAP-12 1.96E-24 1.00E+00 1.00E+00 
COAP-11 1.96E-24 1.00E+00 1.00E+00 
COAP-10 1.96E-24 1.00E+00 1.00E+00 
 
Table 7-15 shows the importance analysis results for Loss of ADS-B data from all aircraft. There are 
two basic events that have the highest contribution to the risk; LAA-7 (Failure of ADS-B receiving 
antenna) and LAA-2 (Failure of ground communication link between ground station and controller 
working position (CWP)) with same FV measure at 4.35E-01. Improvement in the reliability of these 
basic event results in a maximum decrease in the risk with RDF = 1.77E+00. The results further show 
that all the basic events have the same RIF value at 4.35E+03 indicating equal safety-importance to 
the system hazard. 
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Table 7-15: Importance analysis for Loss of ADS-B data from all aircraft (refer Figure 7-17) 
Basic Event FV RDF RIF 
LAA-7 4.35E-01 1.77E+00 4.35E+03 
LAA-2 4.35E-01 1.77E+00 4.35E+03 
LAA-6 4.35E-02 1.05E+00 4.35E+03 
LAA-4 4.35E-02 1.05E+00 4.35E+03 
LAA-11 4.35E-02 1.05E+00 4.35E+03 
LAA-10 4.35E-10 1.00E+00 4.35E+03 
LAA-5 4.35E-10 1.00E+00 4.35E+03 
LAA-8 4.35E-10 1.00E+00 4.35E+03 
LAA-9 4.35E-10 1.00E+00 4.35E+03 
 
The importance analysis results for Loss of ADS-B data from one aircraft are provided in Table 7-16. 
The highest contributing basic event to the risk is LOA-10 (Failure of connection between GPS 
receiver and ADS-B capable transponder) with FV = 9.80E-01. An improvement in the reliability of 
the basic event results in a maximum decrease in the risk level with RDF = 4.44E+01. Further analysis 
based on the RIF indicates that basic events: LOA-10, LOA-6, LOA-7, LOA-13, LOA-14, LOA-4, LOA-12, 
LOA-16 and LOA-15 have higher safety significance with RIF = 9.80E+00 than basic events: LOA-9and 
LOA-8 with RIF= 1.00E+00 
 
Table 7-16: Importance analysis for Loss of ADS-B data from one aircraft (refer Figure 7-18) 
Basic Event FV RDF RIF 
LOA-10 9.80E-01 4.44E+01 9.80E+00 
LOA-6 9.80E-03 1.01E+00 9.80E+00 
LOA-7 9.80E-03 1.01E+00 9.80E+00 
LOA-13 9.80E-04 1.00E+00 9.80E+00 
LOA-14 9.80E-04 1.00E+00 9.80E+00 
LOA-4 9.80E-04 1.00E+00 9.80E+00 
LOA-12 9.80E-08 1.00E+00 9.80E+00 
LOA-9 9.80E-08 1.00E+00 1.00E+00 
LOA-8 9.80E-08 1.00E+00 1.00E+00 
LOA-16 9.80E-13 1.00E+00 9.80E+00 
LOA-15 9.80E-13 1.00E+00 9.80E+00 
 
Table 7-17 shows the importance analysis results for Failure of ADS-B In. The FV measure indicates 
basic event LOA-0 referring to Failure of ADS-B Out (loss of ADS-B data from other aircraft) with FV = 
5.29E-01. An improvement in the basic event leads to a maximum decrease in the risk with RDF = 
1.91E+00. The safety-importance measure (RIF) of the basic events shows that all events have the 
same effect on the risk level measured in Figure 7-19 at with RIF = 5.19E+00. 
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Table 7-17: Importance analysis for Failure of ADS-B In (refer Figure 7-19) 
Basic Event FV RDF RIF 
LOA-0 5.29E-01 1.91E+00 5.19E+00 
FOAI-2 5.19E-01 1.87E+00 5.19E+00 
FOAI-5 5.19E-03 1.00E+00 5.19E+00 
FOAI-9 5.19E-04 1.00E+00 5.19E+00 
FOAI-6 5.19E-07 1.00E+00 5.19E+00 
FOAI-4 5.19E-07 1.00E+00 5.19E+00 
FOAI-8 5.19E-07 1.00E+00 5.19E+00 
 
7.4 Summary 
 
The main novelties in this Chapter are a comprehensive failure mode register for ADS-B, a systematic 
approach for ADS-B failure mode identification and Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) using Fault 
Tree Analysis (FTA). The failure mode register is a living document which can be populated to assist 
system maintenance; docket logging and most importantly to support incident/accident 
investigations. The approach includes various types of data sources including literature, safety 
reports, subject matter experts input and ADS-B track analysis. In addition, it also takes into account 
failure modes induced by the human element and environmental factors.  
 
Based on the findings in this Chapter, a safety advantage over the radar system is that, failures of the 
ADS-B system on-board an aircraft does not affect the whole ATC surveillance services based on the 
ADS-B system. Hence, failures are typically more localized. In addition, the availability of several 
ADS-B ground stations reduces the probability of failure of ground-based ADS-B systems to capture 
ADS-B data from aircraft. On the other hand, failure of a radar system causes complete surveillance 
failure in the particular airspace within its coverage, forcing controllers and flight crew to engage in 
procedural control for ATC operations  (ICAO, 2007c) and (ICAO, 2006d) for all aircraft within the 
sector.  
 
The findings also indicate that some of the failure modes only affect one aircraft. However, loss of 
ADS-B data from one aircraft impacts the reliability of ADS-B In service and the various future air 
navigation applications, such as situational awareness, conflict detection, conflict resolution, 
separation assistance or trajectory prediction. In the case where the failure modes are not detected, 
this may lead to safety risks.  
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Based on the finding from the failure modes, six potential hazards of the ADS-B system are 
identified. FTA is used to develop and quantify the occurrence of the potential hazards (risk). The 
findings indicate that the availability for the ADS-B system as a sole surveillance mean is low at 0.898 
in comparison to the availability of ADS-B system as supplemental or as primary means of 
surveillance at 0.95 and 0.999 respectively. The latter availability values are obtained from DO-242A.  
 
Further analysis identified minimal cut sets in the fault tree of each potential hazard. The minimal 
cut sets indicate the simultaneous occurrence of the basic events (which cannot be reduced) that 
ensures the occurrence of the hazards. Finally, importance analysis is conducted to rank the risk of 
basic events that lead to the ADS-B hazards indentified in this thesis. The risk significance and safety 
significance of each basic event are also identified. These will aid in the ADS-B system safety 
improvements. 
 
The next chapter maps the ADS-B performance identified in this thesis to the envisioned future 
airborne surveillance applications. 
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Chapter 8  
ADS-B for Enhanced Surveillance Applications 
 
 
ADS-B Out supports various ground applications including ATC surveillance in radar airspace, non-
radar airspace and on the airport surface. In addition, the feasibility of enhanced airborne 
surveillance applications requires the capability of aircraft to receive ADS-B Out messages from 
other aircraft within their coverage (ADS-B In). 
 
This Chapter reviews the various enhanced airborne surveillance applications and the required ADS-
B information to support them. A mapping exercise is undertaken to assess the credibility of the 
ADS-B system performance quantified in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 to support the functionalities of 
the various enhanced airborne surveillance applications envisioned as part of the future ATM 
modernisation.  
 
8.1 Background 
 
The evolution of navigation and surveillance technologies is a key element of the modernisation of 
ATM, to enable better planning and thereby increasing capacity and efficiency without jeopardizing 
safety and the environment. The Single-European-Sky ATM Research (SESAR, 2012) and Next 
Generation Air Transportation System (FAA, 2010, FAA, 2012) initiatives recognize that at the core of 
a more efficient navigation is the need to integrate aircraft operations as a seamless continuum and 
to involve all relevant stakeholders, including airspace users, air navigation service providers, airport 
operators and the military, in the decision making process. This requires the capability to provide 
shared Air Traffic Situational AWareness (ATSAW) with high accuracy and integrity aircraft state 
information. This capability is envisioned through the ADS-B system. High-performance surveillance 
systems have the potential to increase both airspace efficiency (and thereby capacity) and safety, by 
improving the capability to perform the necessary synchronisation and separation activities in 
advance, making it possible to use an optimised strategic approach to the integration of traffic 
instead of the current inefficient tactical process. Therefore, performance and reliability of the ADS-
B system will be a major factor in the future ATM performance. Optimal integration of air traffic will 
be achieved on the basis of various ConOps elements (i.e. applications) that each require 
surveillance information with specific levels of performance. 
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8.2 ADS-B for the future ATM system modernisation 
 
At the core of the future SESAR and NextGen ATM are advanced automation systems based on the 
ADS-B. These must progressively fulfill a number of functions, as summarised in Figure 8-1. 
 
Aircraft information is 
broadcast out the aircraft 
by the transponder
ADS-B Out
Aircraft information is 
received in the airborne
ADS-B In
Air Traffic Situational 
Awareness (ATSAW) is 
display of other aircraft 
information in the cockpit 
ATSAW
Aircraft instructed to 
maintain spacing with 
target aircraft
Spacing
Ground Surveillance 
Applications 
ATC  service in radar  
(RAD) airspace via ADS-B 
surveillance 
ADS-B RAD
ATC  service in airport 
surface via ADS-B 
surveillance 
ADS-B APT
Aircraft instructed to 
maintain separation with 
other aircraft or self -
separation
Separation 
ATC  service in non-radar  
(NRA) airspace via ADS-B 
surveillance 
ADS-B NRA
Flight Level changes using 
‘In Trail Procedure (ITP) in 
oceanic airspace
ATSAW-ITP
Visual separation 
approach
ATSAW-VSA
Enhanced awareness 
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ATSAW-AIRB
Enhanced traffic 
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ATSAW-SURF
1
1
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7
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Figure 8-1: ADS-B system evolution 
 
The first step requires the aircraft to be equipped with ADS-B Out (as discussed in detail in Chapter 
3). The second step involves the implementation of ground surveillance applications for ATC; 
followed by ADS-B NRA (step 3), ADS-B RAD (step 4) and ADS-B APT (step 5). The implementation is 
conducted in a sequence, based on the criticality of the current limitations in the radar system to 
support ATC to provide surveillance services to the aircraft. ADS-NRA has been fully implemented 
and is operational in various regions such as Australia while ADS-B RAD and ADS-B APT are still 
currently under trial, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 5. These ground applications are meant to 
provide radar like services where the radar is either unavailable or to supplement the reduced radar 
services in a particular operational environment or airspace. Future applications envision providing 
enhanced surveillance services (e.g. reduced separation to aircraft) by exploiting the higher 
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performance from ADS-B. However, these are still to be implemented due to a lack of confidence in 
the system performance and aircraft equipage. 
 
The sixth step is the implementation of ADS-B In, which requires ADS-B In equipage to enable 
aircraft to receive ADS-B Out messages from other aircraft within its specified range. ADS-B In is a 
means to enable various airborne surveillance applications including providing ATSAW via display of 
other aircraft information to flight crew. At present, pilots build traffic situational awareness by 
integrating information from two main sources: visual observation and radio communication with 
ATC. The radio communication includes traffic information provided to flight crew by a controller, 
transmission from a controller to other aircraft, and responses from other aircraft, and air-to-air 
radio communication in uncontrolled airspace. Additionally, to enhance situational awareness, pilots 
of suitably equipped aircraft may use their TCAS traffic display to supplement the available traffic 
information. Even though the TCAS traffic display is meant to support visual acquisition when TCAS 
logic generates a Traffic Advisory (TA), in some cases it has confused the pilot’s perception of the 
traffic situation  (CASCADE Operational Focus Group, 2009). This causes unsynchronized situational 
awareness between pilots and ATC which may lead to undesirable incidents, as discussed in Chapter 
4. According to EUROCONTROL (CASCADE Operational Focus Group, 2009), this particular situation 
has been one of the drivers of the development of airborne surveillance applications. 
 
ATSAW has led to the development and implementation of various surveillance applications:  
enhanced traffic situational awareness in all environments (ATSA-AIRB), flight level changes using ‘In 
Trail Procedure (ITP) in oceanic airspace (ATSA-ITP), visual separation approach (ATSA-VSA) and 
enhanced traffic situational awareness on the airport surface.  
 
Feasibility of the ground surveillance and airborne surveillance applications are underpinned by the 
ADS-B Out data performance. These applications were introduced in Chapter 3 and the specific 
information in the ADS-B message required for each identified. The next section describes each of 
the enhanced airborne applications, its operational environment and requirements. This is followed 
in the last section, by the validation of real time ADS-B data performance to support the 
applications. 
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8.3 Airborne surveillance applications using ADS-B 
 
This section reviews and discusses the various airborne surveillance applications shown in Figure 8-1, 
envisioned with the ADS-B system. 
 
8.3.1 Air Traffic Situational Awareness during flight operations (ATSAW-AIRB) 
 
The ATSAW-AIRB is defined as the enhancement of a flight crew’s knowledge of the surrounding 
traffic situation in all environments. It is meant to improve flight safety and operations by assisting 
flight crews in building their traffic situational awareness through the provision of an appropriate on-
board traffic display (CASCADE Operational Focus Group, 2009). This is achieved by retrieving ADS-B 
information transmitted by other aircraft transponders via Mode S 1090MHz. The information is 
then fed to the Cockpit Display of Traffic Information (CDTI) tool to provide instantaneous and up-to-
date traffic information (including aircraft identification, position, direction, ground speed, vertical 
tendency, relative altitude and wake vortex category). A functional diagram of the CDTI is shown in 
Figure 8-2. The display determines the “own-aircraft” position through the use of a directly 
connected GPS receiver onboard the aircraft. The ADS-B receiver (1090 MHz Rx) detects ADS-B Out 
signals from other aircraft within its range, and presents raw messages to the CDTI for further 
processing. The CDTI processor decodes the raw messages to determine the identity, position 
(latitude, longitude), altitude, and velocity of detected aircraft. It then presents symbols on the 
display depicting other aircraft in relation to the “own-aircraft” (Owusu, 2005). Figure 8-3 shows the 
onboard CDTI display.  
 
 
 
Figure 8-2: CDTI functional diagram (Owusu, 2005) 
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Figure 8-3: CDTI display onboard (Vidal, 2012) 
 
In the latest TCAS technology, the ATSAW-AIRB and TCAS software are integrated within the TCAS 
equipment, whereby the ATSAW-AIRB (using ADS-B) information is correlated with the TCAS 
information to enhance the TCAS function. The ATSAW (via CDTI) provides additional information 
over the TCAS traffic display for example the aircraft intent information. It also provides a longer 
range (up to 150 NM) than current TCAS (40 to 80 NM). A unique traffic symbol is presented on the 
system display to the pilot when the merged TCAS and ADS-B information is available as shown in 
Figure 8-4. 
 
 
 
Figure 8-4: Merged TCAS and ADS-B traffic symbols (Vidal, 2012) 
 
If no correlation is detected between the TCAS and ADS-B positioning information, only the TCAS 
symbol is displayed to the users. In addition, the ADS-B (ATSAW) symbols are not displayed if: 
 The ADS-B data is out of date by 3 seconds; compared to the TCAS information 
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 The integrity and accuracy of the ADS-B data are invalid; 
 The tracks or positions from other aircraft are missing; or 
 The GPS position of the own aircraft is lost for more than 5 minutes or downgraded. 
 
8.3.1.1 Operational Environment 
 
The ATSAW-AIRB is applicable in both controlled and uncontrolled airspace. It is likely to produce 
more benefits from a safety perspective in airspace where separation is not provided by ATC. It can 
be used from prior to take-off, through in-flight operations, to landing, by aircraft operating under 
Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) and Visual Flight Rules (VFR) and by all types of aircraft. In Visual 
Meteorological Conditions (VMC), a routine out of the window scan remains key to safety. In 
Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC), the ATSAW-AIRB will supplement existing available 
surveillance information from ATC and aircraft radio communication. In terms of traffic density, 
ATSAW-AIRB is applicable in low to very high density. 
 
The use of ATSAW-AIRB does not require any changes to the ATS infrastructure, systems and ATC 
procedures. Therefore, application can be used in the exact same environments as the current 
operations from the communications, navigation and surveillance perspective (CASCADE Operational 
Focus Group, 2009). 
 
8.3.1.2 Requirements 
 
The ATSAW-AIRB application requires all the aircraft within the airspace to be capable of 
transmitting ADS-B Out messages and the “owner aircraft” to be equipped with a traffic display (e.g 
CDTI or merged TCAS/ADS-B traffic display). Standardisation for the implementation of the 
application is developed jointly by EUROCAE and the RTCA (EUROCAE and RTCA, 2010a). 
EUROCONTROL has developed a Preliminary Safety Case for ATSAW-AIRB. To date more than 3000, 
ATSAW-AIRB equipped flights have been performed in Europe (Rekkas, 2013). However, the relevant 
safety case is not in the public domain.  
 
According to Airbus (Lelievrep, 2005), the ATSAW-AIRB application itself is less demanding in terms 
of certification level and ADS-B data performance, than spacing or separation applications. This may 
be due to the unavailability of ADS-B information quality assessment mechanisms in the CDTI. 
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Nevertheless, without ensuring the certification and ADS-B performance level, the safety and 
efficiency of the ATSAW application will not be achieved. This is confirmed by EUROCONTROL 
stressing that ADS-B systems used in the provision of the ATSAW-AIRB shall be of a very high level of 
reliability, availability and integrity (CASCADE Operational Focus Group, 2009).  Furthermore, ATSAW 
paves the way for enhanced airborne surveillance applications; ATSAW-ITP, ATSAW-VSA, ATSAW-
SURF and, also spacing and separation. The required ADS-B information elements to support 
ATSAW-AIRB are: 
 Aircraft 24 bit address; 
 Horizontal Position; 
 Vertical Position; 
 Horizontal Velocity; 
 Vertical Velocity; 
 Emergency/Priority Status; 
 Position Accuracy (NACP); and 
 System Design Assurance (SDA). 
 
The minimum required ADS-B performances for ATSAW-AIRB application are: 
 NACP = 5; 
 NACV = 1; and 
 SDA = 1. 
 
8.3.2 Air Traffic Situational Awareness In-Trail Procedure in oceanic airspace (ATSAW 
ITP) 
 
Currently, aircraft operating in procedural airspace (oceanic or remote) are constrained to fly at the 
same flight level, and thus do not necessarily fly at an optimum flight level. ATSAW-ITP using ADS-B 
is meant to enable altitude changes. The ITP is achieved with the combination of ATSAW and CPDLC. 
The ATSAW display allows the pilot to detect a climb/descend opportunity. The clearance exchange 
for the altitude change is then requested via CPDLC. The shared situational awareness between pilot 
and the ATC enabled by ADS-B will provide confidence to ATC to grant the clearance requested. This 
will also lead to reduced separation between aircraft in these airspaces. The current standard 
longitudinal separation requirement is 80NM (ICAO, 2007c), while with ATSAW- ITP, a reduced 
longitudinal separation of 15NM (Vidal, 2012) will be achieved. The vertical separation minimum is 
1000ft in a RVSM airspace (below FL290) and 2000ft in non RVSM airspace (above FL290). 
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Flight level changes can significantly improve flight efficiency by reducing fuel use. This is because 
there is no single flight level that provides an optimum cruising flight level over the substantial 
period of time that aircraft spend in procedural airspace. As the optimum flight level increases 
throughout the flight (as fuel is burned and aircraft weight is reduced), the aircraft would need to 
climb to maintain optimum cruise efficiency. Additionally, higher or lower flight levels may be more 
efficient because of more favorable winds (ICAO, 2012b). ATSAW-ITP is therefore, expected to 
contribute to a reduction in CO2 emissions (Vidal, 2012). These benefits were assessed by 
EUROCONTROL in the CRISTAL ITP project (Martensson and Rekkas, 2009). The study found that ITP 
is capable of approximately 1% fuel burn reduction resulting in a saving € 108 million (€ 124K per 
aircraft) annually and a reduction in CO2 emission of 344000 tonnes annually. 
 
In addition to capacity, efficiency and cost improvements, flight level changes can increase safety 
when turbulent conditions exist at the current flight level. A flight level change  for this reason would 
reduce the risk of injury to passengers and cabin crew, and increase passenger comfort (ICAO, 
2012b). 
 
8.3.2.1 Operational Environment  
 
The ATSAW-ITP, is designed for en-route non-surveillance environments in which the airspace 
system is composed of fixed routes, flexible tracks, and random routes, where separation is 
procedural and supported by periodic position reports via radio communication (EUROCAE and 
RTCA, 2008a). Random routes may cross each other at a variety of angles depending on city pairs 
served by the flights and on forecast winds. Random routes may also merge with each other. 
Random routes include user preferred routes (UPR) and the Dynamic Aircraft Route Planning (DARP) 
system used in the Pacific region. To date, ATSAW-ITP is only certified in the North Atlantic region. 
 
8.3.2.2 Requirements 
 
In order to enable the ATSAW-ITP application, the following criteria have to be met: 
 A maximum of two reference (target) aircraft; +/- 2000 feet from ITP aircraft altitude; 
 The reference aircraft can be any combination of ahead of or behind the ITP aircraft; 
 The ITP aircraft must be able to climb or descend at no less than 300 feet per minute; 
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 ITP may be initiated at distances between aircraft no closer than 15 NM and no more than 
20 knots of closure; 
 The closing Mach number difference must be less than or equal to a Mach Number of 0.06; 
 The ITP aircraft must maintain the Mach number in climb; 
 The reference aircraft must be level-flight and non-manoeuvring; 
 The ITP aircraft must have certified ITP equipment onboard as well as CPDLC; and 
 The reference aircraft must have a valid ADS-B Out signal. 
 
The required ADS-B information elements to support ATSAW-ITP are: 
 Aircraft 24 bit address; 
 Horizontal Position; 
 Vertical Position; 
 Horizontal Velocity; 
 Vertical Velocity; 
 Emergency/Priority Status; 
 Velocity Accuracy; 
 Source Integrity Level (SIL); 
 Navigation Integrity Category (NIC); 
 Position Accuracy (NACP); and 
 System Design Assurance (SDA). 
The minimum required ADS-B performances for the ATSAW-ITP application are: 
 NACP = 5; 
 NIC = 5; 
 NACV = 1;  
 SIL = 2; and 
 SDA = 2. 
 
8.3.3 Air Traffic Situational Awareness Visual Separation in Approach (ATSAW-VSA) 
 
Operations at some airports are based on pilots maintaining visual separation from the preceding 
aircraft to increase runway capacity. ATSAW-VSA is meant to support this type of operation. The 
objective of this application is to safely execute approach procedures using “own separation” from 
the preceding aircraft more efficiently and more regularly (CASCADE Operational Focus Group, 
2008). The procedure aids the pilot to acquire and maintain visual contact with the preceding 
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aircraft. More importantly it supports safe operations in extended meteorological conditions. The 
ATSAW-VSA improves efficiency by increasing the runway capacity, and also improves safety by 
providing enhanced situational awareness and enhanced identification of the target aircraft (Vidal, 
2010). The ATSAW-VSA paves the way for future spacing applications. 
 
8.3.3.1 Operational Environment 
 
The ATSAW-VSA application, defined in (EUROCAE and RTCA, 2008b), is designed to support aircraft 
performing approach and landing operations in VMC. It is applicable to all types of runway 
configuration: single runway, independent parallel runways, dependent parallel runways and 
closely-spaced parallel runways. It is also applicable to airspace of any traffic density (ICAO, 2012b). 
 
8.3.3.2 Requirements 
 
To enable the ATSAW-VSA, the aircraft has to be equipped with ADS-B In equipment, appropriate 
flight deck tools, and a traffic display tool (e.g. CDTI). Most importantly the application is only 
feasible with full mandate of ADS-Out, ensuring all the surrounding aircraft are equipped with ADS-B 
Out capability. Partial equipage of surrounding aircraft is not sufficient to use the ATSAW-VSA 
application. However, the use of ATSAW-VSA is not a substitute to visual information. Instead the 
pilot has to maintain visual contact with the preceding aircraft throughout the ATSAW-VSA. 
 
Apart from the above, there are no new requirements on ground systems when ATSAW-VSA is used. 
Therefore, from communication, navigation and surveillance perspectives, the application can be 
used in the same environments as existing operations.  
 
The required ADS-B information elements to support ATSAW-VSA are: 
 Aircraft 24 bit address; 
 Horizontal Position; 
 Vertical Position; 
 Horizontal Velocity; 
 Vertical Velocity; 
 Emergency/Priority Status; 
 Velocity Accuracy; 
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 Source Integrity Level (SIL); 
 Navigation Integrity Category (NIC) 
 Position Accuracy (NACP); and 
 System Design Assurance (SDA). 
 
The minimum required ADS-B performances for the ATSAW-VSA application are: 
 NACP = 6; 
 NIC = 6; 
 NACV = 1;  
 SIL = 1; and 
 SDA = 1. 
 
8.3.4 Air Traffic Situational Awareness on the Airport Surface (ATSAW-SURF) 
 
The ATSAW-SURF is intended to improve situational awareness of surrounding aircraft and ground 
vehicles operating in the vicinity of the aerodrome, when operating on the aerodrome surface 
during final approach, landing and take-off. This is achieved by providing the pilot with a display of 
the surrounding traffic position and identity, together with the “own aircraft” position overlaid on a 
map of the aerodrome. The enhanced situational awareness provided by the ATSAW-SURF 
application will improve the safety of aerodrome surface operations, in particular at taxiway and 
runway intersections, and for aircraft landing and taking off. A secondary outcome is to enhance taxi 
efficiency through improved traffic situational awareness during operations such as conditional taxi 
clearances, especially during low visibility conditions, night operations and at airports unfamiliar to 
flight crews. The application is also expected to decrease pilot and controller workload by reducing 
requests for repeat information with respect to surrounding traffic (ICAO, 2012b). 
 
8.3.4.1 Operational Environment 
 
The ATSAW-SURF application defined in (EUROCAE and RTCA, 2010b) is designed to be used by 
aircraft conducting operations on or near the aerodrome surface, at both controlled and 
uncontrolled airports. It may be introduced in a partial or mixed equipage environment in which 
some aircraft and ground vehicles are equipped only with ADS-B Out. It is also applicable to be used 
in all visibility conditions without modifying controller/pilot responsibilities and procedures 
compared to current operations. 
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8.3.4.2 Requirements 
 
To enable the ATSAW-SURF application, the aircraft has to be equipped with ADS-B In equipment, a 
traffic display tool and must have access to the airport map database. There are no further specific 
requirements for communication and surface ground surveillance capability when SURF is used. The 
ATSAW-SURF application does not modify current pilot and controller responsibilities or the use of 
visual information as the primary basis of airport surface operations. The pilot must continue to 
maintain visual contact with other traffic, and should not rely solely on the ATSAW-SURF. Surface 
navigation and own separation must still be based on visual information and radio communications 
(ICAO, 2012b). 
 
The required ADS-B information elements to support ATSAW-SURF are: 
 Aircraft 24 bit address; 
 Call sign; 
 Category; 
 Horizontal Position; 
 Surface Heading; 
 Ground Speed; 
 Capability Codes; 
 Operational Modes; 
 Velocity Accuracy (NACV) 
 Position Accuracy (NACP); and 
 System Design Assurance (SDA). 
 
The minimum required ADS-B performances for ATSAW-SURF application are: 
 NACP = 7 or 9; 
 NACV = 2; and 
 SDA = 1 or 2. 
  
8.3.5 Spacing / Interval Management (IM) 
 
The step following the introduction of ATSAW applications is the introduction of spacing applications 
(Vidal, 2012). This is also known as Interval Management (IM). According to the ICAO, IM provides 
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improved means for managing traffic flows and aircraft spacing. This includes both the use of ground 
and airborne tools as follows (ICAO, 2012b):  
 Ground tools that assist the controller in evaluating the traffic scenario and determining 
appropriate clearances to merge and space aircraft efficiently and safely, and allow the 
controller to issue an IM clearance; and  
 Airborne tools that allow the pilot to conform to the IM clearance. These airborne 
capabilities are referred to as the Flight-deck based Interval Management (FIM) capabilities. 
The requirements for the FIM are provided in Safety Performance and Interoperability 
Requirements for Flight Deck Interval Management (ASPA-FIM) (EUROCAE, 2011). 
 
Under the IM, the equipped aircraft is instructed to merge behind and maintain a given time spacing 
from another aircraft. Three types of manoeuvers are supported by the IM application: 
 Remain in trail; 
 Merge in trail; and  
 Radar vector then merge in trail. 
This is illustrated in Figure 8-5. Compared with current operations, the controller is relieved of the 
provision of speed and turn clearance to manage traffic by assigning an interval to the pilot. 
However, during the IM operations, the controller still retains responsibility for separation. 
 
 
Figure 8-5: Manoeuvres supported by the Interval Management application 
 
In terms of operational benefit, the IM application may enhance traffic regularity during the 
approach to dense airports to increase airport capacity. Apart from this, the ICAO has identified a 
number of potential benefits: 
 Early speed advisories removing requirements for subsequent path-lengthening;  
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 Consistent and low variance spacing between paired aircraft (e.g., at the entry to an 
arrival procedure and on final approach). More precise spacing can allow for higher 
throughput and more efficient aircraft operations;  
 Continuous Descent Operations (CDO) in higher density environments than in current 
operations;  
 Reduced ATC instructions due to the need to communicate fewer speed and vector 
instructions; and  
 When an Arrival MANager (AMAN) is used, the IM procedure will support more efficient 
aircraft operations for FIM-equipped aircraft.  
 
8.3.5.1 Operational Environment 
 
The IM application is used in a variety of environments and situations and during all phases of flight 
(i.e. departure, en-route and arrival phases). 
 
8.3.5.2 Requirements 
 
Technology requirements for the aircraft performing IM operation include: ADS-B IN capability, 
avionics components (FIM equipment /spacing functions with advisories) that provide IM capabilities 
(i.e. to provide IM speed and IM Turn), and a cockpit based CDTI. For the reference/target aircraft: 
ADS-B OUT capability and other requirements similar to ITP compliance. A direct communication link 
is also required between pilotS and controllers (e.g. radio communication or CPDLC). Ground 
automation to support the interval management application is also required. This will most likely be 
customised based on the set of interval management procedures allowed in a given terminal area. 
This may include the implementation of additional CPDLC messages. The AMAN tool is 
recommended for arrival operations (ICAO, 2012c). 
 
The IM application implementation will impact the ATC system in terms of additional ground 
systems and new procedures. According to Airbus, in Europe, these impacts are to be addressed in 
parallel by ANSPs within SESAR (Vidal, 2012). The ICAO adds that, controllers and pilots will be 
provided with new procedures and a new phraseology for IM operations, to be developed after the 
IM application is fully defined (ICAO, 2012b). 
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The required ADS-B information elements to support IM are: 
 Aircraft 24 bit address; 
 Horizontal Position; 
 Vertical Position; 
 Horizontal Velocity; 
 Vertical Velocity; 
 Emergency/Priority Status; 
 Position Accuracy (NACP); and 
 System Design Assurance (SDA). 
 Capability Codes 
 Operational Modes 
 Navigational Integrity Category (NIC) 
 Velocity Accuracy 
 Source Integrity Level (SIL) 
 
The minimum required ADS-B performances for the IM application are: 
 NACP = 6 (En-route) and 7 (TMA); 
 NIC = 5 (En-route) and 7 (TMA); 
 NACV = 1 (En-route) and 2 (TMA); 
 SIL = 2; and 
 SDA = 1 X 10-6 per flight hour. 
 
8.3.6 Separation 
 
The separation application in this section refers to Airborne SEParation (ASEP) and Airborne Self-
SEParation (SSEP). According to the ICAO (2012b), delegation of separation responsibility to flight 
crew is foreseen in the future. The pilot will be responsible to ensure separation from designated 
aircraft as communicated in the future clearance, thereby relieving the controller from the 
responsibility for separation between these aircraft. Typical airborne separation applications include 
(ICAO, 2012c): 
 interval management with delegation of separation: the flight crew maintains a time-based 
separation behind designated aircraft;  
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 lateral crossing and passing: the flight crew adjusts the lateral flight path to ensure that 
horizontal separation with designated aircraft is larger than the applicable airborne 
separation minimum;  
 vertical crossing: the flight crew adjusts the vertical flight path to ensure that vertical 
separation with designated aircraft is larger than the applicable airborne separation 
minimum;  
 paired approaches in which the flight crew maintains separation on final approach to parallel 
runways; and  
 in oceanic airspace, improved procedures of ITP using new airborne separation minima: 
ASEP-ITF In-trail follow; ASEP-ITP In-trail procedure; and ASEP-ITM In-trail merge. 
 
Airborne self-separation occurs when the pilot ensures separation of their aircraft from all 
surrounding traffic. Hence the controller has no responsibility for separation. Typical airborne self-
separation applications include (ICAO, 2012c): 
 airborne self-separation in ATC-controlled airspace;  
 airborne self-separation in segregated en-route airspace;  
 airborne self-separation in mixed-equipage en-route airspace; and  
 airborne self-separation –free flight on an oceanic track.  
 
An early implementation of the ASEP and SSEP applications is anticipated in oceanic and low density 
airspace. ASSTAR (2005-2007) initiated the work on ASEP and SSEP applications in Europe which has 
been supported by the following SESAR projects: 
  
 SESAR Project 04.07.04.b ASAS-ASEP Oceanic Applications.  
The airborne separation in-trail follow (ASEP-ITF) and in-trail merge (ASEP-ITM) applications 
have been designed for use in oceanic and other non-radar airspace.  
 
 SESAR Project 04.07.06 En Route Trajectory and Separation Management – ASAS Separation 
(Cooperative Separation).  
The main objective of this project is to assess the introduction of the ASAS separation 
application in the SESAR context (taking into account all platforms, including military and 
Unmanned Aerial System (UAS)).  
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The ASEP and SSEP applications will require airborne separation minima to be defined which in turn 
will require very high performance navigation and surveillance functions onboard. In addition, due to 
the impact of these applications on the controller and pilot responsibilities, provisions for these 
applications are expected to require modification of the ICAO annexes. Currently, no RTCA/EUROCAE 
documents exists to support these applications (ICAO, 2012b). They are still under research and 
development. 
 
All of the airborne surveillance applications discussed above rely on the capability of ADS-B Out to 
provide the required information elements.  
 
8.4 ADS-B Out Capabilities versus the Airborne Surveillance Applications Requirements 
 
There are currently three different versions of ADS-B Out and hence ADS-B avionics with different 
levels of performance: DO-260, DO-260A and DO-260B. The differences between the three versions 
are discussed in detail in Chapter 3 and summarised below: 
a) Version 0 (DO-260) provides a basic ADS-B capability, with position integrity provided by the 
NUC parameter.  This was the initial version of ADS-B and there are a variety of Version 0 
installations; typically only those ADS-B version 0 installations complying with EASA AMC 20-
24 are approved for use in ATC separation applications;  
 
b) Version 1 (DO-260A)  provides, amongst others, separate accuracy and integrity parameters 
which replace the NUC – NAC and NIC and SIL; also, a new message provides Target State and 
Status data; and 
 
c) Version 2 (DO-260B) provides, amongst others, a renaming and new definition for SIL; 
includes several new fields, such as the system design assurance (SDA) and Geometric 
Vertical Accuracy; removes vertical information from the NIC, NAC, and SIL parameters; 
provides improved support of surface operations through changes to the NIC encoding; 
supports non-diversity antenna options for smaller (general aviation) aircraft in addition to 
various other fixes/improvements as discussed in Chapter 3.  
 
The differences between the versions is in the amount of information (particularly the quality 
indicators for the aircraft state information) transmitted in the ADS-B messages. However, the 
performance of the aircraft state information is not affected by the different versions. The additional 
information in the last version increases the user’s confidence level on the aircraft state information 
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broadcast by the ADS-B system. To date, most of the aircraft flying are equipped with DO-260 
avionics on a voluntary basis. The aircraft analysed in this thesis are certified to DO-260 standards. 
This section analyses the credibility and level of ADS-B Out performance identified and analysed in 
Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 to support the ADS-B ground and airborne surveillance applications. Table 
8-1 presents the results of the mapping exercise between the specific information in the ADS-B 
message required for each of the applications and the availability of this information in real time.  
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Table 8-1: Required Information Elements to Support ADS-B Applications vs. Available Information in the ADS-B Message (certified with DO-260) 
   Required  Available  
 
 
 
 
Comments 
Information 
Element 
ATSAW-
AIRB 
ATSAW- 
VSA 
 
ATSAW- 
ITP 
Spacing Airborne 
Separation 
(ASEP) 
Self –
separation 
(SSEP) 
ATSAW-
SURF &ADS-
B APT 
ATS 
Surveillance 
  Identification 
Call Sign           
Address           
Category           
Mode A Code           
  State Vector 
Horizontal 
Position 
          
Vertical 
Position 
          
Horizontal 
Velocity 
        
 
Vertical 
Velocity 
          
Surface 
Heading 
 
      
 
Ground Speed           
  Mode Status 
Emergency/ 
Priority Status 
        
 
Capability 
Codes 
 
            
No Capability Codes available in the 
ADS-B message 
 
Operational 
Modes 
 
            
No Operational Modes available in 
the ADS-B message 
 
  State Vector Quality Indicator 
NIC 
             
NIC value is presented as NUC 
representing horizontal position 
accuracy and integrity in the ADS-B 
message  
NACP               No specific position accuracy 
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   Required  Available  
 
 
 
 
Comments 
Information 
Element 
ATSAW-
AIRB 
ATSAW- 
VSA 
 
ATSAW- 
ITP 
Spacing Airborne 
Separation 
(ASEP) 
Self –
separation 
(SSEP) 
ATSAW-
SURF &ADS-
B APT 
ATS 
Surveillance 
available in the ADS-B message 
NACV           
SIL 
              
No SIL information available in the 
ADS-B message 
SDA 
              
No SDA value available in the ADS-B 
message 
Air-Reference 
Vector 
 
            
No Air-Reference Vector available in 
the ADS-B message 
Intent Data  
            
No intent information available in 
the ADS-B message 
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The ADS-B data included in the mapping exercise in Table 8-1 are from aircraft with avionics certified 
to DO-260 standards and compliant with EASA AMC 20-24. Based on the mapping exercise, the 
required Identification Information and State Vector Information are available in the real time ADS-B 
message to support all the applications in Table 8-1. The only Mode Status Information available in 
the ADS-B message required to support the ATSAW-AIRB/VSA/ITP, Spacing and ATS Surveillance is 
the Emergency/Priority Status Information. Apart from the Velocity Accuracy (NACV), none of the 
State Vector Quality Indicator information required by the applications is available in the ADS-B 
message. However, the NUC information in the ADS-B message is a substitute for the NIC and NACP 
information, indicating the quality of the transmitted aircraft position information. The Air-
Reference Vector information required for the ASEP application is not available in the ADS-B 
message. Intent Data required for the ASEP and SSEP are also not available in the ADS-B message.  
 
Based on the assessment in Chapter 6, the ADS-B performance between aircraft is variable. 
Therefore, it is currently not possible to derive a representative ADS-B performance. Hence, in order 
to validate the ADS-B performance to support the airborne surveillance applications in this Chapter, 
the best and worst aircraft performances are mapped to the minimum required ADS-B performance 
to support these applications. The applications include ATSAW-AIRB, ATSAW-VSA, ATSAW-SURF, 
Oceanic-ITP, as well as Interval-Management/Spacing and Airborne Separation delegation (ASEP) for 
en-route/terminal phases of operation. Self-Separation (SSEP) is not included as the requirements 
for this application are not established yet. In fact, most of the applications envisioned to use the 
information provided by ADS-B are not established fully.  
 
The requirements for each of the airborne applications included in the mapping exercise in Table 8-4 
and Table 8-5 are obtained from Safety Performance and Interoperability Requirements for ATSAW 
during light operations (ATSAW-AIRB) (DO-319), Safety Performance and Interoperability 
Requirements for ATSAW Visual Separation in Approach (ATSAW VSA) (DO-314), Safety Performance 
and Interoperability Requirements for ATSAW on the Airport Surface (ATSAW SURF) (DO-322), Safety 
Performance and Interoperability Requirements for ATSAW In-Trail Procedure in oceanic airspace 
(ATSAW ITP) (DO-312), and Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards (MASPS) for Aircraft 
Surveillance Applications (ASA) (DO-289).    
 
 The required ADS-B position accuracy is represented by the NACP value, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
This value is translated as a 95% Horizontal Accuracy Bound or measured as a Horizontal Position 
Error (HPE). The required ADS-B integrity is indicated as the NIC value, representing an integrity 
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containment radius around an aircraft’s reported position. The required ADS-B velocity accuracy is 
presented as NACV. Onboard navigation sources such as GNSS provide a direct measure of velocity to 
the ADS-B system. The navigation data source 95% accuracy for the Horizontal (HFOMV) and Vertical 
Figures Of Merit Vertical (VFOMV) components are summarised in Table 8-2. 
 
Table 8-2: Position Velocity Accuracy (NACV) 
NACV HFOMV Value VFOMV Value 
0 HFOMV ≥ 10 m/s or VFOMV ≥ 15.2 m/s or unknown 
1 HFOMV < 10 m/s and VFOMV < 15.2 m/s 
2 HFOMV < 3m/s and VFOMV < 4.6 m/s 
3 HFOMV < 1m/s and VFOMV < 1.5 m/s 
4 HFOMV < 0.3 m/s and VFOMV < 0.46 m/s 
 
Another required ADS-B performance indicator is the System Design Assurance (SDA). The SDA 
defines the failure conditions that the position transmission chain is designed to support, as defined 
in Table 8-3. The supported failure conditions will indicate the probability of a fault in the position 
transmission chain which would cause false or misleading position information to be transmitted. 
 
Table 8-3: System Design Assurance (SDA) 
SDA Probability of Undetected Fault causing transmission of false or misleading information 
0 >1 x 10-3 per flight hour or unknown 
1 ≤1 x 10-3 per flight hour 
2 ≤1 x 10-5 per flight hour 
3 ≤1 x 10-7 per flight hour 
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Table 8-4: Minimum Required ADS-B Performance for Airborne Surveillance Application vs Actual ADS-B Performances (best performing aircraft) 
Performance Metric 
Required ADS-B Performance Measured ADS-B System Performance 
 (Best performing aircraft from Chapter 6 analysis) Situational Awareness Applications 
(ATSAW) 
IM/Spacing  
(EnRoute/Terminal) 
Airborne Separation (ASEP) 
(EnRoute/Terminal) 
AIRB VSA SURF ITP   
Accuracy (NACP) 5 6 7/9   
1
 5 6/7 9 26 meters 
Integrity (NIC) N/A  
2
 6 N/A 5 5/7 9 NUCP = 6.4 
Velocity Accuracy (NACV) 1 1 2 1 1 / 2 3 Unknown 
Source Integrity Level (SIL) N/A 1 N/A 2 2 2 Not Available 
System Design Assurance (SDA) 1 1 1/2    
3
 2 < 1x10
-6
 / flight hour TBD Not Available 
Update Rate (seconds) 3 N/A ≤ 2 ≤ 5 to ≤ 24 *
4
 TBD 2.3  
Latency (seconds) < 1.5 < 1.6 < 0.5 (onboard) ≤ 4.575 * TBD 0.6  
 
Table 8-5: Minimum Required ADS-B Performance for Airborne Surveillance Application vs Actual ADS-B Performances (worst performing aircraft) 
Performance Metric 
Required ADS-B Performance Measured ADS-B System Performance 
 (Worst performing aircraft from Chapter 6 analysis) Situational Awareness Applications 
(ATSAW) 
IM/Spacing  
(EnRoute/Terminal) 
Airborne Separation (ASEP) 
(EnRoute/Terminal) 
AIRB VSA SURF ITP   
Accuracy (NACP) 5 6 7/9   5 6/7 9 553 meters 
Integrity (NIC) N/A 6 N/A 5 5/7 9 NUCP = 5 
Velocity Accuracy (NACV) 1 1 2 1 1 / 2 3 0 
Source Integrity Level (SIL) N/A 1 N/A 2 2 2 Not Available 
System Design Assurance (SDA) 1 1 1/2    2 < 1x10
-6
 / flight hour TBD Not Available 
Update Rate (seconds) 3 N/A ≤ 2 ≤ 5 to ≤ 24 * TBD 1.4  
Latency (seconds) < 1.5 < 1.6 < 0.5 (onboard) ≤ 4.575 * TBD 1.9  
 
                                                   
1
 SURF surface targets require NACP >=9 
  SURF airborne targets require NACP = 7 or 9 depending on parallel runway spacing 
2
 N/A – Not Applicable 
3
 Hazard level for ownship when airborne or on surface >80 knots =Major (SDA=2)  
  Hazard level for ownship when airborne or on surface <80 knots =Minor (SDA=1) 
4
 Not available at the time of writing 
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Table 8-4 maps the performance of the best performing aircraft analysed in this thesis to the 
minimum required ADS-B performance for future applications. The best ADS-B position accuracy of 
26 metres, corresponding to NACP = 9, is better than the required accuracy performance for all 
airborne applications. The measured NUCP = 6.4 corresponds to a HPL < 0.2 NM. Based on the 
specifications, ADS-B position integrity is not required for the ATSAW-AIRB and ATSAW-SURF. The 
required position integrity for ATSAW-VSA is NIC = 6 (HPL < 0.5 NM), and Oceanic-ITP is NIC = 5 (HPL 
< 1.0 NM). The Interval-Management en-route also requires a NIC = 5 and Interval-Management 
TMA a NIC = 7 (HPL < 0.2 NM) and ASEP a NIC = 9 (HPL < 25 meters). Therefore the ADS-B system 
integrity is sufficient to support all of the applications except for the ASEP application. The required 
SIL and SDA parameters are not available from the aircraft certified with DO-260 avionics. The 
required NACV value is missing from the ADS-B message collected for the particular aircraft. This 
reduces the credibility of the ADS-B system in the particular aircraft to support the envisioned 
applications. The measured update rate = 2.3 seconds, is sufficient for all airborne applications 
except for the ATSAW-SURF. The latency performance of 0.6 seconds is better than the required 
latency for all of the airborne applications. The required latency for ATSAW-SURF is based on the 
onboard latency of < 500 milliseconds, while the measured latency of 0.6 seconds is based on the 
total latency. However, the onboard latency for the aircraft is assumed to be consistent with the 
established ADS-B RAD aircraft requirements of 200 milliseconds, and hence, sufficient for the 
ATSAW-SURF.   
 
Table 8-5 maps the performance of the worst performing aircraft analysed to the minimum required 
ADS-B performance for the airborne applications. 553 meters ADS-B position accuracy corresponds 
to a NACP = 6, which is only sufficient to support ATSAW-AIRB, ATSAW-VSA, Oceanic-ITP and Interval-
Management en-route. The ADS-B position integrity NUCP = 5 corresponds to HPL < 0.5 NM, which is 
equivalent to NIC = 6 and hence only sufficient to support the ATSAW-VSA, Oceanic-ITP and Interval-
Management en-route. ADS-B velocity accuracy NACV = 0 indicates that the system is unable to 
support the required velocity accuracy for any of the applications. The measured update rate = 1.4 
seconds, is sufficient for all airborne applications. The latency performance of 1.9 seconds is only 
sufficient to support ATSAW-ITP.   
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8.5 Summary 
 
From the mapping exercise conducted to validate the credibility of the ADS-B Out messages analysed 
in this thesis to support the ground and airborne surveillance applications, it is found that all of the 
applications require some of the Mode Status and State Vector Quality Indicator information, which 
are currently lacking in the ADS-B message. Hence, in order to support the relevant applications, 
aircraft must be certified to DO-260B standards. In addition, continuous ADS-B system monitoring is 
crucial to ensure safety. The analysis in Chapter 6 indicates that some of the certified aircraft have 
missing data elements, corresponding to a performance inferior to their level of certification. The 
mapping exercise performed to assess the capability of the ADS-B system (analysed in Chapter 6) 
indicates that ADS-B accuracy from the best performing aircraft is sufficient for all foreseen 
applications while the worst performing aircraft only supports ATSAW-AIRB, ATSAW-VSA, Oceanic-
ITP and Interval-Management en-route. ADS-B integrity from both aircraft is sufficient to support all 
applications except the most stringent application: ASEP. ADS-B velocity accuracy values from both 
aircraft are insufficient to support any application. ADS-B update rate from the best performing 
aircraft is sufficient for all applications except for the ATSAW-SURF, while the worst performing 
aircraft supports all applications. The best performing aircraft latency is sufficient for all applications 
while the worst performing aircraft latency is only sufficient for the ATSAW-ITP. In addition, the 
remaining required performance parameters SIL and SDA are unavailable from aircraft certified to 
DO-260 standards. Therefore, aircraft must be certified to DO-260B to support the applications with 
continuous monitoring to ensure the required system performance. 
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Chapter 9  
Conclusions, Recommendations and Future Works 
 
 
9.1 Conclusions 
 
The objectives of the thesis were to: 
 Identify the deficiencies of current surveillance systems in supporting increasing air travel 
demand;  
 Identify the capabilities of ADS-B to address the limitations of the current surveillance 
systems;  
 Develop a comprehensive, rigorous and reliable safety assessment framework for ADS-B; 
 Identify the failure modes of the ADS-B, establish a failure mode register and specify failure 
models;  
 Assess and quantify ADS-B performance in an operational environment; and 
 Derive a mapping between ADS-B performance measured and the required performance of 
the various applications to be supported by ADS-B. 
 
Based on the research undertaken and presented in this thesis, the following conclusions are drawn. 
 
 From an extensive literature review in Chapter 2, and safety data analysis and input from 
subject matter experts in Chapter 4, the limitations of the current surveillance systems are 
identified as important to increasing air traffic. 
o Lack of situational awareness for pilot and controllers 
o Limited surveillance coverage 
o Inaccurate aircraft positioning information 
o Low position update rate 
o Unsynchronized surveillance information between pilot and controllers 
o Unavailability of services in oceanic and remote areas 
o Limited services during extreme weather conditions 
o Limited availability of spare parts to support system operations 
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 A detailed review of ADS-B functionalities and capabilities in Chapter 3 and mapping exercise 
in Chapter 4, conclude that ADS-B has the potential to overcome all the limitations identified 
in the current surveillance systems. 
 
 The main contribution of this thesis is the development of a comprehensive framework for 
ADS-B safety assessment, in a systematic manner. The framework incorporates a novel 
approach to validate ADS-B data performance using onboard GPS positioning information as 
the reference system. This outperforms the existing ADS-B assessment methods which use 
radar as the reference system, which has a lower performance than the ADS-B system. The 
framework has been used to assess ADS-B performance in the dense airspace of LTMA, 
resulting in the quantification of the ADS-B system performance in terms of accuracy, 
integrity, continuity, availability, latency and reliability. 
 
 The basis for the performance evaluation includes novel methods for ADS-B data and 
reference data correlation, ADS-B horizontal position error measure (accuracy), latency 
measure and ADS-B integrity quality indicator validation. The performance evaluation has 
shown that there is inconsistency in ADS-B system performance of the same aircraft during 
two different flights. The ADS-B message update rate of all the aircraft to the ground 
stations neither has a constant value nor a deterministic pattern. Three of the aircraft data 
had 100% misdetection of the actual system performance. This is a safety threat to the 
system users and may lead to undesirable incidents.  
 
 The basis for ADS-B system reliability analysis is thorough and novel search of ADS-B failure 
modes. The notion of the failure modes has been explored and a register developed which 
incorporates the characteristics and impact of the failure in its operational environment. The 
hazards derived as a result of the failures were quantified. It concludes that probability of 
availability of ADS-B as sole surveillance system is lower (0.898) than the availability figures 
proposed by RTCA (2002) for ADS-B as primary (0.999) and ADS-B as supplemental (0.95). 
Throughout the process of the performance evaluation, anomalies were not only found in 
the ADS-B system itself but also in the onboard GPS system that feeds the aircraft position 
and state vector information to the ADS-B system.  
 
 The mapping exercise performed between ADS-B performance quantified and the required 
performance of airborne surveillance applications, indicates that ADS-B accuracy from the 
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best performing aircraft is sufficient for the all applications while the worst performing 
aircraft only supports ATSAW-AIRB, ATSAW-VSA, Oceanic-ITP and Interval-Management en-
route. ADS-B integrity from both aircraft is sufficient to support all applications except the 
most stringent application, ASEP. However, some of the required data elements such as SIL 
and SDA are not available in the DO-260 ADS-B messages. Therefore, it can be concluded 
that all aircraft must be certified to DO-260B to support the applications. In addition, 
continuous monitoring is vital to ensure consistency in system performance of each aircraft. 
 
9.2 Recommendations 
 
A number of recommendations are proposed based on the findings in this thesis to improve ADS-B 
system implementation: 
 
 ADS-B and radar are inherently different surveillance systems. Whilst radar is a surveillance 
system independent of aircraft equipage, ADS-B is not. Each aircraft may therefore, exhibit 
different performance due to the type of avionics or state of the communication link service. 
The main problem with the ADS-B communication link is signal jamming. For example, Mode 
S 1090 MHz Extended Squitter (1090ES) is utilized not only by ADS-B, but also by Secondary 
Surveillance Radar (SSR) and Traffic Collision Avoidance Systems (TCAS). In dense airspace 
this may affect ADS-B system reliability and availability, a problem that remains to be 
addressed.  
 
 ADS-B performance is impacted by system-wide, regional and local failures. For example, 
system-wide failure may be due to GNSS satellite outage or ADS-B ground station failure. 
Regional failures may be the result of space weather and local, may be the result of faulty 
avionics. A redundant navigation source with a flag, for example Inertial Navigation System 
(INS) integrated to the ADS-B system, may be a good idea to resolve the GNSS outage issue.  
 
 In order to evaluate the performance of the ground station, a ground station identifier 
should be included in the ADS-B message processed at the ground station.  
 
 The quality indicator validation mechanism developed in this thesis should be implemented 
at the ground station to validate the ADS-B position integrity, and hence ensure safety. Even 
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though the mechanism is tested on aircraft certified towards DO-260 standard in this thesis, 
the same method can be used for the DO-260B standard.  
 
 The onboard GPS time stamp should be included in the ADS-B message to extrapolate the 
ADS-B position to the time it was received at the ground station or other aircraft. This will 
eliminate the total latency.  
 
 Due to the inconsistency identified in the performance of the same aircraft in two different 
flights in the same airspace, it is recommended that the each aircraft performance is 
monitored on a periodic basis. 
 
 Apart from monitoring the onboard and ground ADS-B system performance, the 
performance of the onboard navigation system should be monitored and validated before 
being used as the aircraft state source for the ADS-B system. 
 
 Collaboration between the ANSP and airline operators is crucial to successfully monitor the 
ADS-B system performance as a whole. 
 
9.3 Future Work 
 
This thesis has contributed to the safety assessment of ADS-B system, ADS-B failure modes 
knowledge base, and validation of ADS-B capabilities to support future airborne surveillance 
applications. Within these applications, further studies are proposed below in order to ensure and 
enhance ADS-B system operational use in the current operational environment and future enhanced 
surveillance operations: 
 
 Assessment of ADS-B data from aircraft certified to the DO-260B standards using the Safety 
Assessment Framework developed in this thesis. This thesis has only used ADS-B data from 
aircraft certified to the DO-260 standards due to unavailability of the DO-260B data.   
 
 Development of data fusion algorithm to fuse ADS-B position with radar position and/or 
WAM position to support the transition period before full implementation of ADS-B in the 
future. 
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 Development of safety cases using the safety assessment framework for the following 
scenarios: 
o ADS-B fused with radar operating in LTMA 
o ADS-B fused with MLAT operating in LTMA 
o ADS-B fused with radar and MLAT operating in LTMA 
This thesis focused on ADS-B operating alone in LTMA. 
 
 Development of a method to verify the integrity of the vertical positions transmitted in the 
ADS-B message. The NICBARO indicator in DO-260B only indicates if the vertical position value 
is crosschecked with other sources of pressure altitude. Hence to date, there is no defensible 
method available for this purpose. This thesis only focused on the horizontal position. 
 
  Investigation of the validation of the NIC value in DO-260B ADS-B data using the algorithm 
developed in this thesis. This thesis applied the algorithm for validation of the NUC value 
from DO-260 ADS-B data. 
 
 Improvement of the ADS-B safety assessment framework developed  in this thesis by 
incorporating the advantages of Safety-II approach into the framework. 
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Appendix A 
 
Aircraft 
ID 
Aircraft 
Make-
model 
Flight Level 
Data 
Availability 
GPS 
Receiver 
ADS-B 
Transponder 
Findings Performance 
(accuracy, 
integrity, 
latency) Analysis 
40608F A318 
 
YES Thales 
TLS755 MMR 
Honeywell 
TRA-67A 
Duplicate ADS-B 
messages in the data 
set. 
GPS Clock error- no 
data on the 59
th
 
second in the time 
set. It appears as 00. 
Feasible after 
correcting the 
clock error and 
removing the 
duplicate 
messages. 
405A48 A320 
 
YES Thales 
TLS755 MMR 
Honeywell 
TRA-67A 
No peculiarities. Feasible 
400A26 A320 
 
YES Thales 
TLS755 MMR 
Honeywell 
TRA-67A 
Duplicate ADS-B 
messages in the data 
set. 
 
Feasible. 
40093D A319 
 
NO Thales 
TLS755 MMR 
Honeywell 
TRA-67A 
GPS Clock error- 
time ‘minute’ does 
not add after  the 
‘59th’ second. 
 
Not Feasible due 
to insufficient 
data. 
400877 A319 
 
YES Thales 
TLS755 MMR 
Honeywell 
TRA-67A 
GPS Clock error- 
time ‘minute’ does 
not add after  the 
‘59th’ second. 
Feasible after 
correcting the 
clock error. 
400878 A319 
 
YES Thales 
TLS755 MMR 
Honeywell 
TRA-67A 
Duplicate ADS-B 
messages in the data 
set. 
 
Feasible after 
filtering out 
duplicate 
messages. 
40087B A319 
 
YES Thales 
TLS755 MMR 
Honeywell 
TRA-67A 
Duplicate ADS-B 
messages in the data 
set. 
GPS Clock error- 
time ‘minute’ does 
not add after  the 
‘59
th
’ second. 
Feasible after 
correcting the 
clock error and 
removing the 
duplicate 
messages. 
4008B4 A319 
 
YES Thales 
TLS755 MMR 
Honeywell 
TRA-67A 
GPS Clock error – 
time list does not 
include second ‘00’. 
Duplicate time 
values. 
Feasible after 
correcting the 
clock error. 
4008F2 A319 
 
NO Thales 
TLS755 MMR 
Honeywell 
TRA-67A 
Duplicate ADS-B 
messages in the data 
set. 
 
Feasible after 
removing the 
duplicate 
messages. 
400935 A319 
 
YES Thales 
TLS755 MMR 
Honeywell 
TRA-67A 
No peculiarities. Feasible 
All 6 
 
B747-
400 
 Rockwell 
Collins 
GLU920 
MMR 
ACSS XS-950 GPS horizontal 
position given every 
4 seconds. 
Not Feasible due 
to unreliable GPS 
data to generate 
TRUE 
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All 4 
 
B767-
300 
 Honeywell 
Mercury 
Card 
equipped 
EGPWC MkV 
ACSS XS-950 GPS latitude and 
longitude values are 
given individually at 
different time 
update-every 2 
seconds. Data is 
assumed to be 
corrupted. 
Not Feasible due 
to unreliable GPS 
data to generate 
TRUE 
4005C1 B777-
200 
 
NO Honeywell 
GNSSU 
Honeywell 
TRA-67A 
GPS data and ADS-B 
data time interval 
does not correlate 
Not Feasible due 
to uncorrelated 
timing 
information 
4005BC B777-
200 
 
YES Honeywell 
GNSSU 
Honeywell 
TRA-67A 
GPS latitude and 
longitude position 
jumping. 
 
Not Feasible due 
to unreliable GPS 
data to generate 
TRUE 
4005BE B777-
200 
 
YES Honeywell 
GNSSU 
Honeywell 
TRA-67A 
GPS latitude and 
longitude position 
jumping. 
 
Not Feasible due 
to unreliable GPS 
data to generate 
TRUE 
400610 B777-
200 
 
YES Honeywell 
GNSSU 
Honeywell 
TRA-67A 
GPS latitude and 
longitude position 
jumping. 
 
Not Feasible due 
to unreliable GPS 
data to generate 
TRUE 
4006C2 B777-
200 
 
YES Rockwell 
Collins 
GLU920 
MMR 
Honeywell 
TRA-67A 
GPS latitude and 
longitude position 
jumping. 
 
Not Feasible due 
to unreliable GPS 
data to generate 
TRUE 
4007F7 B777-
200 
 
YES Rockwell 
Collins 
GLU920 
MMR 
Honeywell 
TRA-67A 
GPS latitude and 
longitude position 
jumping. 
Not Feasible due 
to unreliable GPS 
data to generate 
TRUE 
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Latency performance across flight altitude 
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Appendix C  
 
 
Aircraft avionics information and descriptive statistic of ADS-B message update rate 
 
Aircraft 
ID 
Aircraft make-model GPS receiver model Transponder 
model 
N Mean Std. 
Dev 
Min Max 
A319 
40087C A319 Thales TLS755 MMR Honeywell 
TRA 
1355 1.65 1.70 0.40 37.11 
400936 A319 Thales TLS755 MMR Honeywell 
TRA 
3197 1.10 3.09 0.40 173.84 
4008AD A319 Thales TLS755 MMR Honeywell 
TRA 
3097 1.11 0.77 0.40 23.98 
400940 A319 Thales TLS755 MMR Honeywell 
TRA 
2666 1.04 0.35 0.40 4.96 
4008B4 A319 Thales TLS755 MMR Honeywell 
TRA 
1606 1.13 0.80 0.40 15.64 
400802 A319 Thales TLS755 MMR Honeywell 
TRA 
3126 1.10 0.60 0.40 12.07 
4008B5 A319 Thales TLS755 MMR Honeywell 
TRA 
1263 1.53 0.96 0.40 7.80 
400942 A319 Thales TLS755 MMR Honeywell 
TRA 
3033 1.14 0.85 0.40 18.18 
A320 
406250 A320 Thales TLS755 MMR Honeywell 
TRA 
1210 1.62 1.39 0.41 27.09 
40097D A320 Thales TLS755 MMR Honeywell 
TRA 
1076 1.72 1.38 0.41 17.49 
4009DA A320 Thales TLS755 MMR Honeywell 
TRA 
2755 1.09 0.51 0.40 9.92 
4009C7 A320 Thales TLS755 MMR Honeywell 
TRA 
1394 1.72 2.00 0.40 39.81 
405EE0 A320 Thales TLS755 MMR Honeywell 
TRA 
1475 1.64 1.19 0.40 12.80 
400CEB A321 Thales TLS755 MMR Honeywell 
TRA 
2159 1.28 0.81 0.40 15.52 
4010DB A321 Thales TLS755 MMR Honeywell 
TRA 
2244 1.56 1.08 1.56 14.34 
B744 
40054D B744 Rockwell Collins GLU920 MMR ACSS XS 1071 1.93 5.84 0.40 169.84 
40040D B744 Rockwell Collins GLU920 MMR ACSS XS 1017 1.57 1.14 0.40 12.43 
4005E3 B744 Rockwell Collins GLU920 MMR ACSS XS 2587 1.10 0.64 0.40 18.89 
4006AD B744 Rockwell Collins GLU920 MMR ACSS XS 1287 1.53 4.75 0.40 163.41 
4005E2 B744 Rockwell Collins GLU920 MMR ACSS XS 1730 1.50 1.25 0.40 28.32 
4006B3 B744 Rockwell Collins GLU920 MMR ACSS XS 1066 1.29 0.94 0.40 10.36 
4006AB B744 Rockwell Collins GLU920 MMR ACSS XS 1308 1.28 0.96 0.40 17.27 
4006B0 B744 Rockwell Collins GLU920 MMR ACSS XS 2026 1.58 2.51 0.41 104.38 
B777-200 
4007F0 B777-200 Rockwell Collins GLU920 MMR Honeywell 
TRA 
2421 1.45 0.99 0.40 14.74 
4005BB B777-200 Honeywell GNSSU Honeywell 
TRA 
2371 1.52 1.21 0.40 25.99 
400771 B777-200 Rockwell Collins GLU920 MMR Honeywell 
TRA 
1140 1.82 2.23 0.40 41.91 
4007F3 B777-200 Rockwell Collins GLU920 MMR Honeywell 
TRA 
1603 1.22 2.65 0.40 98.40 
400774 B777-200 Rockwell Collins GLU920 MMR Honeywell 1728 1.17 0.87 0.40 19.77 
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Aircraft 
ID 
Aircraft make-model GPS receiver model Transponder 
model 
N Mean Std. 
Dev 
Min Max 
TRA 
400683 B777-200 Rockwell Collins GLU920 MMR Honeywell 
TRA 
2747 1.14 2.46 0.40 127.05 
4007F9 B777-200 Rockwell Collins GLU920 MMR Honeywell 
TRA 
2316 1.60 1.19 0.40 26.51 
4005BE B777-200 Honeywell GNSSU Honeywell 
TRA 
1257 1.59 2.08 0.40 47.11 
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 Appendix D  
 
 
Update rate vs. Flight time 
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Appendix E 
 
 
Spearman’s Rho test for Update rate (seconds) vs. Flight level (feet)  
 
Aircraft Sample size Correlation test results 
Correlation coefficient, r Significance, p Finding 
40054D 1071 0.274 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
4005BE 1257 0.197 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
400CEB 2159 0.038 0.077 Correlation is not significant  
406250 1210 0.151 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
40087C 1355 0.206 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
4010DB 2244 0.165 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
40040D 1017 0.202 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
4007F0 2421 0.115 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
4005BB 2371 0.070 0.001 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
400771 1140 0.193 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
40097D 1076 0.064 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
400936 3197 0.076 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
4008AD 3097 0.110 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
400940 2666 0.060 0.002 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
4007F3 1603 0.153 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
400774 1728 0.202 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
4008B4 1606 0.144 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
4005E3 2587 0.122 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
400683 2747 0.145 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
4009DA 2755 0.127 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
4006AD 1287 0.334 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
400802 3126 0.099 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
4008B5 1263 0.143 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
4009C7 1394 0.144 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
405EE0 1475 0.279 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
4005E2 1730 0.207 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
4007F9 2316 0.146 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
4006B3 1066 0.379 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
4006AB 1308 0.331 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
400942 3033 0.199 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
4006B0 2026 0.114 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
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Spearman’s Rho test for Update rate vs. Range 
Aircraft Sample size Correlation test results 
Correlation coefficient, r Significance, p Finding 
40054D 1071 0.280 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
4005BE 1257 0.222 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
400CEB 2159 0.056 0.009 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
406250 1210 0.154 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
40087C 1355 0.191 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
4010DB 2244 0.146 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
40040D 1017 0.197 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
4007F0 2421 0.093 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
4005BB 2371 0.103 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
400771 1140 0.212 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
40097D 1076 0.157 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
400936 3197 0.082 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
4008AD 3097 0.116 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
400940 2666 0.076 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
4007F3 1603 0.159 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
400774 1728 0.204 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
4008B4 1606 0.143 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
4005E3 2587 0.131 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
400683 2747 0.150 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
4009DA 2755 0.136 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
4006AD 1287 0.337 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
400802 3126 0.116 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
4008B5 1263 0.155 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
4009C7 1394 0.295 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
405EE0 1475 0.279 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
4005E2 1730 0.281 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
4007F9 2316 0.257 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
4006B3 1066 0.444 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
4006AB 1308 0.403 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
400942 3033 0.388 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
4006B0 2026 0.156 0.000 Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 
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Aircraft 
ID 
Aircraft 
Make-
model 
GPS Receiver ADS-B 
Emitter 
Findings 
40087C A319 Thales TLS755 
MMR 
Honeywell 
TRA 
GPS Clock error –after the 59
th
 second, the minute 
does not increase by 1,e.g. after 10:48:59 the time 
was 10:48:00, it did not change to 10:49:00.   400936 A319 Thales TLS755 
MMR 
Honeywell 
TRA 
4008AD A319 Thales TLS755 
MMR 
Honeywell 
TRA 
400940 A319 Thales TLS755 
MMR 
Honeywell 
TRA 
4008B4 A319 Thales TLS755 
MMR 
Honeywell 
TRA 
400802 A319 Thales TLS755 
MMR 
Honeywell 
TRA 
4008B5 A319 Thales TLS755 
MMR 
Honeywell 
TRA 
400942 A319 Thales TLS755 
MMR 
Honeywell 
TRA 
406250 A320 Thales TLS755 
MMR 
Honeywell 
TRA 
40097D A320 Thales TLS755 
MMR 
Honeywell 
TRA 
4009DA A320 Thales TLS755 
MMR 
Honeywell 
TRA 
4009C7 A320 Thales TLS755 
MMR 
Honeywell 
TRA 
405EE0 A320 Thales TLS755 
MMR 
Honeywell 
TRA 
400CEB A321 Thales TLS755 
MMR 
Honeywell 
TRA 
4010DB A321 Thales TLS755 
MMR 
Honeywell 
TRA 
40054D B744 Rockwell Collins 
GLU920 MMR 
ACSS XS Aircraft latitude and longitude given every 4 
seconds. Duplicate time and missing time without 
any pattern found in the clock information. 40040D B744 Rockwell Collins 
GLU920 MMR 
ACSS XS 
4005E3 B744 Rockwell Collins 
GLU920 MMR 
ACSS XS 
4006AD B744 Rockwell Collins 
GLU920 MMR 
ACSS XS 
4005E2 B744 Rockwell Collins 
GLU920 MMR 
ACSS XS 
4006B3 B744 Rockwell Collins 
GLU920 MMR 
ACSS XS 
4006AB B744 Rockwell Collins 
GLU920 MMR 
ACSS XS 
4006B0 B744 Rockwell Collins 
GLU920 MMR 
ACSS XS 
4007F0 B777-200 Rockwell Collins Honeywell Missing time 10:44:26 and 11:27:46 in the GPS data. 
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Aircraft 
ID 
Aircraft 
Make-
model 
GPS Receiver ADS-B 
Emitter 
Findings 
GLU920 MMR TRA 
400771 B777-200 Rockwell Collins 
GLU920 MMR 
Honeywell 
TRA 
No GPS data obtained for this aircraft from British 
Airways. 
4005BE B777-200 Honeywell 
GNSSU 
Honeywell 
TRA 
4005BB B777-200 Honeywell 
GNSSU 
Honeywell 
TRA 
Duplicate and missing time information without any 
deterministic pattern found in the GPS data. 
4007F3 B777-200 Rockwell Collins 
GLU920 MMR 
Honeywell 
TRA 
400774 B777-200 Rockwell Collins 
GLU920 MMR 
Honeywell 
TRA 
400683 B777-200 Rockwell Collins 
GLU920 MMR 
Honeywell 
TRA 
4007F9 B777-200 Rockwell Collins 
GLU920 MMR 
Honeywell 
TRA 
 
 
